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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Often, road construction causes the need to create a work zone. In these scenarios, 
portable concrete barriers (PCBs) are typically installed to shield workers and equipment from 
errant vehicles as well as prevent motorists from striking other roadside hazards. For an existing 
W-beam guardrail system installed adjacent to the roadway and near the work zone, guardrail 
sections are removed in order to place the portable concrete barrier system. The focus of this 
research study was to develop a proper stiffness transition between W-beam guardrail and 
portable concrete barrier systems. The research objectives were to determine performance and 
design constraints and to develop a stiffness transition between PCBs and W-beam guardrail that 
will significantly improve safety for the motoring public and workers within construction zones. 
The stiffness transition was designed and simulated according to the AASHTO MASH Test 
Level 3 (TL-3) impact safety standards. This research effort was accomplished through 
development and refinement of design concepts using computer simulation with LS-DYNA. 
The research methodology began with a literature review performed on PCB and 
transition designs. Next, performance and design criteria were developed to allow the researchers 
to evaluate design concepts. Design concepts for guardrail-to-PCB transitions were developed, 
discussed, and prioritized. A computer simulation effort was undertaken to analyze, refine, and 
evaluate the design concepts under TL-3 impact scenarios. Finally, conclusions pertaining to the 
potential success of each proposed design were made, and recommendations for full-scale crash 
testing were provided. 
Two preferred design concepts with a total of fourteen different transition configurations 
were evaluated using LS-DYNA computer simulation to determine the optimal transition design 
for evaluation through full-scale testing. These design variations included overlapping and 
offsetting of the PCB segments relative to the guardrail, attachment of the guardrail to the 
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PCB’s, use of kicker beam to initiate motion of the PCBs, and use of thrie beam in lieu of W-
beam guardrail. Each design configuration was simulated at a variety of impact points and 
compared based on specific safety performance criteria for the transition, including vehicle snag, 
barrier pocketing, vehicle stability, and occupant risk criteria. Following the analysis, the design 
configurations were ranked based on their potential safety performance and presented to the 
Technical Advisory Committee (TAC). The TAC selected a preferred design configuration that 
used Midwest Guardrail System (MGS) guardrail with nested W-beam for the transition. 
After selection of the preferred design, the researchers used simulation analysis to 
determine Critical Impact Points (CIPs) for full-scale testing, evaluate additional impacts along 
the transition, and analyze impacts on the transition from opposing traffic. This information was 
combined with the previous analysis to develop the final transition design and recommendations 
for full-scale testing and evaluation of the transition. 
Based on this research, the nested-MGS configuration was recommended for evaluation 
using a full-scale crash testing program. The nested-MGS configuration connected the barrier 
systems with the W-beam end-shoe attached to the upstream end of the fourth PCB segment with 
a minimum of three PCB segments extending behind the nested MGS. A minimum of five 12-ft 
6-in. long, W-beam sections should be nested upstream from the end-shoe. For testing purposes, 
the transition should consist of at least a twenty-five post MGS system and an eleven segment 
PCB system at a 15H:1V flare. The critical impact point should occur at the centerline of the 
fifth guardrail post upstream from the end-shoe attachment for test designation no. 3-21. The 
reverse-direction test scenario should use an impact location 12 ft – 6 in. longitudinally upstream 
from the end-shoe attachment for test designation no. 3-21.  
A simulation effort involving impacts with the 1100C small car was not conducted. The 
2270P test vehicle was deemed more critical than the 1100C small car for the concept 
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development phase, due to the likelihood of increased barrier deflections, rail and anchor loads, 
rail pocketing, and wheel snag. Therefore, test designation no. 3-20 for the full-scale crash 
testing program should use MASH procedures for determining a critical impact point. 
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 INTRODUCTION 1
1.1 Problem Statement 
In practice, portable concrete barriers (PCBs) must be connected and transitioned to 
many types of barriers. Sometimes these portable concrete barriers are connected to similarly-
shaped permanent concrete barriers. At other times, portable concrete barriers must be connected 
to dissimilar barriers, such as vertical concrete barriers, tubular steel bridge railings, W-beam 
guardrail, thrie beam guardrail, and open concrete bridge railings. Unfortunately, very little 
research has been devoted to this transition need. The only previously-developed PCB transitions 
have involved attachment to permanent, safety-shape concrete roadside barriers and permanent 
concrete median barriers [1-4].  
Previously, researchers at the Midwest Roadside Safety Facility (MwRSF) conducted a 
survey of the members participating in the Midwest States Regional Pooled Fund program in 
order to identify the most prominent transition needs involving portable concrete barriers. The 
results, as shown in Table 1, identified a transition between portable concrete barriers and W-
beam guardrail as the second highest need. As noted above, a transition from portable concrete 
barriers to permanent concrete safety-shape barriers has been previously developed. Thus, the 
focus of this research study was to investigate stiffness transitions between portable concrete 
barriers and W-beam guardrail. 
A transition between portable concrete barriers and W-beam guardrail is necessary when 
roadway construction creates a work zone in an area with existing W-beam guardrail. In this 
situation, a portion of the W-beam guardrail is often removed, and portable concrete barriers 
would be installed to create a work zone. The area where these two barriers meet can create a 
potential hazard, especially if a proper transition is not installed, as shown in Figure 1. 
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Table 1. Summary of State DOT Survey for Portable Concrete Barrier Transitions [2] 
 
Note: States completing the survey were asked to: 
(1) Identify how useful the development of the listed transition would be to your state by circling a number from 1 to 5. 
(2) Include the approximate percentage of portable concrete barrier transitions which are comprised of the listed transitions. 
(3) Rank the transition types in order of their benefit to your state with 1 being the most beneficial. 
(4) Include pictures, details, and drawings concerning portable concrete barrier transitions, including all those listed above. 
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Figure 1. Unsafe Connection between Guardrail and Portable Concrete Barriers 
Some of the primary concerns associated with a transition between W-beam guardrail and 
portable concrete barriers correspond to the difference in barrier deflections and functionality of 
two barrier types. A strong-post, W-beam guardrail system is a semi-rigid installation with 
typical permanent set deflections ranging between 36 in. (914 mm) and 48 in. (1,219 mm) for 
high-speed impacts with passenger vehicles. However, a PCB system is often placed as a 
temporary installation to create and protect work zones, which may have a permanent set 
deflection as high as 80 in. (2,032 mm) under similar impact scenarios. This drastic difference in 
barrier deflection could lead to unwanted vehicle snag, pocketing, vehicle instability, or occupant 
risk. Therefore, researchers determined that a proper transition in lateral barrier stiffness and 
strength was necessary between the two systems. Unfortunately, a crashworthy stiffness 
transition is currently unavailable. 
1.2 Research Objectives 
The research objectives were to (1) determine performance and design criteria and (2) 
develop a stiffness transition between portable concrete barriers and W-beam guardrail that will 
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significantly improve safety for the motoring public and workers within construction zones. The 
transition system was designed to meet the Test Level 3 (TL-3) safety performance criteria set 
forth in the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) 
Manual for Assessing Safety Hardware (MASH) [5]. 
1.3 Scope 
The research objectives were achieved through the completion of several tasks. First, a 
literature review was performed on previous testing of free-standing PCB systems, pinned and 
anchored portable concrete barriers, W-beam guardrail, transitions between different barrier 
types, and various barrier-stiffening techniques. Next, performance and design criteria were 
developed that would allow the researchers to determine the likelihood of success for each 
design concept. Then, several design concepts for guardrail-to-PCB transitions were developed, 
discussed, and prioritized. A computer simulation effort was undertaken to analyze, refine, and 
evaluate several of the design concepts using LS-DYNA, a 3-D nonlinear finite element code [6]. 
Since ease of installation was a desired trait of the transition system, the simplest design concepts 
were simulated first. Based on the simulation results, complexity was later added on an 
incremental basis in order to meet the performance and design criteria. For each selected 
transition design concept, an FEA model was configured. Subsequently, an LS-DYNA analysis 
and design effort was conducted in order to evaluate the transition concepts under MASH TL-3 
impact scenarios, modify the configurations, and determine the Critical Impact Points (CIPs) for 
the transition. Finally, conclusions pertaining to the potential success of each proposed design 
were made, and recommendations for full-scale crash testing were provided. 
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 LITERATURE REVIEW 2
2.1 Introduction 
Before transition design concepts were formulated and simulated, a literature search was 
conducted in order to review (1) prior guardrail-to-PCB and PCB-to-permanent barrier transition 
configurations, (2) barrier deflections, and (3) other barrier stiffening techniques. A brief 
summary for the relevant research studies are provided below and include test descriptions, test 
conditions, and dynamic and permanent set deflections for actual and simulated tests. These 
results aided in the formulation of design concepts for the transition between W-beam guardrail 
and portable concrete barriers. Please note that the purpose of this literature review was to 
identify similar research and gain knowledge of barrier deflections and transition-stiffening 
techniques. However, a historical summary for all barrier transitions is not included herein. 
2.2 Crash Testing and Simulation Studies on Free-Standing PCBs 
2.2.1 National Crash Analysis Center Finite Element Study 
In 2007, the National Crash Analysis Center (NCAC) conducted an extensive LS-DYNA 
computer simulation study to evaluate the performance of portable concrete barriers, including 
different combinations of PCB shapes, lengths, and connection types [7]. As illustrated by the 
simulation matrix in Figure 2, 160 different combinations were examined under the National 
Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP) Report No. 350 safety guidelines for Test 
Level 3 (TL-3). This investigation required that each simulation be set up for an impact with a 
4,409-lb (2,000-kg) pickup truck at an angle of 25 degrees and an impact velocity of 62.1 mph 
(100 km/h). For this effort, full-scale crash test results and findings from previous studies were 
used to develop and validate the computer models. Each PCB system was evaluated for occupant 
ridedown acceleration, occupant impact velocity, barrier displacement, and rotation angle. Full 
results of the study can be found in the charts located in Appendix A. 
June 26, 2014  
MwRSF Report No. TRP-03-300-14 
6 
  
 
Figure 2. Simulation Matrix for NCAC Study [7] 
2.2.2 Development of MwRSF F-Shape PCB 
In 1996, researchers at the Midwest Roadside Safety Facility (MwRSF) developed an F-
shape PCB for the Midwest States Regional Pooled Fund program [8]. Prior to this effort, PCB 
configurations varied significantly from state to state. As such, contractors that worked in 
multiple states were required to either maintain inventories of several PCB configurations or 
seek approval to use alternate designs on a project-by-project basis. Therefore, a need existed to 
develop, test, and evaluate one standardized PCB design that met the TL-3 impact safety 
standards provided in NCHRP Report No. 350. The F-shape PCB was chosen, as shown in 
Figure 3, and two full-scale crash tests were conducted and are discussed below. 
 
June 26, 2014  
MwRSF Report No. TRP-03-300-14 
7 
  
Figure 3. Initial Prototype for F-Shape PCB Segment (ITMP-1) [8] 
The initial system consisted of sixteen 12-ft 6-in. (3,810-mm) long, F-shape PCB 
segments for a total system length of 203 ft – 3¾ in. (62.0 m). The PCB system was free-
standing on a concrete surface and utilized a pin-and-loop barrier-to-barrier connection. 
Duringtest no. ITMP-1, a 4,409-lb (2,000-kg) pickup truck impacted the PCB system at a speed 
of 64.1 mph (103.2 km/h), and at an angle of 27.6 degrees using a point 3 ft – 9¼ in. (1,149 mm) 
upstream from the joint between barrier nos. 8 and 9. Upon impact, the vehicle climbed and 
overrode the system, and the test was deemed unsuccessful. 
Upon inspection of the damaged barrier system, it was discovered that considerable 
damage occurred at the barrier joints. It was determined that this damage was likely caused by 
the weakened recessed areas located at the top end of each barrier segment. The recessed areas 
were incorporated for future use in implementing a rigid joint for permanent barrier installations. 
In order to reduce joint rotations and prevent barrier uplift, it was necessary to strengthen the 
barrier ends by eliminating the recessed areas. This retrofit was completed in a three-step 
process, as shown in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Retrofit to F-Shape PCB Sections [8] 
The second system consisted of twenty-one 12-ft 6-in. (3,810-mm) long, F-shape PCB 
segments for a total system length of 267 ft – 5½ in. (81.5 m). The PCB system was free-
standing on a concrete surface and utilized a pin-and-loop barrier-to-barrier connection. 
Duringtest no. ITMP-2, a 4,420-lb (2,005-kg) pickup truck impacted the PCB system at a speed 
of 62.3 mph (100.3 km/h), and at an angle of 27.1 degrees using a point 3 ft – 11¼ in. (1,200 
mm) upstream from the joint between barrier nos. 8 and 9. The system contained and redirected 
the vehicle with maximum lateral dynamic and permanent set deflections of 3 ft – 9¼ in. (1,149 
mm) and 3 ft – 8⅞ in. (1,140 mm), respectively, and was determined to be successful according 
to TL-3 of NCHRP Report No. 350.  
2.2.3 F-Shape PCB Evaluation under Update to NCHRP Report No. 350 
With the vehicle fleet constantly changing and growing, standards for testing and 
evaluating roadside safety hardware must also change. Thus, NCHRP Report No. 350 was being 
updated to include heavier vehicles with higher centers of gravity. In 2006, MwRSF researchers 
conducted another crash test under the impact conditions outlined in the Update to NCHRP 
Report No. 350 (i.e., future MASH) on the F-shape PCB system that had been previously tested 
[9].  
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The system consisted of sixteen 12-ft 6-in. (3,810-mm) long, F-shape PCB segments for a 
total system length of 204 ft – 6 in. (62.3 m). The PCB system was free-standing on a concrete 
surface and utilized a pin-and-loop barrier-to-barrier connection. During test no. 2214TB-2, a 
5,000-lb (2,268-kg) pickup truck impacted the system 48 in. (1,219 mm) upstream from the joint 
between barrier nos. 8 and 9 at a speed of 61.9 mph (99.6 km/h), and at an angle of 25.4 degrees. 
The system contained and redirected the vehicle with maximum lateral dynamic and permanent 
set deflections of 6 ft – 7⅝ in. (2,022 mm) and 6 ft – 1 in. (1,854 mm), respectively, and was 
found to be successful according to the TL-3 criteria published in the Update to NCHRP Report 
No. 350. 
2.3 Testing of Pinned and Anchored PCBs 
2.3.1  Limited-Slip PCB Connection 
In 1993, researchers at TTI conducted a study into limited-displacement PCB systems 
immediately adjacent to vertical drop-offs for the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) 
[10]. There are circumstances that require PCB systems to be positioned immediately adjacent to 
vertical drop-offs in temporary work zones. During these cases, there is insufficient lateral space 
for displacement of free-standing PCB systems during crash events. Two different barrier-to-
barrier connection types were used in this study, and test results from free-standing and anchored 
configurations were compared. The two different barrier-to-barrier connection types included a 
channel/angle-splice connection and a grid-slot connection. Five full-scale tests were conducted 
using 30-ft (9.1-m) long, New Jersey safety-shape PCB segments, and are discussed below.  
The first system consisted of four 30-ft (9.1-m) long segments for a total system length of 
120 ft (36.6 m), which were placed immediately adjacent to a vertical drop-off. The PCB system 
was pinned to the concrete surface through the front toe of each PCB with four evenly-spaced 
1¼-in. (32-mm) diameter x 20½-in. (521-mm) long, steel pins at an angle of 53.1 degrees from 
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the horizontal plane, as shown in Figure 5. The PCB system utilized a channel/angle-splice 
barrier-to-barrier connection. During test no. 1959A-1, a 4,410-lb (2,000-kg) pickup truck 
impacted the system 5 ft (1,524 mm) upstream from the joint between barrier nos. 2 and 3 at a 
speed of 60.3 mph (97.0 km/h), and at an angle of 25.7 degrees. The vehicle rolled upon exiting 
the PCB system, and the test was determined to be unsuccessful according to TL-3 of NCHRP 
Report No. 350. Researchers analyzed the test and determined that a longer PCB system would 
likely have contained the vehicle.  
 
Figure 5. Limited-Slip Pin Placement Angle [10] 
The second system consisted of nine 30-ft (9.1-m) long segments for a total system 
length of 270 ft (82.3 m), which were placed immediately adjacent to a vertical drop-off. The 
PCB system was free-standing on a concrete surface and utilized a channel/angle-splice barrier-
to-barrier connection. During test no. 1959A-2, a 4,409-lb (2,000-kg) pickup truck impacted the 
system 5 ft (1,524 mm) upstream from the end of barrier no. 4 at a speed of 61.9 mph (99.6 
km/h), and at an angle of 26.1 degrees. All of the PCB segments downstream from the impact 
location were displaced off the vertical drop-off. Consequently, test no. 1959A-2 was considered 
unsuccessful according to TL-3 of NCHRP Report No. 350. 
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The third system consisted of nine 30-ft (9.1-m) long segments for a total system length 
of 270 ft (82.3 m), which were placed immediately adjacent to a vertical drop-off. The PCB 
system was pinned to the concrete surface through the front toe of each PCB with four evenly- 
spaced 1¼-in. (32-mm) diameter x 20½-in. (521-mm) long, steel pins at an angle of 40.1 degrees 
from the horizontal plane. The PCB system utilized a channel/angle-splice barrier-to-barrier 
connection. During test no. 1959A-3, a 4,409-lb (2,000-kg) pickup truck impacted the system 5 
ft (1,524 mm) upstream from the end of barrier no. 4 at a speed of 60.6 mph (97.5 km/h), and at 
an angle of 26.2 degrees. The system contained and redirected the vehicle with a maximum 
lateral permanent set deflection of 5 in. (127 mm) and was considered successful according to 
TL-3 of NCHRP Report No. 350. 
The fourth system consisted of nine 30-ft (9.1-m) long segments for a total system length 
of 270 ft (82.3 m), which were placed immediately adjacent to a vertical drop-off. The PCB 
system was pinned to the concrete surface through the front toe of each PCB with four, evenly-
spaced, 1¼-in. (32-mm) diameter x 20½-in. (521-mm) long, steel pins at an angle of 40.1 
degrees from the horizontal plane. The PCB system utilized a grid-slot barrier-to-barrier 
connection. During test no. 1959A-4, a 4,409-lb (2,000-kg) pickup truck impacted the system 5 
ft (1,524 mm) upstream from the end of barrier no. 2 at a speed of 60.9 mph (98.0 km/h), and at 
an angle of 23.7 degrees. The vehicle came to a rest on top of the PCB system with a maximum 
lateral permanent set barrier deflection of 9 in. (229 mm) and was considered successful 
according to TL-3 of NCHRP Report No. 350. 
The fifth system consisted of nine 30-ft (9.1-m) long segments for a total system length 
of 270 ft (82.3 m), which were placed immediately adjacent to a vertical drop-off. The PCB 
system was free-standing on a concrete surface and utilized a grid-slot connection. During test 
no. 1959A-5, a 4,409-lb (2,000-kg) pickup truck impacted the system 4 ft – 6 in. (1,372 mm) 
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upstream from the end of barrier no. 2 at a speed of 44.6 mph (71.8 km/h), and at an angle of 
25.0 degrees. Two PCB segments were displaced off the vertical drop-off, and the vehicle rolled 
upon exiting the PCB system. The test was considered unsuccessful for installation in a low-
speed work zone according to TL-2 of NCHRP Report No. 350. 
2.3.2 K-Rail Used in Semi-Permanent Installations 
In 1999, researchers at the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) conducted 
compliance testing of the California K-Rail (New Jersey safety-shape) PCB in semi-permanent 
applications [11]. The California K-Rail had previously been tested in free-standing applications 
according to NCHRP Report No. 350, but in the interest of limiting deflections of the PCB 
system, a semi-permanent installation was developed. In compliance with NCHRP Report No. 
350, two full-scale crash tests were conducted on the semi-permanent application.  
Both systems consisted of eight 20-ft (6,096-mm) long segments for a total system length 
of 160 ft (48.8 m). The PCB systems were pinned in all four corners to an asphalt concrete 
surface. The pins were 1-in. (25-mm) diameter x 24-in. (610-mm) long, steel stakes. The PCB 
system utilized a pin-and-loop barrier-to-barrier connection. During test no. 551, a 4,445-lb 
(2,016-kg) pickup truck impacted the system at the joint between barrier nos. 4 and 5 at a speed 
of 62.5 mph (100.6 km/h), and at an angle of 25.0 degrees. The system contained and redirected 
the vehicle with a maximum lateral permanent set deflection of 2¾ in. (70 mm) and was 
considered successful according to TL-3 of NCHRP Report No. 350. During test no. 552, a 
1,861-lb (844-kg) small car impacted the system at the joint between barrier nos. 4 and 5 at a 
speed of 63.2 mph (101.7 km/h), and at an angle of 20.0 degrees. The system contained and 
redirected the vehicle with a maximum lateral permanent set deflection of 1 in. (25 mm) and was 
considered successful according to TL-3 of NCHRP Report No. 350. Due to a misinterpretation 
of the original drawings, the pins were cut to a length of 24 in. (610 mm) instead of the intended 
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39.4 in. (1001 mm). So, after evaluation of both tests, the California K-Rail was recommended 
for use with four 1-in. (25-mm) diameter x 39.4-in. (1001-mm) long, steel stakes in each corner 
of the PCBs, as shown in Figure 6.  
  
Figure 6. California K-Rail Steel Stake Setup [11] 
2.3.3 Development of a Tie-Down System for F-Shape PCBs 
In 2002, MwRSF researchers developed a tie-down system for PCBs [12]. During bridge 
construction, PCBs are often placed adjacent to the edge of a bridge deck. However, free-
standing PCB systems near vertical drop-offs are at risk of being displaced off of the bridge deck 
when impacted by an errant vehicle. In order to decrease this risk, researchers developed a steel 
tie-down strap that could be placed on the connection pin at the PCB joints and anchored to the 
bridge deck using drop-in anchors. Following a series of LS-DYNA computer simulations, as 
well as component testing of the steel tie-down strap, researchers pursued full-scale crash testing 
with the design shown in Figure 7. The design consisted of a 3-in. (76-mm) wide x ¼-in. (6-mm) 
thick x 36-in. (914-mm) long piece of ASTM A36 steel bent into a trapezoidal shape. The straps 
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were attached to the bridge deck using two Red Head ¾-in. (19-mm) diameter, drop-in anchors 
and ¾-in. (19-mm) diameter x 2¼-in. (57-mm) long, ISO Class 8.8 bolts. 
  
Figure 7. Steel Tie-Down Strap [12] 
The test installation consisted of sixteen 12-ft 6-in. (3,810-mm) long, F-shape PCB 
segments placed 12 in. (305 mm) away from a simulated bridge deck edge. The tie-down straps 
were installed at eleven joints, beginning at barrier no. 2 and ending at barrier no. 13. During test 
no. ITD-1, a 4,435-lb (2,012-kg) pickup truck impacted the system 3 ft – 11¼ in. (1,200 mm) 
upstream from the joint between barrier nos. 8 and 9 at a speed of 60.6 mph (97.5 km/h), and at 
an angle of 24.3 degrees. The PCB system contained and redirected the vehicle with maximum 
lateral dynamic and permanent set barrier deflections of 3 ft – 1¾ in. (959 mm) and 2 ft – 9½ in. 
(851 mm), respectively. The tie-down straps were designed to support the dead weight of three 
PCB segments. In test no. ITD-1, only one PCB segment was displaced completely off the bridge 
deck with two PCB segments partially displaced off the bridge deck. Thus, the results from test 
no. ITD-1 were successful according to TL-3 of NCHRP Report No. 350. 
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2.3.4  Development of Tie-Down System for Redesigned F-Shape PCB 
In 2003, MwRSF researchers developed a tie-down system for redesigned F-shape PCBs 
that incorporated a bolt-through detail [13]. The redesigned F-shape PCBs incorporated a three-
loop connection that provided double shear at two locations on each pin. The bolt-through, tie-
down system consisted of three 1⅛-in. (29-mm) diameter, ASTM A307 anchor bolts with heavy 
hex nuts and 3-in. (76-mm) x 3-in. (76-mm) x ½-in. (13-mm) thick washers spaced evenly across 
the traffic side of each PCB segment, as shown in Figure 8. Each anchor bolt was epoxied into 
the concrete with an embedment depth of 12 in. (305 mm).  
The test installation consisted of sixteen 12-ft 6-in. (3,810-mm) long, redesigned F-shape 
PCB segments placed adjacent to a simulated bridge deck edge with a total system length of 204 
ft (62.2 m). During test no. KTB-1, a 4,448-lb (2,018-kg) pickup truck impacted the system 5 ft – 
5 in. (1,651 mm) upstream from the joint between barrier nos. 8 and 9 at a speed of 62.0 mph 
(99.8 km/h), and at an angle of 25.3 degrees. The system contained and redirected the vehicle 
with maximum lateral dynamic and permanent set deflections of 11.3 in. (287 mm) and 3½ in. 
(89 mm), respectively, and was considered successful according to TL-3 of NCHRP Report No. 
350. 
June 26, 2014  
MwRSF Report No. TRP-03-300-14 
16 
  
Figure 8. Tie-Down System for Redesigned F-Shape PCB [13] 
2.3.5  Tie-Down and Transition for PCBs on Asphalt Road Surfaces 
In 2006, MwRSF researchers developed a tie-down system for PCBs on an asphalt road 
surface [1]. Previous tie-down systems had been developed, but only tested on concrete surfaces 
and thus were not appropriate for use on asphalt road surfaces. The tie-down system consisted of 
F-shape PCB segments placed on a 2-in. (51-mm) thick, asphalt pad with three 1½-in. (38-mm) 
diameter x 36-in. (914-mm) long, A36 steel pins installed through the holes on the traffic-side 
toe of the PCB segments. 
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Figure 9. Asphalt Pin Assembly [1] 
The test installation consisted of sixteen 12-ft 6-in. (3,810-mm) long, F-shape PCB 
segments placed 6 in. (152 mm) from a 3-ft (914-mm) wide x 3-ft (914-mm) deep trench. The 
tie-down pins were installed on the middle ten PCB segments. During test no. FTB-1, a 4,434-lb 
(2,011-kg) pickup truck impacted the system 4 ft (1,219 mm) upstream from the joint between 
barrier nos. 8 and 9 at a speed of 61.3 mph (98.7 km/h), and at an angle of 25.4 degrees. The tie-
down PCB system contained and redirected the vehicle with maximum lateral dynamic and 
permanent set barrier deflections of 21.8 in. (554 mm) and 11⅛ in. (283 mm), respectively. A 
portion of the soil and asphalt fractured and separated away from the road surface beneath the 
PCB system due to loading of the tie-down pins. The separated area was approximately 23 ft – 6 
in. (7.2-m) long and had an average separation of 7 in. (178 mm). However, this separation did 
not adversely affect the performance of the system, and researchers determined that test no. FTB-
1 was successful according to TL-3 of NCHRP Report No. 350. 
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A second aspect of the research pertained to a transition between barrier systems. When a 
free-standing PCB system is connected to a rigid barrier, a transition between the two barrier 
systems may be required.  The final transition utilized a varied spacing of the same asphalt tie-
down pins from FTB-1 over a series of four PCB segments to create a transition in stiffness, as 
shown in Figure 10.  The first barrier in the transition had a single pin in the downstream end. 
The second barrier had pins installed at the two outside hole locations. The final two barriers had 
all three pins installed. In addition, either 10-gauge (3.42-mm) or nested 12-gauge (2.66-mm) 
thrie beam was bolted across both sides of the joint between the pinned barriers and the rigid 
barrier system in order to reduce the potential for vehicle snag at the joint. 
 
 
Figure 10. PCB Transition from Free-Standing to Rigid [1] 
The test installation consisted of twenty-two 12-ft 6-in. (3,810-mm) long, F-shape PCB 
segments: five rigidly constrained barriers, four transition barriers, and thirteen free-standing 
barriers. All four transition barriers and twelve of the free-standing barriers were installed on a 2-
in. (51-mm) thick, asphalt pad, while the five rigidly-constrained barriers and one free-standing 
barrier were installed on a concrete surface. During test no. FTB-2, a 4,475-lb (2,030-kg) pickup 
truck impacted the system 4 ft (1,219 mm) upstream from the joint between barrier nos. 8 and 9 
at a speed of 63.8 mph (102.7 km/h), and at an angle of 26.1 degrees. The tie-down PCB 
transition system contained and redirected the vehicle with maximum lateral dynamic and 
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permanent set barrier deflections of 18⅜ in. (467 mm) and 5¼ in. (133 mm), respectively, and 
was determined to be successful according to TL-3 of NCHRP Report No. 350. 
2.3.6 PCB Transition to Tall Permanent Concrete Median Barrier 
In 2010, MwRSF researchers developed a transition between a free-standing PCB system 
and a permanent concrete barrier for median applications [2]. The permanent concrete barrier 
chosen for testing was the 42-in. (1,067-mm) tall, single-slope median barrier, while the PCB 
was a 32-in. (813-mm) tall, F-shape barrier. The system consisted of eight free-standing barriers, 
four transition barriers, and a rigid parapet. The free-standing and transition barriers were 
installed on a 3-in. (76-mm) thick, asphalt pad. The transition barriers used a varied spacing of 
asphalt pins to create a transition in stiffness over four barriers. The asphalt pins used were 1½-
in. (38-mm) diameter x 38½-in. (978-mm) long, ASTM A36 steel pins with a steel cap plate on 
the top. The first barrier in the transition (adjacent to the free-standing barrier) had a single pin at 
the downstream end through both the front- and back-side toes. The second barrier had pins 
installed at the two outermost hole locations on both the front- and back-side toes. The third and 
fourth transition barriers had all three pins installed on both the front- and back-side toes. In 
order to prevent vehicle snag, nested 12-gauge (2.66-mm) thrie beam sections were installed on 
both the front and back sides of the joint between the pinned barriers and the rigid parapet, as 
shown in Figure 8. 
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Figure 11. Transition from PCB to Permanent Concrete Barrier [2] 
Using finite element modeling, two critical impact locations were identified for full-scale 
crash testing. Thus, two full-scale crash tests were conducted on the system described above. 
During test no. TCBT-1, a 5,175-lb (2,347-kg) pickup truck impacted the transition barrier 56⅜ 
in. (1,432 mm) away from the upstream end of the permanent concrete barrier at a speed of 62.5 
mph (100.6 km/h), and at an angle of 24.7 degrees. The system safely contained and redirected 
the vehicle with maximum lateral dynamic and permanent set barrier deflections of 2⅝ in. (67 
mm) and ¼ in. (6 mm), respectively, and consequently was deemed successful according to TL-3 
of MASH. During test no. TCBT-2, a 5,160-lb (2,341-kg) pickup truck impacted the system 3 ft 
– 5¼ in. (1,048 mm) upstream from the end of barrier no. 5 at a speed of 62.2 mph (100.1 km/h), 
and at an angle of 26.2 degrees. The system safely contained and redirected the vehicle with 
maximum lateral dynamic and permanent set barrier deflections of 34 in. (864 mm) and 34 in. 
(864 mm), respectively, and consequently was deemed successful according to TL-3 of MASH. 
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2.3.7 Evaluation of 12-ft 6-in. Pinned F-Shape PCB 
In 2006, TTI researchers evaluated mechanisms for limiting deflections of 12-ft 6-in. 
(3,810-mm) long, F-shape PCB systems installed near extreme drop-offs [14]. From the 
currently available PCB-restraining or -anchoring mechanisms, most designs required through-
deck bolting, anchor bolts with adhesive bonding, or other constraining straps. The goal of this 
research was to develop an easy-to-install restraining mechanism to limit PCB deflections while 
minimizing the damage to the bridge deck. The design incorporated two 1½-in. (38-mm) 
diameter × 21¼-in. (540-mm) long, ASTM A36 steel drop-pins placed into 1⅞-in. (48-mm) 
diameter holes cast into the toe of each PCB segment at an angle of 40 degrees from the 
horizontal. The embedment depth of the drop-pins was 6¼ in. (159 mm), when measured 
vertically. Each of the holes for the drop-pins was located 16 in. (406 mm) away from the ends 
of the barrier segments on the traffic-side of the PCBs. 
The test installation consisted of eight 12-ft 6-in. (3,810-mm) long, pinned F-shape PCB 
segments placed adjacent to a simulated bridge deck edge with a total system length of 100 ft 
(30.5 m). During test no. 405160-3-2a, a 4,674-lb (2,120-kg) pickup truck impacted the system 4 
ft (1,219 mm) upstream from the joint between barrier nos. 3 and 4 at a speed of 62.7 mph (100.9 
km/h), and at an angle of 25.4 degrees. The tie-down PCB transition system contained and 
redirected the vehicle with maximum lateral dynamic and permanent set barrier deflections of 
11½ in. (292 mm) and 5¾ in. (146 mm), respectively, and was determined to be successful 
according to TL-3 of NCHRP Report No. 350. 
2.3.8  Pinned Anchorage System for New York State’s PCBs 
In 2009, MwRSF researchers evaluated mechanisms for limiting deflections of New York 
State’s New Jersey safety-shape PCB system [15]. For PCBs located adjacent to vertical drop-
offs, NYSDOT found it desirable to utilize vertical pins through the back-side toe of the PCBs in 
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order to reduce barrier deflections as well as to reduce the need for workers to be positioned on 
the traffic-side face of the system when installing anchors. In an attempt to reduce construction 
costs and damage to bridge decks, vertical pins were placed in every other PCB segment in order 
to evaluate whether the barrier deflections would be maintained to reasonable levels. Four 1-in. 
(25-mm) diameter x 15½-in. (394-mm) long, hot rolled ASTM A36 steel rods were used to pin 
the PCB segments to the concrete surface through the back-side toe. Each anchor rod was 
inserted into a 1⅛-in. (29-mm) diameter, drilled hole in the rigid concrete surface using an 
embedment depth of 5 in. (127 mm), as shown in Figure 12. 
The full-scale crash test consisted of ten 20-ft (6,096-mm) long, New Jersey safety-shape 
PCB segments with a total system length of 200 ft (61.0 m). The PCB system utilized an I-beam 
key connector barrier-to-barrier connection and only PCB segment nos. 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 were 
pinned to the concrete surface. During test no. NYTCB-4, a 5,172-lb (2,346-kg) pickup truck 
impacted the system 51
3
/16 in. (1,300 mm) upstream from the joint between barrier nos. 4 and 5 
at a speed of 62.3 mph (100.3 km/h), and at an angle of 24.3 degrees. The pinned PCB system 
contained and redirected the vehicle with maximum lateral dynamic and permanent set barrier 
deflections of 64.8 in. (1,646 mm) and 53½ in. (1,359 mm), respectively, and was determined to 
be successful according to TL-3 of MASH. 
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Figure 12. NYSDOT Pinned PCB Setup [15] 
2.3.9 Pinned Anchorage System for New York State’s PCBs – Phase II 
Previous research was conducted to reduce deflections of New York State’s New Jersey 
safety-shape PCB system by anchoring alternating PCB segments to the concrete surface with 
vertical steel pins placed through the back-side toe [15]. However, significant barrier deflections 
were observed during the full-scale crash test, which may need to be reduced for work zones 
with restricted space. In 2010, MwRSF researchers conducted further research on New York 
State’s New Jersey safety-shape PCB system with every PCB segment anchored to the concrete 
surface [16]. Four 1-in. (25-mm) diameter x 15½-in. (394-mm) long, hot rolled ASTM A36 steel 
rods were used to pin the PCB segments to the concrete surface through the back-side toe. Each 
anchor rod was inserted into a 1⅛-in. (29-mm) diameter, drilled hole in the rigid concrete surface 
to an embedment depth of 5 in. (127 mm), as shown in Figure 13. 
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Figure 13. NYSDOT Pinned PCB, Phase II Setup [16] 
The test installation consisted of ten 20-ft (6,096-mm) long, New Jersey safety-shape 
PCB segments with a total system length of 200 ft (61.0 m). The PCB system utilized an I-beam 
key connector barrier-to-barrier connection, and the system was placed 12 in. (305 mm) laterally 
from the edge of a simulated bridge deck. During test no. NYTCB-5, a 5,124-lb (2,324-kg) 
pickup truck impacted the system 4 ft - 3
3
/16 in. (1,300 mm) upstream from the joint between 
barrier nos. 4 and 5 at a speed of 64.3 mph (103.5 km/h), and at an angle of 26.2 degrees. The 
pinned PCB system contained and redirected the vehicle with maximum lateral dynamic and 
permanent set barrier deflections of 20½ in. (521 mm) and 9 in. (229 mm), respectively, and was 
determined to be successful according to the TL-3 of MASH. 
2.3.10 Termination and Anchorage of PCBs 
In 2009, MwRSF researchers investigated termination and end anchorages for PCB 
systems [17]. The impact behavior of PCBs, when struck near the upstream end of the system, 
had never been investigated. In order to determine impact loads for future analysis and design of 
June 26, 2014  
MwRSF Report No. TRP-03-300-14 
25 
the termination anchor system, computer simulations were conducted using the non-linear finite 
element code, LS-DYNA.  
Upon determination of the design loads, several concepts were explored, and a driven-
steel anchor post concept was chosen for full-scale testing. The PCB segment farthest upstream 
was installed with 36 in. (914 mm) of its downstream end placed on a concrete surface and the 
remainder of the PCB segment resting on soil. This end barrier was anchored by two cable 
assemblies that connected the end connector pin to two driven-steel anchor posts. Each of the 
two anchor posts utilized an 8-ft (2,438-mm) long, W6x25 (W152x37.2) steel section with a 24-
in. (610-mm) x 24-in. (610-mm) x ½-in. (13-mm) thick soil plate welded to the front flange and 
a ½-in. (13-mm) thick plate welded to the top of the post. The anchor posts were installed in soil 
with an embedment depth of 8 ft (2,438 mm). One post was located along the longitudinal axis 
of the system, 45⅜ in. (1,153 mm) upstream from the first barrier. The second post was located 
29⅜ in. (746 mm) upstream from the first barrier and offset 11½ in. (292 mm) laterally from the 
traffic-side face of the barrier.  
Cable brackets were bolted to the top of the anchor posts, which were assembled from 
multiple ½-in. (13-mm) thick, A36 steel plates welded together. The cable assemblies were 
comprised of a ¾-in. (19-mm) diameter, 7x19 wire rope, BCT cable end fittings, a Crosby 
heavy-duty HT thimble, and a 115-HT mechanical splice. One 54¾ in. (1,391 mm) long cable 
assembly was aligned with the longitudinal axis of the barrier system. This cable assembly was 
attached with one end fixed between the lower barrier loops on an additional connection pin on 
the upstream end of the barrier, and the other end attached to the anchor post. The end connector 
pin utilized a second 2½-in. (64-mm) wide x 4-in. (102-mm) long x ½-in. (13-mm) thick, ASTM 
A36 steel plate and a ½-in. (13-mm) diameter x 10-in. (254-mm) long, Grade 8 hex bolt and nut 
at the bottom of the pin to prevent it from pulling out of the barrier loops when loaded. The 
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second cable assembly measured 48⅜ in. (1,229-mm) long, and it was attached from just below 
the top barrier loop on the connector pin on the end of the barrier to the offset anchor post. A pin 
sleeve, made from 1½-in. (38-mm), Schedule 40 pipe, was used to keep the anchor cables in the 
correct vertical positions. The as-tested PCB end anchorage is shown in Figure 14. 
The test installation consisted of twelve 12-ft 6-in. (3,810-mm) long, F-shape PCB 
segments that utilized the end anchorage design above for a total system length of 156 ft – 6 in. 
(47.7 m). The PCB system utilized a pin-and-loop barrier-to-barrier connection. During test no. 
TTCB-1, a 4,991-lb (2,264-kg) pickup truck impacted the system 9 ft - ⅝ in. (2,759 mm) 
downstream from the upstream end of barrier no. 1 at a speed of 62.9 mph (101.2 km/h), and at 
an angle of 25.5 degrees. The maximum dynamic anchor deflections were 5.3 in. (135 mm) for 
the offset anchorage and 6.2 in. (157 mm) for the in-line anchorage, measured from string 
potentiometers mounted on the anchors. The PCB end anchorage system contained and 
redirected the vehicle with a maximum lateral permanent set barrier deflection of 66½ in. (1,689 
mm), and was determined to be successful according to the TL-3 of MASH. 
  
Figure 14. PCB End Anchorage [17] 
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2.4 Testing of W-Beam Guardrail Systems 
2.4.1  Guardrail Deflection Analysis – Phase I 
In 2011, TTI researchers reviewed literature on previous full-scale crash tests of beam 
guardrails tested in accordance with the criteria set forth in National Cooperative Highway 
Research Program (NCHRP) Report No. 350 and Manual for Assessing Safety Hardware 
(MASH) test no. 3-11 [18]. The guardrail systems were divided into one of five categories: 
single 12-gauge (2.66-mm) W-beam rail, thrie beam rail, nested W-beam rail, 13-gauge (2.28-
mm) Buffalo W-beam rail, and W-beam rail designed for special applications. The single 12-
gauge (2.66-mm) W-beam rail category was of particular interest for this research, and the TTI 
findings can be found in Appendix B. A performance summary of the 27¾-in. (705-mm) and 31-
in. (787-mm) tall guardrail systems can be found in Tables 2 and 3, respectively. Based on this 
information, an average dynamic deflection of 39.7 in. (1,008 mm) and 41.4 in. (1,052 mm) was 
calculated for the 27¾-in. (705-mm) and 31-in. (787-mm) tall guardrail systems, respectively. 
An average permanent set deflection of 24.3 in. (617 mm) and 28.4 in. (721 mm) was also 
calculated for the 27¾-in. (705-mm) and 31-in. (787-mm) tall guardrail systems, respectively. 
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Table 2. System Performance of 27¾-in. (705-mm) Tall Guardrail Systems  
Test Agency Test Name Test Designation 
Permanent Set 
Deflection, in. 
(mm) 
Dynamic 
Deflection, in. 
(mm) 
System Configuration 
TTI 405421-1 NCHRP 350 3-11 
27.6 
(701) 
39.4 
(1,001) 
Modified W-beam, strong post G4(1S) guardrail 
TTI 405391-1 NCHRP 350 3-11 
31.1 
(790) 
43.3 
(1,100) 
Round wood post G4(2W) guardrail 
TTI 400001-MPT-1 NCHRP 350 3-11 
28.3 
(719) 
44.5 
(1,130) 
Modified G4(1S) with recycled blockouts 
TTI 439637-1 NCHRP 350 3-11 
17.7 
(450) 
29.5 
(749) 
Modified G4(1S) 
TTI 400001-APL-1 NCHRP 350 3-11 
31.3 
(795) 
53.6 
(1,361) 
Modified G4(2W) with Amitty plastic's recycled posts 
TTI 404201-1 NCHRP 350 3-11 
33.9 
(861) 
40.6 
(1,031) 
G4(2W) with 100-mm asphaltic curb 
TTI 400001-CFI1 NCHRP 350 3-11 
12.8 
(325) 
31.9 
(810) 
G4 with HALCO X-48 steel posts and recycled plastic 
blockouts 
TTI 400001-ILP2 NCHRP 350 3-11 
13.4 
(340) 
31.1 
(790) 
G4(2W) guardrail with imperial 5-Lam posts and blockouts 
E-TECH Inc. 41-1655-001 NCHRP 350 3-11 
27.6 
(701) 
51.2 
(1,300) 
G4 guardrail with lightweight HALCO X-40 steel posts and 
recycled plastic blockouts 
TTI 400001-MON1 NCHRP 350 3-11 
10.4 
(264) 
33.0 
(838) 
Modified G4(1S) with Mondo Polymer blockouts 
MwRSF PR-1 NCHRP 350 3-11 N/A 
38.2 
(970) 
Strong W-beam guardrail with posts installed in rock 
SwRI N/A_1 NCHRP 350 3-11 N/A 
40.6 
(1,031) 
O-Post as an alternative to a standard W6x8.5 steel post for use 
for W-beam guardrail 
SwRI N/A_2 NCHRP 350 3-11 N/A 
43.7 
(1,110) 
O-Post impacting at the open side 
E-TECH Inc. 41-1792-001 NCHRP 350 3-11 
23.6 
(599) 
27.6 
(701) 
G4 guardrail with lightweight, strong HALCO X-44 steel posts 
and recycled plastic blockouts 
MwRSF 2214WB-2 MASH 3-11 
33.3 
(846) 
47.1 
(1,196) 
Modified G4(1S) guardrail 
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Table 3. System Performance of 31-in. (787-mm) Tall Guardrail Systems 
Test Agency Test Name Test Designation 
Permanent Set 
Deflection, in. 
(mm) 
Dynamic 
Deflection, in. 
(mm) 
System Configuration 
MwRSF NPG-4 NCHRP 350 3-11 
25.7 
(653) 
43.1 
(1,095) 
Modified Midwest Guardrail System 
MwRSF NPG-5 NCHRP 350 3-11 
24.1 
(612) 
40.3 
(1,024) 
MGS with 6-in. tall concrete curb 
MwRSF NPG-6 NCHRP 350 3-11 
12.0 
(305) 
17.6 
(447) 
MGS with reduced post spacing 
MwRSF 2214MG-1 MASH 3-11 
42.9 
(1,090) 
57.0 
(1,448) 
Midwest Guardrail System 
MwRSF 2214MG-2 MASH 3-11 
31.6 
(803) 
43.9 
(1,115) 
MGS with reduced post spacing 
TTI 220570-2 MASH 3-11 
28.7 
(729) 
40.9 
(1,039) 
W-beam guardrail on SYLP 
SwRI GMS-1 MASH 3-11 
22.0 
(559) 
35.0 
(889) 
Modified G4(1S) longitudinal barrier with GMS fastener 
MwRSF MGSDF-1 NCHRP 350 3-11 
35.5 
(902) 
60.2 
(1,529) 
MGS with Douglas Fir wood posts 
MwRSF MGSPP-1 NCHRP 350 3-11 
27.8 
(706) 
37.6 
(955) 
MGS with round Ponderosa Pine posts 
TTI 400001-TGS1 MASH 3-11 
31.0 
(787) 
38.4 
(975) 
Trinity Guardrail System (TGS) 
Holmes 
Solution 
57073112 MASH 3-11 
31.5 
(800) 
41.3 
(1,049) 
Nucor Strong Post W-beam guardrail system without 
blockouts 
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2.5 Testing of Transitions Between Different Barrier Types 
2.5.1 Two Approach Guardrail Transitions for Concrete Safety Shape Barriers 
In 1996, MwRSF researchers developed two guardrail-to-concrete safety-shape barrier 
transitions [19]. One transition design was constructed using W6x9 (W152x13.4) steel posts, and 
the other system was constructed using 6-in. x 8-in. (152-mm x 203-mm) wood posts. For both 
systems, a varied post spacing consisted of one post at 11½ in. (292 mm), five at 18¾ in. (476 
mm), and three at 37½ in. (953 mm). The steel- and wood-post versions of the approach 
transition are shown in Figures 15 and 16, respectively. Two full-scale crash tests were 
conducted on each approach transition design for a total of four tests. 
The first full-scale crash test utilized steel posts with an embedment depth of 43 in. 
(1,092 mm) in the thrie beam area. During test no. ITNJ-1, a 4,396-lb (1,994-kg) pickup truck 
impacted the system 7 ft – 11⅞ in. (2,435 mm) upstream from the end of the concrete barrier at a 
speed of 62.1 mph (99.9 km/h), and at an angle of 25.0 degrees. The system experienced larger 
than expected deflections, which caused pocketing upstream of the bridge rail end. The 
pocketing caused a high exit angle and eventually resulted in vehicle rollover. Consequently, the 
performance of test no. ITNJ-1 was deemed unsuccessful according to TL-3 of NCHRP Report 
No. 350. 
Upon investigation of the results from test no. ITNJ-1, it was determined that the system 
was not stiff enough near the bridge end. In order to increase the stiffness and strength, the post 
embedment depth in the thrie beam area was increased to 49 in. (1,245 mm). Also, the upstream 
corner on the traffic-side of the concrete bridge rail was chamfered in order to mitigate vehicle 
snag. During test no. ITNJ-2, a 4,359-lb (1,977-kg) pickup truck impacted the system 7 ft – 11⅞ 
in. (2,435 mm) upstream from the end of the concrete barrier at a speed of 63.1 mph (101.5 
km/h), and at an angle of 25.7 degrees. The modified steel-post transition system contained and 
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smoothly redirected the vehicle with maximum lateral dynamic and permanent set barrier 
deflections of 5¼ in. (133 mm) and 3⅝ in. (92 mm), respectively, and was determined to be a 
success according to TL-3 of NCHRP Report No. 350. 
The third full-scale crash test utilized wood posts with an embedment depth of 43 in. 
(1,092 mm) in the thrie beam area. During test no. ITNJ-3, a 4,381-lb (1,987-kg) pickup truck 
impacted the system 7 ft – 11⅞ in. (2,435 mm) upstream from the end of the concrete barrier at a 
speed of 63.4 mph (102.0 km/h), and at an angle of 26.9 degrees. Similar to test no. ITNJ-1, the 
system experienced larger-than-expected deflections, which caused vehicle instabilities and 
eventually rollover. Consequently, the performance of test no. ITNJ-3 was deemed unsuccessful 
according to TL-3 of NCHRP Report No. 350.  
In order to lower deflections of the transition system with wood-post configuration, the 
post embedment depth in the thrie beam area was increased to 52 in. (1,321 mm). During test no. 
ITNJ-4, a 4,407-lb (1,999-kg) pickup truck impacted the system 7 ft – 11⅞ in. (2,435 mm) 
upstream from the end of the concrete barrier at a speed of 63.6 mph (102.4 km/h), and at an 
angle of 24.6 degrees. The wood-post transition system contained and smoothly redirected the 
vehicle with maximum lateral dynamic and permanent set barrier deflections of 3.8 in. (97 mm) 
and 1¼  in. (32 mm), respectively, and was determined to be a success according to TL-3 of 
NCHRP Report No. 350. 
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Figure 15. Steel-Post Approach Transition, Test No. ITNJ-2 [19] 
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Figure 16. Wood-Post Approach Transition, Test No. ITNJ-4 [19]  
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2.5.2 Evaluation of Guardrail-to-Concrete Barrier Transition 
With the vehicle fleet constantly changing and growing, standards for testing roadside 
safety hardware must also change. Thus, NCHRP Report No. 350 was updated to include heavier 
vehicles with higher centers of gravity. In 2006, MwRSF researchers conducted another crash 
test under the impact conditions outlined in the Update to NCHRP Report No. 350 on the 
guardrail-to-concrete barrier transition system that had been previously tested [20]. 
The transition design was constructed using W6x9 (W152x13.4) steel posts with a length 
of 6 ft (1,829 mm) for post nos. 3 through 10 and 6 ft – 6 in. (1,981) for post nos. 11-17 [20]. A 
varied post spacing consisted of one post at 10½ in. (267 mm), five at 18¾ in. (476 mm), and 
three at 37½ in. (953 mm). During test no. 2241T-1, a 5,083-lb (2,306-kg) pickup truck impacted 
the system at 7 ft – 11⅞ in. (2,435 mm) upstream from the end of the concrete barrier at a speed 
of 60.3 mph (97.0 km/h), and at an angle of 24.8 degrees. The steel-post transition system 
contained and smoothly redirected the vehicle with maximum lateral dynamic and permanent set 
barrier deflections of 11.4 in. (290 mm) and 7⅝ in. (194 mm), respectively, and was determined 
to be a success according to TL-3 found in the Update to NCHRP Report No. 350. 
2.5.3 Stiffness Transition Between W-Beam Guardrail and Thrie Beam 
In 2007, MwRSF researchers investigated stiffness transitions from W-beam guardrail to 
thrie beam approach guardrail transitions [21]. Prior testing of symmetric W-beam-to-thrie beam 
transition elements had been conducted according the guidelines set forth in NCHRP Report No. 
350, but the system did not successfully pass the 2000P light pickup truck test [22]. This study 
was conducted to alleviate some of the stiffness concerns associated with the previously-tested 
transition design. This study included four full-scale crash tests that utilized a varied post spacing 
that consisted of post nos. 1 through 7 spaced 75 in. (1,905 mm), post nos. 7 through 19 spaced 
37.5 in. (953 mm), and post nos. 19 through 21 spaced 75 in. (1,905 mm). 
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For the first full-scale crash test, the W-beam rail had a nominal top-rail height of 27¾ in. 
(705 mm), while the thrie beam had a nominal top-rail height of 31⅝ in. (803 mm). The 
approach transition is shown in Figure 17. During test no. MWT-3, a 4,456-lb (2,021-kg) pickup 
truck impacted the system 8 in. (203 mm) upstream from the centerline of post no. 9 at a speed 
of 63.9 mph (102.8 km/h), and at an angle of 24.8 degrees. The transition system contained but 
did not safely redirect the vehicle, since the vehicle rolled over upon exiting the system. 
Therefore, test no. MWT-3 was determined to be unsuccessful according to TL-3 of NCHRP 
Report No. 350. 
Upon investigation of the results from test no. MWT-3, researchers concluded that the 
roll behavior was due to the relatively higher center of gravity of the 2000P vehicle combined 
with the relatively low rail height for the 27¾-in. (705-mm) tall, standard guardrail. The 
proposed solution was to switch the approach guardrail to the 31-in. (787-mm) tall Midwest 
Guardrail System (MGS). Since the MGS utilized a 31-in. (787-mm) rail height, a new 
asymmetric transition element was needed. The new transition element was fabricated by cutting 
a triangular piece out of the bottom of a standard 12-gauge (2.66-mm) thrie beam rail, as shown 
in Figure 18. During test no. MWT-4, a 4,448-lb (2,018-kg) pickup truck impacted the system 9 
in. (229 mm) upstream from the centerline of post no. 9 at a speed of 61.0 mph (98.2 km/h), and 
at an angle of 25.3 degrees. The system did not safely contain or redirect the vehicle, since the 
vehicle penetrated the system due to rail rupture. Consequently, test no. MWT-4 was deemed 
unsuccessful according to TL-3 of NCHRP Report No. 350. 
Upon investigation of the results of test no. MWT-4, researchers concluded that 
increasing the post size and embedment depth of posts within the transition region would 
eliminate pocketing. For test no. MWT-5, post nos. 9 through 15 were W6x12 (W152x17.9) 
sections measuring 7 ft – 6 in. (2,286-mm) long. Additionally, the post embedment depth for 
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post nos. 9 through 15 was 58 in. (1,473 mm). The fabricated asymmetrical W-beam-to-thrie 
beam transition was also replaced with a new 10-gauge (3.42-mm) MGS asymmetrical transition 
element, shown in Figure 19. During test no. MWT-5, a 4,431-lb (2,010-kg) pickup truck 
traveling at 61.5 mph (99.0 km/h) impacted the system 13 in. (330 mm) upstream from the 
centerline of post no. 9, at an angle of 24.9 degrees. The system safely contained and redirected 
the vehicle with maximum lateral dynamic and permanent set barrier deflections of 23⅞ in. (606 
mm) and 14¾ in. (375 mm), respectively, and consequently was deemed successful according to 
NCHRP Report No. 350. 
The fourth full-scale crash test utilized the same system setup used for test no. MWT-5, 
but now tested with a small car. During test no. MWT-6, a 1,992-lb (904-kg) small car impacted 
the system 12½ in. (318 mm) upstream from the centerline of post no. 10 at a speed of 65.5 mph 
(105.4 km/h), and at an angle of 20.4 degrees. The system safely contained and redirected the 
vehicle with maximum lateral dynamic and permanent set barrier deflections of 23⅞ in. (606 
mm) and 14¾ in. (375 mm), respectively, and consequently was deemed successful according to 
NCHRP Report No. 350. 
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       Figure 17. Approach Transition, Test No. MWT-3 [21] 
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Figure 18. Asymmetric Transition Element for Test No. MWT-4 [21] 
  
Figure 19. MGS Stiffness Transition with Asymmetrical Element [21] 
2.5.1 Evaluation of Thrie Beam Transition without Curb 
In 2013, TTI researchers conducted a performance evaluation of a modified thrie beam 
transition to rigid concrete barrier without a curb element below the transition rail [23]. The rigid 
concrete barrier was a 36-in. (914-mm) tall, single-slope traffic rail that was 7½-in. (191-mm) 
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wide at the top and 14½-in. (368-mm) wide at the bottom. The approach guardrail transition 
consisted of nineteen W6x8.5 (W152x12.6) posts with lengths of 72 in. (1,829 mm) for post nos. 
3-13 and 84 in. (2,134 mm) for post nos. 14 to 19. The 12-gauge (2.66-mm) W-beam guardrail 
was positioned from post no. 1 to post no. 11, and then an asymmetric W-to-thrie transition 
element spanned from post no. 11 to post no. 13. Then, nested 12-gauge (2.66-mm) thrie beam 
rail extended from post no. 13 to the attachment location on the rigid concrete barrier, as shown 
in Figure 20. 
During test no. 490022-4, a 5,002-lb (2,269-kg) pickup truck impacted the system 7 ft – 5 
in. (2,261 mm) upstream from the rigid concrete barrier at a speed of 62.6 mph (100.7 km/h), and 
at an angle of 23.9 degrees. The transition system contained but did not safely redirect the 
vehicle, since the vehicle rolled over upon exiting the system. The maximum dynamic and 
permanent set deflections were 5.9 in. (150 mm) and 4.5 in. (114 mm), respectively, with a 
working width of 22.8 in. (579 mm). Test no. 490022-4 was determined to be unsuccessful 
according to TL-3 of MASH due to vehicle rollover.   
 
Figure 20. Thrie Beam Transition without Curb [23] 
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2.5.2 MGS Approach Guardrail Transition Using Standardized Steel Posts 
Previously, MwRSF researchers developed and crash-tested a stiffness transition between 
MGS and thrie beam AGTs utilizing an asymmetrical transition element and three different steel 
post types under TL-3 of NCHRP Report No. 350. However, many State Departments of 
Transportation (DOTs) viewed the system as too complicated, and they do not use W6x12 
(W152x17.9) steel posts. Therefore, a simplified transition was developed using only W6x15 
(W152x22.3) and W6x9 (W152x13.4) steel posts [24]. 
The system consisted of three bridge rail posts and eighteen guardrail posts. The guardrail 
posts utilized a varied post spacing of 75 in. (1,905 mm) for post nos. 1 through 8, 37½ in. (953 
mm) for post nos. 8 through 12, 18¾ in. (476 mm) for post nos. 12 through 16, and 37½ in. (953 
mm) for post nos. 16 through 19. Post nos. 3 through 15 were galvanized ASTM A36 W6x9 
(W152x13.4) steel sections measuring 6 ft (1,829-mm) long. Post nos. 16 through 18 were 
galvanized ASTM A36 W6x15 (W152x22.3) steel sections measuring 7 ft (2,134-mm) long. The 
soil embedment depths for post nos. 3 through 15, and 16 through 18 were 40 in. (1,016 mm) and 
55⅛ in. (1,400 mm), respectively. During test no. MWTSP-1, a 5,169-lb (2,345-kg) pickup truck 
impacted the system 71 in. (1,803 mm) upstream from post no. 9 at a speed of 61.5 mph (99.0 
km/h), and at an angle of 24.7 degrees. The system adequately contained but did not safely 
redirect the vehicle. The vehicle came to an abrupt stop due to pocketing that formed in the 
system. Consequently, MWTSP-1 was deemed unsuccessful according to TL-3 of MASH. 
Upon investigation of test no. MWTSP-1, it was observed that post no. 1, a Breakaway 
Cable Terminal (BCT) wood anchor post, fractured early in the impact event. Inspection of the 
post revealed significant checking through the wide faces of the post along with a critically 
placed knot on the upstream, back-side corner of the post. Researchers concluded that these post 
deficiencies were the cause of the early post fracture. Researchers also concluded that without 
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this early post fracture, the system would have adequately contained and redirected the vehicle. 
So a retest was conducted using the system layout shown in Figure 21. During test no. MWTSP-
2, a 5,158-lb (2,340-kg) pickup truck impacted the system 74½ in. (1,892 mm) upstream from 
post no. 9 at a speed of 61.2 mph (98.5 km/h), and at an angle of 26.3 degrees. The system 
adequately contained and redirected the vehicle with maximum lateral dynamic and permanent 
set barrier deflections of 32.8 in. (833 mm) and 25¾ in. (654 mm), respectively, and was 
consequently deemed successful according to TL-3 of MASH. 
The MGS stiffness transition to thrie beam AGTs was also subjected to crash testing with 
a 1100C small car according to MASH in order to investigate potential underride tendencies. 
During test no. MWTSP-3, a 2,591-lb (1,175-kg) small car impacted the system 93¾ in. (2,381 
mm) upstream from post no. 9 at a speed of 61.0 mph (98.2 km/h), and at an angle of 25.7 
degrees. The system adequately contained and redirected the vehicle with maximum lateral 
dynamic and permanent set barrier deflections of 34.8 in. (884 mm) and 27 in. (686 mm), 
respectively, and was consequently deemed successful according to TL-3 of MASH.  
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Figure 21. MGS Approach Transition to Thrie Beam [24] 
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2.5.3 Roadside Barriers for Bridge-Pier Protection 
In 1983, the New York State Department of Transportation developed a roadside barrier 
for the protection of concrete bridge piers near the pavement edge [3-4]. Seven full-scale crash 
tests were conducted following the evaluation guidelines found in NCHRP Report No. 230. The 
barrier system consisted of four 15-ft (4,572-mm) long, half-section, safety-shape concrete 
barriers and 6-in. (152-mm) x 6-in. (152-mm) x 3/16-in. (4.76-mm) box-beam guiderail. One 
concrete barrier was installed in front of and parallel to two simulated bridge piers. The 
remaining three concrete barriers were installed at an 8H:1V flare rate away from the roadway 
upstream from the bridge piers. The concrete barriers were rigidly installed with continuity 
connectors at barrier joints, and driven steel backup posts for the first four full-scale tests and 
soil-backfill for the final three full-scale tests.  
For the first four full-scale tests, the box-beam guiderail was attached to the face of the 
second concrete barrier with a total system length of 130 ft – 6 in. (39.8 m). During test no. 60, a 
4,450-lb (2,018-kg) sedan impacted the box-beam guiderail 55 ft – 6 in. (16.9 m) downstream 
from its end at a speed of 55.7 mph (89.6 km/h), and at an angle of 25.0 degrees. The system 
safely contained and redirected the vehicle with maximum lateral dynamic and permanent set 
barrier deflections of 2.6 ft (792 mm) and 1.7 ft (518 mm), respectively, and consequently was 
deemed successful according to NCHRP Report No. 230.  During test no. 61, a 1,600-lb (726-kg) 
sedan impacted 12.2 ft (3,719 mm) upstream from the box-beam attachment to the concrete 
barrier at a speed of 59.0 mph (95.0 km/h), and at an angle of 14.0 degrees. The system safely 
contained and redirected the vehicle with maximum lateral dynamic deflection of 6 in. (152 mm) 
and no permanent set barrier deflection, and consequently was deemed successful according to 
NCHRP Report No. 230. During test no. 62, a 4,500-lb (2,041-kg) sedan impacted 12.2 ft (3,719 
mm) upstream from the box-beam attachment to the concrete barrier at a speed of 54.3 mph 
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(87.4 km/h), and at an angle of 29.0 degrees. The system safely contained and redirected the 
vehicle with maximum lateral dynamic and permanent set barrier deflections of 0.25 ft (76 mm) 
and 0.19 ft (58 mm), respectively, and subsequently was deemed successful according to 
NCHRP Report No. 230. During test no. 63, a 4,730-lb (2,145-kg) sedan impacted 7.7 ft (2,347 
mm) upstream from the joint between barrier nos. 1 and 2 at a speed of 57.1 mph (91.9 km/h), 
and at an angle of 26.0 degrees. The vehicle climbed the face of the concrete barrier and rolled 
upon exiting the system and was deemed unsuccessful according to NCHRP Report No. 230. 
In order to prevent vehicle climb on the concrete barriers, the box-beam guiderail was 
installed across the face of the most downstream concrete barrier, and continuing past the 
simulated bridge piers. During test no. 76, a 1,800-lb (816-kg) sedan impacted 4.3 ft (1,311 mm) 
upstream from the joint between barrier nos. 1 and 2 at a speed of 58.3 mph (93.8 km/h), and at 
an angle of 20.0 degrees. The system safely contained and redirected the vehicle with no lateral 
dynamic or permanent set barrier deflections and consequently was deemed successful according 
to NCHRP Report No. 230. During test no. 77, a 4,650-lb (2,109-kg) sedan impacted 4.3 ft 
(1,311 mm) upstream from the joint between barrier nos. 1 and 2 at a speed of 61.2 mph (98.5 
km/h), and at an angle of 29.0 degrees. The system safely contained and redirected the vehicle 
with no lateral dynamic deflection and a permanent set barrier deflection of 0.19 ft (58 mm), and 
consequently was deemed successful according to NCHRP Report No. 230. 
For the final full-scale crash test, the box-beam installed in front of the most downstream 
concrete barrier was removed, and test no. 63 was repeated with full-height bridge piers to 
evaluate the severity of vehicle contact with the bridge piers. During test no. 78, a 4,500-lb 
(2,041-kg) sedan impacted 3.2 ft (975 mm) upstream from the joint between barrier nos. 1 and 2 
at a speed of 63.7 mph (102.5 km/h), and at an angle of 30.0 degrees. The vehicle climbed the 
face of the concrete barriers and impacted both simulated bridge piers, and rolled upon exiting 
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the system. The system was consequently deemed unsuccessful according to NCHRP Report No. 
230. 
It was therefore recommended by the New York State Department of Transportation that 
the box-beam guiderail should be installed across the face of the most downstream concrete 
barrier in order to adequately contain and redirect the vehicle without impact with the bridge 
piers. 
2.5.4 Development of Low-Profile-to-F-Shape Transition Barrier Segment 
In 2006, TTI researchers developed a low-profile-to-F-shape transition barrier segment 
[25]. Low-profile barriers are used in low-speed work zones to give drivers increased visibility 
of traffic and pedestrians. However, areas where speed limits transition from low-speed to high-
speed or high-speed to low-speed require a transition from the low-profile barrier to the taller F-
shape PCB. For this study, the transition barrier segment was 32 in. (813 mm) tall on the side 
that connected to the F-shape PCB, and transitioned to the low-profile barrier height of 20 in. 
(508 mm) over a length of 10 ft (3,048 mm), as shown in Figure 22. The transition barrier 
segment was connected to the F-shape PCB using a cross-bolt connection, while the transition 
segment used a standard bolted connection to attach to the low-profile barrier. Through finite 
element modeling, two critical impact conditions were identified, and two full-scale crash tests 
were conducted. 
During test no. 455276-1, a 4,725-lb (2,143-kg) pickup truck impacted the transition 
barrier 25.6 in. (650 mm) downstream from the joint between the F-shape PCB and the transition 
barrier at a speed of 44.0 mph (70.8 km/h), and at an angle of 25.1 degrees. The system safely 
contained and redirected the vehicle with maximum lateral dynamic and permanent set barrier 
deflections of 10¼ in. (260 mm) and 10¼ in. (260 mm), respectively, and consequently was 
deemed successful according to TL-2 of NCHRP Report No. 350. During test no. 455276-2, a 
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4,744-lb (2,152-kg) pickup truck impacted the system at the joint between the low-profile barrier 
and the transition barrier at a speed of 44.7 mph (71.9 km/h), and at an angle of 25.9 degrees. 
The system safely contained and redirected the vehicle with maximum lateral dynamic and 
permanent set barrier deflections of 7 in. (178 mm) and 6⅝ in. (168 mm), respectively, and 
consequently was deemed successful according to the TL-2 of NCHRP Report No. 350. 
 
 
Figure 22. Low-Profile-to-F-Shape Transition Barrier Segment [25]  
2.6 Testing of Various Barrier Stiffening Techniques  
2.6.1 Concrete Median Barriers with Corrugated Ends and Tensioned Cables 
In 1978, CALTRANS researchers investigated a new barrier type that could be used in 
both temporary and permanent installations [26]. The barrier segments were 12-ft 6-in. (3,810-
mm) long, New Jersey safety-shape PCBs with corrugated ends. A continuous 2½-in. (64-mm) 
diameter hole was cast 10 in. (254 mm) vertically from the bottom of each PCB segment through 
the longitudinal cross-section. In order to limit barrier deflections, a cable was threaded through 
the hole in each PCB and tensioned at the exterior ends. 
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For the first full-scale crash test, the system utilized ten PCB segments for a total system 
length of 125 ft (38.1 m). The PCB system was placed on polystyrene pads, and the cable was 
tensioned to 17,640 lb (78,467 N) on the upstream end of the system and 14,780 lb (65,745 N) 
on the downstream end of the system. During test no. 331, a 4,680-lb (2,123-kg) sedan impacted 
the PCB system at 5.5 ft (1,676 mm) upstream from joint no. 5 at a speed of 63.0 mph (101.4 
km/h), and at an angle of 25.0 degrees. The vehicle became airborne and was on top of the PCB 
system. Consequently, test no. 331 was found to be unsuccessful according to the safety criteria 
provided in NCHRP Report No. 153. 
For the second full-scale crash test, the system utilized ten PCB segments for a total 
system length of 125 ft (38.1 m). The PCB system was placed on grout pads, and the cable was 
tensioned to 4,880 lb (21,707 N) throughout the system. During test no. 332, a 4,600-lb (2,087-
kg) sedan impacted the PCB system 11.7 ft (3,566 mm) upstream from joint no. 5 at a speed of 
60.0 mph (96.6 km/h), and at an angle of 25.0 degrees. The grout pads were ineffective in 
limiting barrier deflections, and the PCB segment design was determined to be structurally 
inadequate according to NCHRP Report No. 153. 
2.6.2 Channel Beams Spanning a Gap in Continuous Concrete Median Barrier 
In 1979, CALTRANS researchers investigated systems for spanning gaps in continuous 
concrete median barriers where storm drain catch basins were located [27]. The permanent New 
Jersey safety-shape concrete median barrier was 32 in. (813 mm) tall with a 4-ft (1,219-mm) gap 
cutout. Threaded rods with ⅞-in. (22-mm) diameter were cast into the ends of the permanent 
concrete median barriers at an embedment depth of 5 in. (127 mm). Hanger brackets were cut 
from pieces of C6x8.2 (C150x12.2) steel channel rubrail and bolted on the ends of the permanent 
concrete median barriers. The channel beams, C6x8.2 (C150x12.2), were bolted onto the hanger 
brackets, as shown in Figure 23. During test no. 361, a 4,410-lb (2,000-kg) sedan impacted the 
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concrete median barrier system 5.9 ft (1,798 mm) upstream from the gap at a speed of 61.0 mph 
(98.2 km/h), and at an angle of 23.0 degrees. The gap beam sustained minimal damage, and the 
vehicle was safely contained and redirected. Consequently, test no. 361 was determined to be a 
success according to Transportation Research Circular (TRC) Report No. 191. 
 
Figure 23. Hanger Bracket and Steel Channel Beam Design [27] 
2.6.3 PCB System for Off-Road Applications 
In 1996, MwRSF researchers developed a PCB system for placement on a soil foundation 
[28]. PCB systems are typically placed on concrete or bituminous surfaces, but it is often 
impractical and costly to follow this practice. Therefore, it was determined that development of a 
PCB system capable of placement on soil foundations or native fill with slopes 10H:1V or flatter 
would be economical. In order to mitigate the potential of barrier tipping, a ski system was 
developed. The design called for two ski systems to be attached to each PCB segment. The 
maximum overturning moment of a PCB during a crash test was estimated to be 3.3 kip-ft (4.5 
kN-m), and each ski system was designed to resist half of this moment. A 2-ft (610-mm) x 2-ft 
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(610-mm) square piece of ¾-in. (19-mm) thick plywood was placed under the ski to prevent it 
from gouging into the soil. The ski was attached to the plywood with a ¼-in. (6-mm) long wood 
screw. The ski design is shown in Figure 24. 
  
Figure 24. PCB Ski Design [28] 
The test installation consisted of seventeen 12-ft 6-in. (3,810-mm) long, F-shape PCB 
segments for a total system length of 203 ft – 5½ in. (62.0 m). The ski configuration was 
connected to barrier nos. 5 through 14. During test no. KTS-1, a 4,405-lb (1,998-kg) pickup 
truck impacted the PCB system 47¼ in. (1,200 mm) upstream from the joint between barrier nos. 
8 and 9 at a speed of 61.9 mph (99.6 km/h), and at an angle of 26.9 degrees. The system 
contained and redirected the vehicle with a maximum lateral permanent set deflection of 45
11
/16 
in. (1,160 mm), and was considered successful according to TL-3 of NCHRP Report No. 350. 
2.6.4 Box-Beam Stiffening of Unanchored PCBs 
In 2008, MwRSF researchers tested a PCB-stiffening system for the New York 
Department of Transportation using box-beams bolted across barrier joints on the backside of the 
system in order to limit system deflections [29]. Anchoring of PCB systems with pins or bolted-
through connections had been previously tested, but this process is time consuming, and may 
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result in damage to the bridge. NYSDOT personnel developed a concept of using box-beam 
stiffeners that would minimize barrier deflections while preventing bridge deck damage.  
The first test installation consisted of ten 20-ft (6,096-mm) long, New Jersey safety-shape 
PCB segments for a total system length of 200 ft (61.0 m). The PCB system was free-standing, 
with both end segments anchored to the tarmac using nine 1-in. (25-mm) diameter x 15½-in. 
(394-mm) long, A36 steel rods – five anchors on the traffic-side and four anchors on the back-
side. Each anchor rod was driven into a hole drilled in the concrete to an embedment depth of 5 
in. (127 mm). The PCB system utilized an I-beam key connector barrier-to-barrier connection. 
The three joints between barrier nos. 4 and 7 were stiffened with box-beams. Each box-beam 
stiffener consisted of a 6-in. (152-mm) x 6-in. (152-mm) x ⅛-in. (3-mm) ASTM A500 Grade C 
box-beam, which was 12 ft (3,658 mm) long. Two ¾-in. (19-mm) holes were drilled through the 
barriers at an angle of 6 degrees in order to mount the box-beam stiffeners. The box-beams were 
connected to the barriers with ¾-in. (19-mm) diameter x 17-in. (432-mm) long, Grade 5 
continuously threaded rod. The PCB with box-beam stiffeners is shown in Figure 25. During test 
no. NYTCB-1, a 5,016-lb (2,275-kg) pickup truck impacted the box-beam-stiffened PCB system 
51.2 in. (1,300 mm) upstream from the end of barrier no. 4 at a speed of 61.8 mph (99.5 km/h), 
and at an angle of 24.6 degrees. The system contained and redirected the vehicle with maximum 
lateral dynamic and permanent set deflections of 27.6 in. (701 mm) and 26 in. (660 mm), 
respectively, and was considered successful according to TL-3 in the Update to NCHRP Report 
No. 350. 
For the purpose of comparison, the second full-scale crash was identical to the first, 
except with the box-beam stiffeners removed. The system was constructed with identical PCB 
segments, I-beam key connectors, and anchored ends. During test no. NYTCB-2, a 5,024-lb 
(2,279-kg) pickup truck impacted the free-standing PCB system 51.2 in. (1,300 mm) upstream 
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from the end of barrier no. 4 at a speed of 61.2 mph (98.5 km/h), and at an angle of 25.8 degrees. 
The system contained and redirected the vehicle with maximum lateral dynamic and permanent 
set deflections of 40¼ in. (1,022 mm) and 39½ in. (1,003 mm), respectively, and was considered 
successful according to TL-3 in the Update to NCHRP Report No. 350. 
  
Figure 25. NYSDOT Box-Beam Stiffener System [29] 
The third full-scale crash test utilized a system that was identical to test no. NYTCB-1, 
except with more robust box-beam stiffeners, and placement of the system 12 in. (305 mm) away 
from the edge of a simulated bridge deck. For this installation, each box-beam stiffener consisted 
of a 6-in. (152-mm) x 8-in. (203-mm) x ¼-in. (6-mm) ASTM A500 Grade C box-beam, which 
was 12 ft (3,658 mm) long. The stiffeners were connected to the barrier segments utilizing 
similar connecting rods to those used in test no. NYTCB-1, except that the length was increased 
to 19 in. (483 mm). During test no. NYTCB-3, a 5,001-lb (2,268-kg) pickup truck impacted the 
box-beam stiffened PCB system 51.2 in. (1,300 mm) upstream from the end of barrier no. 4 at a 
speed of 63.5 mph (102.2 km/h), and at an angle of 24.4 degrees. The system contained and 
redirected the vehicle with maximum lateral dynamic and permanent set deflections of 30.9 in. 
(785 mm) and 26 in. (660 mm), respectively, while all of the PCB segments remained on the 
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simulated bridge deck. Consequently, test no. NYTCB-3 was considered successful according to 
TL-3 in the Update to NCHRP Report No. 350. 
2.6.5 Retrofit of Existing Approach Guardrail Transitions 
In 2012, MwRSF researchers established guidance for retrofitting existing approach 
guardrail transitions for the State of Wisconsin [30]. A survey determined that several transition 
systems were installed in a manner that deviated from the as-tested design details. These 
deviations included: missing transition posts, transition posts installed near or at the slope break 
point of the fill slope, insufficient soil backfill/grading behind transition posts, wood posts 
installed in asphalt surfacing, and the presence of drainage structures below the rail. The purpose 
of the research was to determine if these deficiencies degraded the performance of the 18-ft 9-in. 
(5,715-mm) long and the 31-ft 3-in. (9,525-mm) long, approach guardrail transitions.  
Missing transition posts were believed to have the potential to cause system failure and 
allow a vehicle to snag on the upstream end of the bridge rail. Whenever possible, the best option 
for repairing this deficiency is to re-install an appropriate post in the prescribed location. 
However, for some cases where this is not possible, three retrofit designs were developed. The 
first retrofit corresponded to a missing post near a blunt-end parapet, which consisted of a 
horizontal cantilever beam off of the back-side of the bridge rail that would be vertically 
centered with the thrie beam at a height of 21.7 in. (551 mm). The second retrofit corresponded 
to a missing post near a sloped-end parapet, which was similar to the first retrofit, with 
modifications to the blockout and anchor plate. The third retrofit corresponded to missing posts 
not adjacent to a parapet, which consisted of two surrogate posts linked by a horizontally-
mounted beam. The horizontally-mounted beam attached at the mid-span to the thrie beam 
transition at the location of the missing post with the use of several blockouts. The three missing 
transition post retrofits are shown in Figure 26. 
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Figure 26. Missing Transition Post Retrofits [30] 
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Transition posts installed near or at slope break points of fill slopes with insufficient level 
terrain behind the guardrail transition have the potential to cause excessive barrier deflections, 
vehicle pocketing, and vehicle snag on the upstream end of the bridge rail. In order to provide 
adequate soil resistance, it was recommended that affected wood posts positioned on a 2H:1V 
sloped terrain should be supplemented with 8-ft 6-in. (2,591-mm) long, W6x16 (W152x23.8) 
steel posts. Affected wood posts positioned on a 3H:1V sloped terrain should be supplemented 
with 12-ft (3,658-mm) long, W6x12 (W152x17.9) steel posts, as shown in Figure 27. 
 
Figure 27. Driven-Post Design [30] 
Transition posts embedded in asphalt surfaces show potential to hinder post rotation and 
cause wood posts to prematurely fracture during impact events. Upon investigation of 
photograph evidence provided by the Wisconsin DOT of common approach transition 
installations, it was discovered that asphalt usage was more prevalent on sloped terrain in order 
to prevent soil erosion. A series of four bogie tests were conducted on 6-in. (152-mm) x 8-in. 
(203-mm) x 84-in. (2,134-mm) long, wood posts confined in 2-in. (51-mm) thick asphalt, with 
an embedment depth of 50 in. (1,270 mm) at the slope break point of either a 2H:1V or 4H:1V 
fill slope. It was determined that for wood posts positioned on a 2H:1V fill slope, a 2-in. (51-
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mm) thick, asphalt confinement was not shown to negatively affect post behavior. However, 
since the forces observed in the two bogie tests did not reach the design loads for the approach 
transition system, it was determined that wood posts confined in asphalt on a 2H:1V slope break 
point should be supplemented with an additional steel post, as shown previously in Figure 26. 
For wood posts positioned on a 4H:1V fill slope, a 2-in. (51-mm) thick, asphalt confinement was 
shown to negatively affect post behavior. It was recommended that transition systems should not 
be installed on 4H:1V or flatter slopes while confined in 2-in. (51-mm) thick, asphalt pavement. 
Transition systems installed with drainage structures below the installation show potential 
to cause severe vehicle instabilities during vehicle containment, capture, and redirection. Survey 
data and photograph evidence indicated that the majority of approach transitions utilized a 6-in. 
(152-mm) tall, vertical curb. Based on previous full-scale crash testing of comparable transition 
systems, it was determined that for 18-ft 9-in. (5,715-mm) long and 31-ft 3-in. (9,525-mm) long 
transition systems, the use of a 4-in. (102-mm) tall, triangular curb below the thrie beam 
transition is required. Also, the adverse effect of a lateral drainage flume curb below an approach 
transition installation was investigated. It was believed that the height and shape of the 6-in. 
(152-mm) tall curb could lead to an increased propensity for vehicle instability. Also, the 3-in. 
(76-mm) deep swell near the lateral curb opening may promote bumper or wheel snag as 
vehicles wedge under the thrie beam rail, and could potentially result in system underride. It was 
strongly recommended that no additional approach guardrail transitions with a lateral drainage 
flume curb below the system be installed until full-scale crash testing was conducted. 
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 DEVELOPMENT OF DESIGN CONCEPTS 3
3.1 Design Constraints 
Upon consultation with the Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) members, it was 
determined that the TL-3 transition was necessary for situations where road construction created 
a work zone adjacent to existing W-beam guardrail systems. In this scenario, a portion of the W-
beam guardrail would need to be removed. Subsequently, PCBs would be used to shield the 
work zone and installed at a 15H:1V flare rate. In order to limit damage to the roadway surface 
and reduce installation time, it was preferred that none of the PCBs be anchored or pinned to the 
roadway surface. Although the primary configuration considered a transition from W-beam 
guardrail to PCBs, there was potential for reverse-direction impacts, which should be 
investigated during a critical impact point (CIP) study. 
Soil grading and roadside terrain were also considered, since several transition design 
concepts would require that PCBs be installed behind the existing W-beam guardrail system. 
When PCBs are installed on native soil, they may settle or gouge into the soil, potentially 
resulting in a large overturning moment and/or barrier tipping upon impact. For these situations, 
a compacted, crushed limestone base, or similar, would be required for a minimum lateral width 
of 4 ft (1,219 mm) and at a 10V:1H cross slope behind the transition installation. Since the 
transition could likely be installed on a concrete, asphalt, or compacted crushed limestone base, 
all three foundations needed to be considered during the concept development and full-scale 
crash testing phases of the study.  
Two different W-beam guardrail systems were considered in this research: the modified 
G4(1S) guardrail system and the Midwest Guardrail System (MGS). The PCBs consisted of 32-
in. (813-mm) tall, F-shape PCBs that were developed through the Midwest Pooled Fund Program 
[1].  
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3.1.1 W-Beam Guardrail Systems 
3.1.1.1 Modified G4(1S) Guardrail 
It was determined that the initial W-beam guardrail system used in this research should 
be representative of the most common guardrail system found on the roadside, which was the 
modified G4(1S) guardrail system. It was also determined that the modified G4(1S) guardrail 
would provide a more critical impact scenario due to its relatively low top-rail height and a 
higher center of gravity for the 2270P test vehicle. Researchers also felt confident that a 
successful transition from modified G4(1S) guardrail to PCBs could successfully be adapted to 
the MGS with minor modifications. 
The modified G4(1S) guardrail system utilized A992 Grade 50 W6x9 (W152x13.4) steel 
posts measuring 72 in. (1,829-mm) long, 12-ft 6-in. (3,810-mm) long 12-gauge (2.66-mm) W-
beam rail sections, and 6-in. (152-mm) wide x 8-in. (203-mm) deep x 14¼-in. (362-mm) long, 
wood blockouts to space the rail away from the front face of the steel posts. The top-rail height 
was 27¾ in. (705 mm) with a 21⅝-in. (549-mm) center mounting height, and the steel guardrail 
posts were spaced at 6 ft – 3 in. (1,905 mm) on center. A typical cross-section is shown in Figure 
28. 
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Figure 28. Typical Cross-Section of Modified G4(1S) Guardrail 
3.1.1.2 Midwest Guardrail System (MGS) 
The second W-beam guardrail system that was considered was the Midwest Guardrail 
System (MGS) [31]. Due to its taller top-rail mounting height and history of improved 
performance over the modified G4(1S) guardrail system, researchers felt confident that an MGS-
based transition system would improve system performance and the likelihood of success.   
The MGS utilized A992 Grade 50 W6x9 (W152x13.4) steel posts measuring 72 in. 
(1,829-mm) long, 12-ft 6-in. (3,810-mm) long 12-gauge (2.66-mm) W-beam rail sections, and 6-
in. (152-mm) wide x 12-in. (305-mm) deep x 14¼-in. (362-mm) long, wood blockouts to space 
the rail away from the front face of the steel posts. The top-rail height was 31 in. (787 mm) with 
a 24⅞-in. (632-mm) center mounting height. The MGS used a standard 6-ft 3-in. (1,905-mm) 
post spacing, and the splice locations were moved to the center of the span between guardrail 
posts. A typical cross-section is shown in Figure 29. 
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Figure 29. Typical Cross-Section of Midwest Guardrail System (MGS) 
3.1.2 F-Shape Portable Concrete Barrier 
A 32-in. (813-mm) tall, F-shape PCB was chosen for this research study, which is 
representative of the typical PCBs used by NDOR to create work zones [1,8,13]. Each PCB 
segment measured 12 ft – 6 in. (3,810 mm) long and utilized a pin-and-loop barrier-to-barrier 
connection, as shown in Figure 30. The PCB system was installed at a 15H:1V flare rate, which 
is a typical flare used by NDOR. 
 
Figure 30. Cross-Section of 32-in. (813-mm) Tall, F-Shape PCB [1] 
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3.2 Design Concepts 
Taking into account all of the design considerations, several design concepts were 
brainstormed and discussed. The top five design concepts were formulated, and drawings were 
developed and presented to the TAC members for consideration. Following discussion, the 
concepts were ranked by feasibility, likelihood of success, and ease of installation. The rankings 
were to provide guidance through concept evaluation and the simulation process. A description 
of each design concept along with pros and cons are presented below. The TAC members 
advised that the simplest transition in regards to installation time and number of components was 
considered a high priority. Therefore, each design concept was presented in its simplest form, 
and complexity was added as needed based on the simulation results to improve the safety 
performance of the transition system.  
3.2.1 Flared PCB–Modified G4(1S) 
The first design concept was comprised of three components: modified G4(1S) guardrail, 
W-beam end-shoe connection, and F-shape PCBs. The modified G4(1S) guardrail attached to a 
15H:1V flared F-shape PCB system using a W-beam end-shoe connection to the third PCB 
segment. Three 15H:1V flared PCB segments extended behind the modified G4(1S) guardrail 
system, and the posts that interfered with the installation of the PCBs were removed, as shown in 
Figure 31. The two posts that remained in front of the PCB system would aid in the displacement 
of the PCB system. Upon impact, the remaining two posts would rotate backward into the PCBs 
and initiate displacement of the PCB system, which could reduce vehicle climb and instabilities. 
Based on the simulation results, several modifications could be made to the transition system to 
improve its likelihood of success. These modifications included: a transition to thrie beam, 
removal of posts in front of PCB system, installation of blockouts between the rail and PCBs, 
installation of a cantilever beam to the front face of the most upstream PCB, and nesting of rail. 
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Notes:  
(1) Thrie beam may be utilized in transition area. 
(2) Posts installed in front of PCB system may be removed. 
(3) May require blockouts between W-beam guardrail and PCBs where post removal was required. 
(4) Cantilever beam may be installed on most upstream PCB. 
(5) Nesting of rail components may be required. 
 
Figure 31. Flared PCB–Modified G4(1S) Design Concept
Blockout 
Guardrail Post 
Portable Concrete Barrier (PCB) 
W-Beam End-Shoe 
W-Beam Guardrail 
June 26, 2014  
MwRSF Report No. TRP-03-300-14 
62 
One positive for this design concept considered the use of an existing modified G4(1S) 
guardrail system without significant changes. It was also highly desirable to attach the modified 
G4(1S) system directly to a 15H:1V flared PCB system in order to alleviate the need to 
incorporate PCB segments at different flare rates. However, one downside for this design 
concept was the presence of a single-point connection between the modified G4(1S) and the PCB 
system using a W-beam end-shoe. One potential modification involved the installation of 
blockouts at standard post spacings to allow for more connection points between the modified 
G4(1S) system and the PCB system, which should reduce the loading on the W-beam end-shoe 
connection.  
3.2.2 Parallel PCB–Modified G4(1S) 
The next design concept utilized three components: modified G4(1S) guardrail, W-beam 
end-shoe connection, and F-shape PCBs. Two PCB segments were placed parallel to and behind 
the modified G4(1S) guardrail system before the PCB system was flared at 15H:1V to create the 
work zone, as shown in Figure 32. The modified G4(1S) was attached to the fifth PCB segment 
using a W-beam end-shoe connection. Five posts remained in front of the PCB system, and posts 
that interfered with the installation of the 15H:1V flared PCBs were removed. The posts that 
remained in front of the PCB system were expected to rotate backward into the PCBs and initiate 
displacement of the PCB system. Based on the simulation results, several modifications could be 
made to the transition system to improve its likelihood of success. These modifications included: 
a transition to thrie beam, removal of posts in front of PCB system, installation of blockouts 
between the rail and PCBs, installation of a cantilever beam to the front face of the most 
upstream PCB, and nesting of rail components. 
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Notes: 
(1) Thrie beam may be utilized in transition area. 
(2) Posts installed in front of PCB system may be removed. 
(3) May require blockouts between W-beam guardrail and PCBs where post removal was required. 
(4) Cantilever beam may be installed on most upstream PCB. 
(5) Nesting of rail components may be required. 
 
Figure 32. Parallel PCB–Modified G4(1S) Design Concept 
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One concern for this design concept was that placing PCBs segments parallel to and 
behind the modified G4(1S) may accentuate wheel snag on the end of the PCB system during 
vehicle impacts upstream from the PCB system. Along with wheel snag, rail pocketing was a 
concern upstream from the end of the PCB system due to the inertial force required to initiate 
PCB displacement. Further, the attachment location may vary based on the actual location of the 
PCB system relative to the guardrail system. An alternative attachment location will alter the 
distance between the PCB segments placed parallel to and behind the modified G4(1S) system, 
thus affecting system performance. One positive for this design concept was that it would allow 
for the use of an existing modified G4(1S) W-beam guardrail system without significant 
changes. 
3.2.3 Beam Attachment Between PCB and Modified G4(1S) 
The third design concept utilized four components: modified G4(1S) guardrail, W-beam 
end-shoe connection, F-shape PCBs, and either a box-beam or horizontal post. This design 
concept explored the use of an end-to-end connection between the two systems. In order to 
encourage the two systems to displace together, the systems would be connected to one another. 
This behavior would be achieved by attaching a box-beam rail to the backside of the most 
upstream PCB and extending it to the backside of the most downstream guardrail post. 
Alternatively, a horizontal post could be attached to the backside of the most upstream PCB and 
extend to the web of the most downstream guardrail post. Both designs are shown in Figure 33.  
Researchers also took note of the high probability for wheel snag on the upstream end of 
the PCB system, which could accentuate vehicle instabilities and elevated occupant risk values. 
Researchers decided that the best way to mitigate wheel snag concerns would be to design and 
fabricate a special chamfered-end, PCB segment, as shown in Figure 34. Based on the simulation
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Notes: 
(1) Thrie beam may be utilized in transition area. 
(2) Nesting of rail sections may be required. 
(3) May require a special chamfered PCB section in order to prevent wheel snag on upstream end of PCB system. 
 
Figure 33. Beam Attachment Between PCB and Modified G4(1S) Design Concept 
 
 
 
Figure 34. Chamfered-End PCB Segment 
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results, several modifications could be made to the transition system to improve its likelihood of 
success. These modifications included: a transition to thrie beam, nesting of the rail components, 
and installation of a chamfered-end PCB segment. Note that this design does not incorporate the 
15H:1V flare rate, often used to create a work zone. However, it was decided that the PCB 
system could run parallel to the modified G4(1S) guardrail system for a distance and then 
transition to the 15H:1V flared PCB system. 
One concern with this design concept was the cost associated with designing and 
fabricating a special chamfered-end PCB segment. Similar to the previous design concept, the 
attachment location may vary based on the actual location of the PCB system relative to the 
guardrail system, which may affect performance. One positive for this design concept was that it 
would likely be the shortest system and easiest to install for all of the transition design concepts. 
It also includes the existing modified G4(1S) guardrail system with no significant modifications, 
which reduces the complexity of the transition design. 
3.2.4 PCB Offset From Modified G4(1S) 
The fourth design concept utilized three components: modified G4(1S) guardrail, W-
beam end-shoe connection, and F-shape PCBs. This design concept is similar to the Parallel 
PCB–Modified G4(1S) design concept. In this design concept, the PCB segments located behind 
the modified G4(1S) guardrail are installed to replace the guardrail posts that would be installed 
in front of the PCB system. The PCB segments are installed behind the modified G4(1S) 
guardrail system and blocked away from the rail using spacers at locations where guardrail posts 
were removed. This design concept is shown in Figure 35. The primary reasoning behind 
guardrail post removal and blockout installation was to allow for the blockouts to initiate PCB 
displacement, and provide a smooth transition in lateral stiffness from the modified G4(1S) 
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Notes: 
(1) Thrie beam may be utilized in transition area. 
(2) Cantilever beam may be installed on most upstream PCB. 
(3) Nesting of rail components may be required. 
(4) May require a special chamfered PCB section in order to prevent wheel snag on upstream end of PCB system. 
 
Figure 35. PCB Offset from Modified G4(1S) Design Concept 
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to the PCBs. The blockout depths would remain 8 in. (203 mm) with a slight taper to fit the 
sloped face of the F-shape PCBs. Since the PCBs would be installed to replace the guardrail 
posts and would be blocked away from the guardrail, the attachment to the PCB system would be 
different from the previous design concepts. The rail would need to taper back toward the face of 
the PCB system over one rail section, and smaller tapered blockouts would be required in the 
attachment area. Based on the simulation results, several modifications could be made to the 
transition system to improve its likelihood of success. These modifications included: a transition 
to thrie beam, installation of a cantilever beam off of the most upstream PCB segment, nesting of 
rail components, or installation of a special chamfered-end PCB segment. Note that this design 
does not incorporate a 15H:1V flare that is often used to create a work zone. However, it was 
decided that the PCB system could run parallel to and behind the modified G4(1S) guardrail 
system for a distance and then transition to the 15H:1V flared PCB system.  
One concern associated with this design concept was the potential for wheel snag on the 
upstream end of the PCB system, which may require the use of a special chamfered-end, PCB 
segment. The cost associated with the design and fabrication of a chamfered-end PCB segment 
also made this design concept less desirable. Also, similar to previous design concepts, the 
attachment location may vary based on the actual location of the PCB system relative to the 
guardrail system, which may affect performance. One positive for this design concept is that it 
would use standard 8-in. (203-mm) deep blockouts instead of oversized blockouts, which may be 
required to attach W-beam to flared PCB segments. It also includes the existing modified G4(1S) 
guardrail system with no significant changes, which reduces the complexity of the transition 
design. 
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3.2.5 Stiffened PCB and Modified G4(1S) 
The final design concept utilized three components: modified G4(1S) guardrail, W-beam 
end-shoe connection, and F-shape PCBs. The approach for this design concept was to stiffen the 
area where the two systems attached to each other, thus forcing the systems to deflect together 
and eliminating the need to match deflection behaviors. In order to increase the stiffness of the 
modified G4(1S) system, guardrail posts would be installed at 37½ in. (953 mm) or at half-post 
spacings leading up to the PCB attachment location. In addition, either pins or tie-downs would 
be installed in the PCBs to limit the deflections. If the PCB system were installed on a 
compacted crushed limestone base, guardrail posts could be driven behind the PCB system to 
accomplish the same goal, which is shown in Figure 36. As the PCB system progressed 
downstream, the PCBs would be transitioned to a free-standing system at a 15H:1V flare by 
variable placement of either the driven guardrail posts or the pins or tie-downs. Upstream, the 
modified G4(1S) guardrail system would be transitioned from 37½-in. (953 mm), half-post 
spacing to 75-in. (1905 mm), full or standard post spacing. Based on the simulation results, 
several modifications could be made to the transition system to improve its likelihood of success. 
These modifications included: a transition to thrie beam and nesting of rail components. 
One concern associated with this design concept was the installation of new posts, which 
would increase system cost and make this concept less desirable. Also, a stiffened transition 
could potentially have adverse effects on the vehicle stability and occupant risk values. One 
positive for this design concept was that it does not require fabrication of new components, such 
as a cantilever beam or the chamfered-end PCB segment. Pocketing would not likely be a 
concern due to its increased lateral stiffness.  
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Notes: 
(1) Thrie beam may be utilized in transition area. 
(2) Nesting of rail components may be required. 
(3) May require tie-downs or pins through toe of PCBs. 
 
Figure 36. Stiffened PCB and Modified G4(1S) Design Concept 
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3.3 Design Concept Summary  
Once all of the design concepts were presented to the Nebraska TAC members, the pros 
and cons for each design concept were discussed and weighed. The TAC members determined 
that the use of the modified G4(1S) guardrail was preferred. However, a transition to thrie beam 
would be feasible and would not require extensive time or effort to install. Thus, design concepts 
that utilize a transition to thrie beam may be considered. The fabrication of a cantilever beam 
was also determined to be favorable based on the idea that the safety improvements would 
outweigh the cost of fabrication. However, the design and fabrication of a chamfered-end PCB 
segment would be far too extensive and expensive. Thus, design concepts that would potentially 
use it were deemed less desirable. The installation of new guardrail posts, and pinning or 
anchoring PCB segments would require significant time and extra equipment. These design 
concepts were also deemed less desirable. Based on the feasibility, likelihood of success, ease of 
installation and component fabrication, all design concepts were ranked and simulated in this 
order: 
(1) Flared PCB–Modified G4(1S), 
(2) Parallel PCB–Modified G4(1S), 
(3) Beam Attachment Between PCB and Modified G4(1S), 
(4) PCB Offset From Modified G4(1S), and 
(5) Stiffened PCB and Modified G4(1S). 
Due to project constraints, only the first two design concepts were simulated in the initial 
investigation. 
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 TEST CONDITIONS AND EVALUATION CRITERIA 4
4.1 MASH TL-3 Simulated Test Conditions 
Transition systems must satisfy impact safety standards defined in MASH in order to be 
accepted by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) for use on the roadside. According to 
TL-3 of MASH, longitudinal barriers must be impacted at a nominal speed and angle of 62.1 
mph (100 km/hr) and 25 degrees, respectively. Therefore, each candidate design was subjected to 
simulated impacts according to these parameters and at several impact locations ranging from the 
connection point between the guardrail and the PCB system, to four posts upstream of the PCB 
system. The design concepts were simulated using LS-DYNA. Each simulation was subjected to 
a MASH TL-3 impact scenario, and metrics were extracted, compiled, and compared. 
4.2 Evaluation Criteria 
It was necessary to determine evaluation criteria for which to properly analyze and rank 
the concepts as well as determine the likelihood of success. The evaluation criteria included 
vehicle behavior, occupant risk, and rail pocketing, which are described in greater detail below.  
4.2.1 Vehicle Behavior 
Vehicle behavior is examined to evaluate the potential for safe vehicle containment and 
redirection without excessive roll or complete rollover. The transition system should capture and 
smoothly redirect the vehicle. Also, the vehicle should not penetrate, underride, or override the 
transition system, while remaining upright during and after the impact event. Vehicle behavior 
was evaluated after calculating of several parameters, including maximum roll, pitch, and yaw 
angles. According to MASH, the maximum roll and pitch angles are not to exceed 75 degrees 
[5]. It was also determined that wheel snag on the upstream end of the PCB system could affect 
vehicle behavior and cause rapid deceleration, so it was documented for each simulation.  
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4.2.2 Occupant Risk 
Occupant risk evaluates the degree of hazard to occupants in the impacting vehicle. In 
order to quantify this hazard, maximum longitudinal and lateral occupant impact velocities 
(OIVs) as well as maximum longitudinal and lateral occupant ridedown accelerations (ORAs) 
were calculated for each simulation. According to MASH, longitudinal and lateral OIVs should 
fall below the maximum allowable value of 40.0 ft/s (12.2 m/s). MASH also states that 
longitudinal and lateral ORAs should fall below the maximum allowable value of 20.49 g’s [5]. 
Occupant compartment damage was not measured in this study. To date, there have been no 
extensive validation efforts that have focused on the occupant compartment of the Chevrolet 
Silverado pickup model. 
4.2.3 Pocketing Angle 
Maximum pocketing angles are a primary concern for the transition design due to the 
relatively high initial deflection of the guardrail system and the relatively low initial deflection of 
the PCB system. Excessive pocketing angles can affect a system’s capability to safely contain 
and redirect a test vehicle without rupture of the rail components. The maximum pocketing angle 
for each simulation was calculated by tracking adjacent nodes on the rail to determine barrier 
deflections as well as to calculate maximum slopes in advance of the vehicle. The maximum 
pocketing angle should fall below 23 degrees, which has previously been shown to be associated 
with degraded barrier performance, including rail rupture [22].  
June 26, 2014  
MwRSF Report No. TRP-03-300-14 
74 
 FINITE ELEMENT BARRIER AND VEHICLE MODELS 5
5.1 Introduction 
Finite element modeling is a very robust tool that is used to evaluate roadside safety 
hardware. Accurate finite element modeling can be used to preliminarily evaluate potential 
design concepts prior to conducting expensive full-scale vehicle crash testing. Four finite 
element models were used to evaluate potential design concepts for the transition between W-
beam guardrail and PCBs. A previously-developed MGS model [32] was used to configure 
several design concepts. The MGS model was altered to configure a model of the modified 
G4(1S) guardrail system. A previously-developed F-shape PCB model [1] was used to configure 
both tangent and 15H:1V flared PCBs within a work-zone environment. A Chevrolet Silverado 
vehicle model was chosen to be representative of 2270P pickup truck test vehicles. 
5.2 Midwest Guardrail System (MGS) Model 
A second generation MGS LS-DYNA model was developed by researchers at MwRSF. 
The goals of the new model were to: improve end anchorage design to better match full-scale 
system construction and results, refine system mesh for improved barrier deflection performance, 
and improve vehicle-to-barrier interaction and results. The second generation model has been 
shown to improve model performance in simulating full-scale vehicle crash tests [32]. A list of 
MGS model parts and associated LS-DYNA modeling parameters are shown in Table 4. A 
comparison between the actual and finite element model end anchorage and full MGS system is 
shown in Figures 37 and 38, respectively.  
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Table 4. Summary of MGS Model Parts and LS-DYNA Parameters [32] 
Part Name 
Element  
Type 
Element 
Formulation 
Material 
Type 
Material Formulation 
Anchor Cable Beam 
Belytschko-Schwer, 
Resultant Beam 
6x19 3/4"  
Wire Rope 
Moment,  
Curvature Beam 
Anchor Post 
Bolt 
Solid 
Constant Stress Solid 
Element 
ASTM A307 Rigid 
Anchor Post 
Bolt Heads 
Shell Belytschko-Tsay ASTM A307 Rigid 
Anchor Post 
Washers 
Solid 
Constant Stress Solid 
Element 
ASTM F844 Rigid 
BCT Anchor 
Post 
Solid Fully Integrated, S/R Wood Plastic Kinematic 
Bearing Plate Solid 
Constant Stress Solid 
Element 
ASTM A36 Rigid 
Blockout Solid Fully Integrated, S/R Wood Elastic 
Blockout Bolts Shell Belytschko-Tsay ASTM A307 Rigid 
Bolt Springs Discrete 
DRO=Translational 
Spring/Damper 
ASTM A307 
Spring,  
Non-Linear Elastic 
Ground-Line 
Strut 
Shell Belytschko-Tsay ASTM A36 
Piecewise,  
Linear Plastic 
Post Soil Tubes Shell Belytschko-Tsay 
Equivalent 
Soil 
Rigid 
Soil Springs Discrete 
DRO=Translational 
Spring/Damper 
Equivalent 
Soil 
Spring,  
General Non-Linear 
W-Beam 
Guardrail 
Section 
Shell 
Fully Integrated, 
Shell Element 
AASHTO 
M180, 12-Ga. 
Galvanized 
Steel 
Piecewise,  
Linear Plastic 
W6x9 Post Shell 
Fully Integrated, 
Shell Element 
ASTM A992  
Gr. 50 
Piecewise,  
Linear Plastic 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 37. MGS End Anchorage, (a) Actual (b) Finite Element Model 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 38. MGS Full System, (a) Actual (b) Finite Element Model 
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5.3 Modified G4(1S) Guardrail Model 
The 31-in. (787-mm) tall MGS model was modified in several ways to represent the 
modified G4(1S) guardrail system with nominal top-rail height of 27¾ in. (705 mm) and 8-in. 
(203-mm) deep blockouts. This alteration process was accomplished in several steps, as 
described below: 
1. Translating the W6x9 (W152x13.4) guardrail line posts 3¼ in. (83 mm) vertically in 
order to increase the post embedment depth from 40 in. (1,016 mm) to 43¼ in. 
(1,099); 
 
2. Translating the corrugated rail and mounting hardware 3¼ in. (83 mm) vertically to 
align with the new height of the W6x9 (152x13.4) guardrail line posts; 
 
3. Scaling the wood blockouts, guardrail bolts, and guardrail bolt hole nulls in order to 
decrease the blockout depth from 12 in. (305 mm) to 8 in. (203 mm); 
 
4. Translating the corrugated rail and mounting hardware 4 in. (102 mm) to align the 
decreased depth blockouts with the front face of the W6x9 (W152x13.4) guardrail 
line posts; 
 
5. Scaling BCT anchor post elements between rail mounting hole and groundline hole 
vertically in order to decrease the BCT anchor post height 3¼ in. (83 mm) in order to 
align mounting holes with the rail; and 
 
6. Re-drawing and re-meshing the upstream anchor cable to align with the new rail 
height and groundline mounting locations. 
 
These steps were followed in order to decrease the top-rail height from 31 in. (787 mm) to 27¾ 
in. (705 mm) and decrease the blockout depth from 12 in. (305 mm) to 8 in. (203 mm), as shown 
in Figures 39 and 40, respectively. 
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                       (a)                                                                              (b) 
Figure 39. Top-Rail Height and Embedment Depth Comparison for (a) Modified G4(1S) 
Guardrail and (b) Midwest Guardrail System 
 
    (a)                                                 (b) 
Figure 40. Blockout Depth Comparison for (a) Modified G4(1S) Guardrail and (b) Midwest 
Guardrail System 
5.3.1 Downstream Anchorage Removal 
A typical guardrail system requires anchorage on both its upstream and downstream ends 
in order to provide adequate rail tension. However, for this research, the downstream end of the 
guardrail system will be transitioned to a PCB system. Therefore, removal of the downstream 
anchorage was necessary, which required removal of several components: the downstream BCT 
posts, BCT anchor tubes, groundline strut and yoke, anchor cable, attachment hardware, and end 
43¼ in. 
27¾ in. 31 in. 
40 in. 
8 in. 
12 in. 
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section of W-beam guardrail. The modified G4(1S) guardrail system with the downstream 
anchorage removed is shown in Figure 41. 
 
Figure 41. Modified G4(1S)Guardrail System with Downstream Anchorage Removed 
5.4 F-Shape PCB Model 
A modified F-shape PCB model was developed by researchers at MwRSF. The PCB 
model required minor modifications to the previously-developed model. First, the original model 
used solid elements with rigid material definition to represent the F-shape PCB. This approach 
was originally taken because the proper mass properties and geometry of the barrier were 
captured. However, the use of solid elements does not provide a robust contact surface when 
used with shell elements of the existing 2270P pickup model. Therefore, a modified F-shape 
PCB model was created using shell elements with a rigid material definition. The rigid material 
definition allowed the proper mass and rotational inertias to be defined for the barrier even 
though it was essentially hollow. The use of the shell elements improved the overall contact 
behavior between the barrier and the vehicle. In addition, the use of shell elements made it easier 
to fillet the corners and edges of the barrier. By rounding off the barrier edges, edge contacts and 
penetrations were reduced, thus further improving the contact interface. The geometry of the 
barrier was also modified to include holes in the face of the barrier for use with driven steel pins 
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in asphalt. The loops in the barrier model were also modified to match the current configuration, 
which consisted of two sets of three rebar loops. The modified F-shape PCB model was validated 
using previous F-shape PCB testing [1]. A list of F-shape PCB model parts and associated LS-
DYNA modeling parameters is shown in Table 5. A comparison between the actual and finite 
element model F-shape PCB is shown in Figure 42. 
Table 5. Summary of F-Shape PCB Model Parts and LS-DYNA Parameters 
Part Name 
Element  
Type 
Element 
Formulation 
Material 
Type 
Material Formulation 
Barrier Loops Solid Fully Integrated, S/R ASTM A706 Rigid 
Connection 
Pins 
Solid Fully Integrated, S/R ASTM A36 
Piecewise,  
Linear Plastic 
Connection Pin 
Plate 
Shell Belytschko-Tsay ASTM A36 
Piecewise,  
Linear Plastic 
F-Shape PCB Shell Belytschko-Tsay Concrete Rigid 
June 26, 2014  
MwRSF Report No. TRP-03-300-14 
81 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 42. F-Shape PCB, (a) Actual (b) Finite Element Model 
5.4.1 F-Shape PCB Rotation 
In order to create a safe and usable work zone, an F-shape PCB system is often installed 
with a 15H:1V flare relative to the roadway. When creating a transition between guardrail and F-
shape PCBs, it was necessary to rotate the PCB model 3.81 degrees relative to the guardrail 
system. The rotated PCB model is shown in Figure 43. 
 
 
Figure 43. Rotated F-Shape PCB Model 
3.81° 
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5.5 Chevrolet Silverado Vehicle Model 
The Chevrolet Silverado vehicle model was chosen for the research and simulation study. 
MASH denotes that a TL-3 longitudinal barrier must be subjected to impacts with the 2270P 
pickup truck and the 1100C small car. However, the 2270P test vehicle was deemed more critical 
than the 1100C small car due to the likelihood of increased barrier deflections, rail and anchor 
loads, rail pocketing, and wheel snag. Further, vehicle instabilities have been exhibited during 
full-scale crash tests involving 2270P pickup trucks with F-shape PCB systems due to vehicle 
climb. The Silverado vehicle model was originally created by the National Crash Analysis 
Center (NCAC) and later modified by MwRSF personnel for use in roadside safety applications. 
The Chevrolet Silverado vehicle model is shown in Figure 44.  
It should be noted that during the simulation analysis performed as part of this study, 
several simulations indicated increased occupant risk values and vehicle instability during tail 
slap of the rear wheel, tire, and suspension assembly with the barrier system. Previous, full-scale 
testing with the 2270P vehicle has not indicated these increases in occupant risk criteria and/or of 
vehicle instability and it was believed that the increases were potentially due to the modeling of 
the vehicle’s rear suspension. Any simulation model has inherent strengths or weaknesses based 
on the assumptions and concessions that were made during its development. In the case of the 
Chevy Silverado model, the model was originally designed based on frontal impact testing and 
then adopted for roadside safety use. As such, certain aspects of the vehicle suspension and rear 
axle configuration that were not as critical in frontal impacts may have a larger effect on oblique 
roadside safety impact. MwRSF has observed that the lateral stiffness of the rear 
tire/wheel/suspension of the Chevy Silverado model appears to over predict the effect of tail slap 
on vehicle stability. As such, tail slap effects noted in the simulation models were not deemed 
physical and were given less consideration when evaluating the transition designs.  
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The best approach to deal with this type of issue would be to modify the model to 
improve the response of the rear of the vehicle during tail slap. Unfortunately, modifications to 
the vehicle suspension require a significant amount of effort that was outside the scope of this 
study. In order to revise the suspension in the model, researchers would need to conduct 
component level tests on the suspension to identify and define the correct suspension behavior, 
modify the model to incorporate these changes, verify that the model modifications did not 
produce unwanted changes to the model behavior, and validate that the model changes function 
properly during tail slap. This level of modification to the vehicle model was not inculded as part 
of this research. Thus, it was chosen to place less emphasis on results that were contingent on tail 
slap rather than modify the vehicle model. 
 
Figure 44. Chevrolet Silverado Vehicle Model 
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 BASELINE SIMULATION – MODIFIED G4(1S) GUARDRAIL ACROSS PCBs  6
6.1 Introduction 
A baseline study was conducted in order to better understand the inherent risks associated 
with a barrier installation without using a proper transition from guardrail to PCBs. The baseline 
model consisted of the modified G4(1S) guardrail system with a minimum overlap in front of the 
15H:1V flared PCB system without system-to-system connection to provide continuity. The 
simulation study consisted of impacts at the final six post locations in the modified G4(1S) 
guardrail system, as depicted in Figure 45. 
 
 
 
Figure 45. Baseline Simulation – Impact Locations 
6.2 Vehicle Behavior 
Based on the simulation results, it was found that satisfactory vehicle behavior was a very 
large concern for the baseline system. The vehicle behavior results and evaluation criteria for all 
six impact locations are found in Table 6. Generally, W-beam guardrail systems have anchorage 
on both the upstream and downstream ends of the system to develop rail tension, which enables 
the system to capture and redirect the vehicle. The lack of downstream anchorage in this system 
allowed the rail components to disengage away from the posts very early in the impact event, 
which diminished any capability to capture and redirect the vehicle. This early rail 
disengagement allowed the vehicle to penetrate and override the modified G4(1S) guardrail 
system. As the vehicle overrode the guardrail system, it engaged several guardrail posts prior to 
and during impact with the PCB system. The combination of vehicle impact with guardrail posts 
and an unanchored upstream end of the PCB system caused severe vehicle instabilities. The roll 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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values exceeded the MASH limits for impact location nos. 1-3, as shown in Table 6. The concern 
for vehicle rollover as well as wheel snag on PCBs demonstrated that an overlay of modified 
G4(1S) across PCBs without system-to-system connection was inadequate.  
Table 6. Vehicle Behavior Results – Baseline System 
Impact 
Location 
Roll Pitch Yaw 
Wheel 
Snag on 
PCBs? 
1 90.9°
1
 23.9° 45.8° No 
2 106.4°
1
 42.7°
1
 47.0° No 
3 87.8°
1
 27.0°
1
 53.7° No 
4 16.6° 27.7°
1
 90.1°
1
 Yes 
5 16.2°
1
 10.9° 8.9° Yes 
6 16.6°
1
 6.9° 15.2°
1
 Yes 
MASH 
Limits 
< 75° < 75° N/A N/A 
1
Maximum value was not reached prior to conclusion of simulation 
*Yellow cells denote values within 20% of MASH or recommended limits 
*Red cells denote values that exceed MASH or recommended limits 
6.3 Occupant Risk 
The lack of rail tension diminished the capability for the modified G4(1S) guardrail to 
capture and redirect the vehicle. For impact locations upstream from the end of the PCB system, 
the vehicle contacted the upstream end of the PCB system. This end-on impact scenario caused 
elevated occupant risk values for impact location nos. 4 to 6. The vehicle snag on the upstream 
end of the PCB system resulted in rapid decelerations. The rapid deceleration exposed potential 
occupants to longitudinal ORAs that exceeded the MASH limits for impact location nos. 4 to 6, 
as shown in Table 7.  
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Table 7. Occupant Risk Results – Baseline System 
Impact 
Location 
OIV  
ft/s  
(m/s) 
ORA 
g's 
Longitudinal Lateral Longitudinal Lateral 
1 
-14.53 
(-4.43) 
-19.42 
(-5.92) 
-13.29 -11.87 
2 
-20.08 
(-6.12) 
-19.49 
(-5.94) 
-10.85 -15.75 
3 
-28.18 
(-8.59) 
-15.19 
(-4.63) 
-13.58 -14.38 
4 
-38.68 
(-11.79) 
-12.80 
(-3.90) 
-46.12 15.10 
5 
-13.85 
(-4.22) 
-8.79 
(-2.68) 
-81.87 17.27 
6 
-15.81 
(-4.82) 
-9.81 
(-2.99) 
-21.35 6.86 
MASH 
Limits 
≤ 40  
(12.2) 
≤ 40 
(12.2) 
≤ 20.49 ≤ 20.49 
*Yellow cells denote values within 20% of MASH or recommended limits 
*Red cells denote values that exceed MASH or recommended limits 
The sequentials, as shown in Figures 46 and 47, show the impact event associated with 
impact location no. 5. At 100 ms, the guardrail had disengaged from the line posts. By 300 ms, 
the vehicle had overridden the guardrail system and impacted the upstream end of the PCB 
system. The impact with the end of the PCB caused an abrupt vehicle deceleration, which led to 
a longitudinal ORA of -81.87 g’s. Similar end-on impact behavior was seen at location nos. 4 
and 6, which also had longitudinal ORAs exceeding the MASH limit. These ORA results 
indicated that the baseline system would likely fail the MASH occupant risk criteria if subjected 
to actual crash testing. 
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0 ms 
 
100 ms 
 
200 ms 
 
300 ms 
 
400 ms 
Figure 46. Baseline System Sequentials, Impact Location No. 5 
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500 ms 
 
600 ms 
Figure 47. Baseline System Sequentials, Impact Location No. 5 (cont.) 
6.4 Pocketing Angle 
Due to the fact that there was no system-to-system connection between the modified 
G4(1S) guardrail system and the PCBs, pocketing angles could not be measured and evaluated.  
6.5 Discussion 
Upon full investigation of the simulation results, it was determined that a proper stiffness 
transition was required between the two barrier systems. Due to the lack of a downstream 
anchorage for the modified G4(1S) guardrail system, there was inadequate rail tension to capture 
and redirect the vehicle. The lack of rail tension led to early disengagement away from the 
downstream guardrail posts as well as vehicle penetration into the barrier system and an end-on 
impact with the upstream end of the PCB system. The next step was to provide the increased rail 
tension in the modified G4(1S) guardrail by implementing a system-to-system connection using 
a W-beam end-shoe.  
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 MODIFIED G4(1S) END-SHOE 7
7.1 Introduction 
Based on the results from the baseline system, downstream anchorage of the modified 
G4(1S) guardrail was required in order to provide adequate tension in the rail. Thus, the 
guardrail was extended and connected to the PCB system using a W-beam end-shoe, as shown in 
Figure 48. The modified G4(1S) end-shoe configuration was simulated and evaluated at the same 
six impact locations used for the baseline model. 
 
 
Figure 48. Modified G4(1S) End-Shoe – Impact Locations 
7.2 Model Modifications 
Three additional components were required in order to attach the modified G4(1S) 
guardrail system to the PCB system: two 12-ft 6-in. (3,810-mm) long, 12-gauge (2.66-mm) W-
beam sections and a 30-in. (762-mm) long, 12-gauge (2.66-mm) W-beam end-shoe, as shown in 
Figure 49. The two W-beam guardrail sections were attached to the downstream end of the 
existing guardrail system. Then, the W-beam end-shoe was used to attach the W-beam guardrail 
system to the third PCB segment. 
 
Figure 49. W-Beam End-Shoe 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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An actual W-beam end-shoe could likely be bolted directly to the face of the F-shape 
PCB segment with very little trouble. However, due to the sloped face of the F-shape PCB, in 
combination with limitations in modeling capabilities, a small attachment wedge rigidly attached 
the W-beam end-shoe to the PCB segment, as shown in Figure 50. The attachment wedge was 
constructed of the same rigid concrete material as the PCBs in order to mimic, as closely as 
possible, a real W-beam end-shoe attachment. 
 
Figure 50. W-Beam End-Shoe Attachment with Wedge 
7.3 Vehicle Behavior 
The vehicle behavior results and evaluation criteria for the six impact locations were 
compiled and analyzed for the modified G4(1S) end-shoe configuration, as shown in Table 8. It 
can be seen that the maximum roll angle exceeded the MASH limit at impact location nos. 1, 3, 
and 6. Wheel snag on the upstream end of the PCB system was a concern at impact location no. 
4. However, the W-beam end-shoe connection restored rail tension, which allowed the vehicle to 
be successfully captured at all six impact locations. 
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Table 8. Vehicle Behavior Results – Modified G4(1S) End-Shoe 
Impact 
Location 
Roll Pitch Yaw 
Wheel 
Snag on 
PCBs? 
1 78.4°
1
 21.8°
1 
37.5° No 
2 49.9°
1
 19.5°
1
 41.6°
1 
No 
3 81.5°
1
 29.8°
1
 35.6° No 
4 47.6°
1 
24.6°
1
 41.2° Yes 
5 30.5° 8.1° 23.6° No 
6 133.6°
1
 32.6° 44.2° No 
MASH 
Limits 
< 75° < 75° N/A N/A 
1
Maximum value was not reached prior to conclusion of simulation 
*Yellow cells denote values within 20% of MASH or recommended limits 
*Red cells denote values that exceed MASH or recommended limits 
Upon investigation of the results, the primary cause for elevated roll angles corresponded 
with the guardrail posts installed in front of the PCB system. The guardrail posts installed in 
front of the PCB system rotated into the PCBs, which initiated PCB displacement, as predicted. 
However, these posts wedged against the face of the PCBs and allowed the vehicle to climb up 
and above the modified G4(1S) guardrail system, as shown in the sequentials for impact location 
no. 4 in Figures 51 and 52. At 200 ms, the vehicle had run over the weak axis of post no. 2. At 
300 ms, the vehicle had ridden up post no. 1, which was wedged against the PCB system. By 400 
ms, the vehicle had become airborne and started to roll toward the PCB system. 
Vehicle climb was exhibited in the simulations at all six impact locations. Post wedging 
was the cause of some of the vehicle climb, but the low top-rail height of the modified G4(1S) 
guardrail system was also a concern. A higher top-rail height would likely provide a more stable 
vehicle capture and redirection. 
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0 ms 
 
100 ms 
 
200 ms 
 
300 ms 
 
400 ms 
Figure 51. Modified G4(1S) End-Shoe Sequentials, Impact Location No. 4 
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500 ms 
 
600 ms 
 
700 ms 
 
800 ms 
 
900 ms 
Figure 52. Modified G4(1S) End-Shoe Sequentials, Impact Location No. 4 (cont.) 
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7.4 Occupant Risk 
The modified G4(1S) end-shoe configuration improved vehicle capture and prevented 
vehicle impact into the upstream end of the PCB system, which resulted in reduced occupant risk 
values, as shown in Table 9. Neither the longitudinal nor the lateral OIVs were within 20% of the 
MASH limits for any of the six impact locations. However, the longitudinal ORAs for impact 
location no. 5 was -23.62 g’s, which exceeded the MASH limit of 20.49 g’s. A lack of a 
connection between the modified G4(1S) guardrail and the PCB system for an extended length 
contributed to outward bowing of the rail and slow rotation of the guardrail posts downstream of 
the impact location. This behavior allowed the vehicle to run over the weak axis of two guardrail 
posts. This, in combination with high rail pocketing angles, led to a high longitudinal ORA at 
impact location no. 5.  
Table 9. Occupant Risk Results – Modified G4(1S) End-Shoe 
Impact 
Location 
OIV  
ft/s  
(m/s) 
ORA 
g's 
Longitudinal Lateral Longitudinal Lateral 
1 
-15.12 
(-4.61) 
-20.44 
(-6.23) 
-16.24 -7.32 
2 
-28.02 
(-8.54) 
-14.80 
(-4.51) 
-10.56 -8.84 
3 
-20.73 
(-6.32) 
-18.70 
(-5.70) 
-9.50 -10.36 
4 
-21.16 
(-6.45) 
-17.55 
(-5.35) 
-12.46 8.03 
5 
-16.31 
(-4.97) 
-17.03 
(-5.19) 
-23.62 -11.42 
6 
-16.99 
(-5.18) 
-16.50 
(-5.03) 
-10.49 -8.45 
MASH 
Limits 
≤ 40  
(12.2) 
≤ 40 
(12.2) 
≤ 20.49 ≤ 20.49 
*Red cells denote values that exceed MASH or recommended limits 
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7.5 Pocketing Angle 
The pocketing angle for impact location no. 4 exceeded the recommended value of 23.0 
degrees, as shown in Table 10. Also, the pocketing angles for impact location nos. 5 and 6 were 
within 20% of the recommended limited. As previously mentioned, the lack of a blocked 
connection between the modified G4(1S) guardrail and the PCBs resulted in outward bowing of 
the rail and limited rotation of the guardrail posts installed in front of the PCBs. The limited post 
rotation contributed to elevated pocketing angles at impact location nos. 4 to 6. 
Table 10. Pocketing Angle Results – Modified G4(1S) End-Shoe 
Impact 
Location 
Pocketing 
Angle 
Time 
(ms) 
Location 
1 10.6° 360 
7 ft – 8.9 in. Upstream from  
End-Shoe 
2 10.9° 470 
14 ft – 4.3 in. Upstream from  
End-Shoe 
3 17.9° 120 
2 ft – 6.8 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 2 
4 23.1° 210 
2 ft – 6.8 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 2 
5 20.7° 220 
2 ft – 9 in. Upstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 2 
6 22.1° 310 
2 ft – 7.4 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 3 
Recommended 
Limits 
23.0° N/A N/A 
*Yellow cells denote values within 20% of MASH or acceptable limits 
*Red cells denote values that exceed MASH or acceptable limits 
7.6 Discussion 
Upon full investigation of the simulation results from all six impact locations, it was 
determined that the modified-G4(1S)-end-shoe configuration provided an inadequate transition 
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system. Wedging of posts against the PCBs increased the propensity for vehicle climb and 
generated vehicle instability. Also, vehicle climb concerns were attributed to the low top 
mounting height of the W-beam guardrail and less effective vehicle capture of the modified 
G4(1S) guardrail. Pocketing was also observed at impact location nos. 4 to 6 due to limited post 
rotation caused by outward bowing of the rail. Due to concerns for vehicle climb, inadequate 
guardrail height, and pocketing, researchers determined that the modified-G4(1S)-end-shoe 
configuration had a low likelihood of successfully meeting the TL-3 MASH full-scale crash 
testing criteria. In order to mitigate these problems, researchers decided to utilize and investigate 
the stiffer and taller thrie beam rail section. 
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 THRIE BEAM END-SHOE 8
8.1 Introduction 
A transition from W-beam to thrie beam was incorporated into the design in order to aid 
in the capture and stable redirection of the vehicle. The higher nominal rail height along with the 
increased stiffness of the thrie beam should allow for increased capture and stable redirection of 
the vehicle, while simultaneously reducing rail pocketing. Thrie beam should also decrease the 
amount of wheel snag on guardrail posts, as well as decrease wheel interaction with the face of 
PCBs, which may decrease vehicle climb. The thrie beam-end-shoe configuration layout and its 
nine impact locations are shown in Figure 53. 
 
 
 
Figure 53. Thrie Beam End-Shoe – Impact Locations 
8.2 Model Modifications 
8.2.1 Symmetric W-Beam-to-Thrie Beam Transition Element 
A symmetric 6-ft 3-in. (1,905-mm) long, 12-gauge (2.66-mm) transition element was 
required to transition from modified G4(1S) guardrail to thrie beam. The transition element was 
meshed to match the mesh of the W-beam guardrail on the upstream end and to match the mesh 
of the thrie beam on the downstream end, which allowed for ease of connection between the rail 
elements, as shown in Figure 54. The area around the bolt-slot openings utilized a finer mesh in 
order to allow for a better contact interface between the rail and the guardrail bolt. 
1 2 3 4 5 7 6 8 9 
Thrie Beam Transition W-Beam 
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Figure 54. Symmetric W-Beam-to-Thrie Beam Transition Element Model 
8.2.2 Thrie Beam 
The last five rail sections in the modified G4(1S) guardrail system were replaced with 
thrie beam sections. Each of the thrie beam sections, as shown in Figure 55, measured 12 ft – 6 
in. (3,810 mm) long and had a 12 gauge (2.66 mm) thickness. The thrie beam sections were 
meshed to have similar sized elements as the W-beam guardrail elements in order to match the 
contact interfaces with the blockouts, guardrail bolts, and vehicle. 
 
Figure 55. Thrie Beam Model 
8.2.3 Increased Nominal Rail Height 
The nominal rail height for thrie beam installation was 31⅝ in. (803 mm), as shown in 
Figure 56. In order to increase the nominal rail height, the post embedment depth was decreased 
3⅞ (98 mm) from 43¼ in. (1,099 mm) to 39⅜ in. (1,000 mm). The increased nominal rail height, 
along with the increased stiffness of the rail, was intended to allow for improved vehicle 
behavior. The blockouts measured 6 in. (152 mm) wide x 8 in. (203 mm) deep x 14¼ in. (362 
mm) tall. The blockouts did not run the entire height of the thrie beam section, because they were 
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designed to allow the lower thrie beam to fold underneath the blockout upon impact. This action  
allowed the wheel of the vehicle to protrude underneath thrie beam rail and blockout, which 
allowed for improved capture of the vehicle and reduced wheel and floor board loading and 
deformation [33]. 
 
                                                 (a)                                (b) 
Figure 56. Thrie Beam Top Mounting Height, (a) Actual (b) Model 
8.3 Vehicle Behavior 
The increased nominal rail height of the thrie beam along with its increased stiffness and 
strength allowed for a much more stable capture and redirection of the vehicle. The transition to 
thrie beam also eliminated wheel snag on the upstream end of the PCB system. The roll, pitch, 
and yaw angles for all impact locations yielded results that were well below and not within 20% 
of the MASH limits, as shown in Table 11. As researchers further investigated each impact 
location, it was discovered that the roll values at impact location nos. 5, 8, and 9 were very close 
to being within 20% of the MASH limit. At impact location no. 5, the roll angle was still 
increasing at the conclusion of the simulation, and researchers concluded that the vehicle would 
have likely rolled over. 
 This slight vehicle instability was caused by posts in front of the PCB system wedging 
against the face of the PCBs and promoting vehicle climb, as shown in Figure 57. Researchers 
31⅝ in. 31⅝ in. 
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determined that posts located in front of the PCB system could result in vehicle climb and 
instabilities. 
Table 11. Vehicle Behavior Results – Thrie Beam End-Shoe  
Impact 
Location 
Roll Pitch Yaw 
Wheel 
Snag on 
PCBs? 
1 33.0° 24.6°
1 
39.5° No 
2 30.2° 12.7° 41.1°
 
No 
3 22.6° 20.3° 38.8° No 
4 25.7°
 
15.2° 38.3° No 
5 56.5°
1 
17.5° 41.4°
1 
No 
6 30.5° 19.7°
1 
37.2° No 
7 33.0° 18.0° 40.2° No 
8 52.2° 17.9° 40.7° No 
9 53.3° 16.7° 38.6° No 
MASH 
Limits 
< 75° < 75° N/A N/A 
1
Maximum value was not reached prior to conclusion of simulation 
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Figure 57. Post Wedging and Wheel Snag, Impact Location No. 5 
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8.4 Occupant Risk 
Although researchers observed wheel snag on guardrail posts installed in front of the 
PCB system, there were no occupant risk values that exceeded or were within 20% of the MASH 
limits, as shown in Table 12. Researchers determined that longitudinal and lateral OIVs and 
ORAs were not a concern for the thrie beam-end-shoe configuration. 
Table 12. Occupant Risk Results – Thrie Beam End-Shoe 
Impact 
Location 
OIV  
ft/s  
(m/s) 
ORA 
g's 
Longitudinal Lateral Longitudinal Lateral 
1 
-19.13 
(-5.83) 
-19.36 
(-5.90) 
-15.20 -15.57 
2 
-18.64 
(-5.68) 
-17.78 
(-5.42) 
11.70 -10.17 
3 
-18.37 
(-5.60) 
-21.85 
(-6.66) 
-10.96 -9.02 
4 
-16.70 
(-5.09) 
-20.47 
(-6.24) 
-12.36 -4.52 
5 
-24.02 
(-7.32) 
-17.52 
(-5.34) 
-8.65 -8.30 
6 
-21.72 
(-6.62) 
-18.08 
(-5.51) 
-9.38 -8.80 
7 
-20.80 
(-6.34) 
-19.09 
(-5.82) 
-12.55 -10.85 
8 
-15.55 
(-4.74) 
-16.96 
(-5.17) 
13.03 -8.61 
9 
-16.08 
(-4.90) 
-17.19 
(-5.24) 
-9.55 -8.50 
MASH 
Limits 
≤ 40  
(12.2) 
≤ 40 
(12.2) 
≤ 20.49 ≤ 20.49 
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8.5 Pocketing Angle 
The increased stiffness and height of the thrie beam allowed for lower pocketing angles, 
as shown in Table 13. None of the pocketing angles for the nine impact locations exceeded the 
recommended value of 23 degrees. However, the pocketing angles for impact location nos. 6 and 
7 were within 20% of the recommended value.  
Table 13. Pocketing Angle Results – Thrie Beam End-Shoe 
Impact 
Location 
Pocketing 
Angle 
Time 
(ms) 
Location 
1 3.3° 110 Centerline of Post No. 6 
2 5.2° 50 
9 ft – 3.7 in. Upstream from 
End-Shoe 
3 8.8° 120 
9 ft – 3.7 in. Upstream from 
End-Shoe 
4 12.9° 200 
9 ft – 3.7 in. Upstream from 
End-Shoe 
5 15.0° 70 
1 ft – 10.4 in. Upstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 1 
6 18.9° 120 
2 ft – 7.1 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 2 
7 21.5° 130 
2 ft – 9.1 in. Upstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 2 
8 17.9° 200 
2 ft – 7.2 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 3 
9 15.0° 200 
2 ft – 7.1 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 4 
Recommended 
Limits 
23.0° N/A N/A 
*Yellow cells denote values within 20% of MASH or recommended limits 
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The higher  pocketing angles associated with impact location nos. 6 and 7 were due to the 
outward bowing of the thrie beam and limited rotation of posts located in front of the PCB 
system when impacted upstream of the PCBs, as shown in Figure 58.  
 
Figure 58. Bowing of Thrie Beam at Impact Location No. 7 
8.6 Discussion 
Upon full investigation of the simulation results, it was determined that the increased 
nominal rail height and stiffness of the thrie beam aided in the capture of the vehicle. Slight 
vehicle instabilities and higher pocketing angles were observed for some impact locations. The 
posts installed in front of the PCB system showed a tendency to wedge against the face of the 
PCBs and cause wheel snag and slight vehicle climb. Also, the lack of a blocked connection 
between the thrie beam rail and the PCBs caused bowing of the rail and higher pocketing angles. 
Researchers observed improvements in this configuration as compared to the modified G4(1S) 
configurations, and its performance suggested a high possibility for meeting the MASH TL-3 
full-scale crash testing criteria. In order to provide several options and potentially decrease 
vehicle instabilities and pocketing angle concerns, researchers decided to next remove posts in 
front of the PCB system and install blockouts and additional attachment bolts at 6-ft 3-in. (1,905 
mm) post spacings between the face of the PCBs and thrie beam. 
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 THRIE BEAM WITH FULLY-BLOCKED RAIL 9
9.1 Introduction 
Following the initial thrie beam investigation, several design modifications were made in 
order to improve system performance. Due to wheel snag and wedging of the guardrail posts 
against the face of the PCBs, the guardrail posts located in front of the PCBs were removed. In 
order to eliminate bowing of the thrie beam, blockouts and post bolt attachments were installed 
at standard 6-ft 3-in. (1,905 mm) increments between the thrie beam and PCBs. The fully-
blocked rail–thrie beam configuration was simulated for impacts at nine different locations, as 
shown in Figure 59. 
 
 
 
Figure 59. Thrie Beam with Fully-Blocked Rail – Impact Locations 
9.2 Model Modifications 
9.2.1 Post Removal and Spacer Block Implementation 
Upon removal of two posts in front of the PCB system, there were five locations where 
installation of a blockout was necessary between the thrie beam and PCBs. Due to the 15H:1V 
PCB flare and sloped face of the F-shape PCBs, the geometry of the blockouts required a 5.81-
degree vertical taper along with a 3.81-degree longitudinal cut, as shown in Figure 60.  
1 6 5 4 3 2 7 8 9 
Thrie Beam Transition W-Beam 
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(a)                                                                    (b) 
Figure 60. Blockout Slope Geometry, (a) Longitudinal (b) Vertical 
In order to create the five blockouts for this configuration, one blockout was created and 
meshed. Then, it was scaled to fit the other four locations, as shown in Figure 61. The 
corresponding blockout depths are shown in Table 14. 
 
Figure 61. Spacer Block Locations and Depths 
Table 14. Thrie Beam with Fully-Blocked Rail Blockout Depths 
Blockout No. Depth, in. (mm) 
1 6½ (165) 
2 12 (305) 
3 17⅜ (441) 
4 22⅜ (568) 
5 28¼ (718) 
The blockouts were modeled using the same simplified wood material as used for the 
other blockouts in the thrie beam model. Due to the complicated fracture mechanics of wood, a 
reliable material formulation that accurately simulates wood fracture has yet to be developed. 
Therefore, the blockouts had no failure criteria. Along with blockouts, guardrail bolts were 
installed and scaled to fit each new blockout location. The blockout bolts were modeled to be 
3.81° 
5.81° 
5 
1 2 
3 4 
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connected directly to the face of the PCB segments. If oversized blockouts are used in the final 
design, expanded research must be conducted to configure the guardrail bolt to PCB attachment 
for use in a full-scale vehicle crash testing program.  
9.3 Vehicle Behavior 
The thrie beam-with-fully-blocked rail configuration captured and redirected the vehicle 
for all nine impact locations, and vehicle stability was acceptable as angles did not exceed the 
MASH limits for roll and pitch. Also, wheel snag on the PCBs was not observed for any of the 
nine impact locations, as shown in Table 15. However, the roll angle for impact location no. 3 
was within 20% of the MASH limit and had not reached the maximum angle prior to the 
conclusion of the simulation. Researchers initially determined that the vehicle would have rolled 
over. However, upon further inspection, the excessive roll motion was deemed unrealistic, and it 
was likely caused by the lateral stiffness of the vehicle’s rear suspension when the back end of 
the vehicle impacted the thrie beam. No extensive research has been performed to validate the 
rear suspension of the Chevrolet Silverado pickup model. Previous simulation results have 
indicated that the rear suspension is overly stiff and can over-predict roll angles as well as 
occupant risk values when the back end of the vehicle impacts a barrier system. Therefore, it was 
determined that the vehicle rotation angles would not have exceeded the MASH limits for the 
thrie beam-with-fully-blocked rail configuration. 
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Table 15. Vehicle Behavior Results – Thrie Beam with Fully-Blocked Rail 
Impact 
Location 
Roll Pitch Yaw 
Wheel 
Snag on 
PCBs? 
1 27.5° 24.5°
1 
40.3° No 
2 25.6° 14.1° 45.8°
 
No 
3 67.4°
1 
26.0°
1 
66.8° No 
4 17.0°
 
9.3° 39.9° No 
5 13.8°
 
7.8° 37.2°
 
No 
6 19.2°
1 
10.4°
 
55.4°
1 
No 
7 22.9° 11.1°
1 
48.1°
1 
No 
8 34.8° 15.8° 40.0°
1 
No 
9 48.0°
 
13.2° 38.1° No 
MASH 
Limits 
< 75° < 75° N/A N/A 
1
Maximum value was not reached prior to conclusion of simulation 
*Yellow cells denote values within 20% of MASH or recommended limits 
9.4 Occupant Risk 
The occupant risk values for the thrie beam-with-fully-blocked rail configuration did not 
exceed the MASH limits for any of the nine impact locations, as shown in Table 16. However, 
the maximum longitudinal ORA for impact location no. 9 was -16.85 g’s, which falls within 20% 
of the MASH limit of 20.49 g’s. This high ORA value occurred after the vehicle became 
airborne upon redirection and impacted the ground. Researchers determined that a more stable 
vehicle capture and redirection, that does not allow the vehicle to become airborne, was 
necessary to reduce this high longitudinal ORA. 
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Table 16. Occupant Risk Results – Thrie Beam with Fully-Blocked Rail 
Impact 
Location 
OIV  
ft/s  
(m/s) 
ORA 
g's 
Longitudinal Lateral Longitudinal Lateral 
1 
-20.73 
(-6.32) 
-19.03 
(-5.80) 
-11.19 -11.75 
2 
-23.52 
(-7.17) 
-18.73 
(-5.71) 
-9.48 -10.63 
3 
-31.20 
(-9.51) 
-22.34 
(-6.81) 
-7.14 -11.11 
4 
-27.76 
(-8.46) 
-16.93 
(-5.16) 
-13.55 -6.32 
5 
-29.10 
(-8.87) 
-18.54 
(-5.65) 
-7.53 -6.37 
6 
-28.31 
(-8.63) 
-16.73 
(-5.10) 
-10.13 -6.03 
7 
-26.15 
(-7.97) 
-19.65 
(-5.99) 
-13.78 7.17 
8 
-17.81 
(-5.43) 
-17.75 
(-5.41) 
-8.28 -8.83 
9 
-16.31 
(-4.97) 
-17.39 
(-5.30) 
-16.85 -8.69 
MASH 
Limits 
≤ 40  
(12.2) 
≤ 40 
(12.2) 
≤ 20.49 ≤ 20.49 
*Yellow cells denote values within 20% of MASH or recommended limits 
9.5 Pocketing Angle 
The oversized blockouts were installed with the intention of initiating PCB displacement 
earlier in the impact event, which would reduce pocketing at impact locations upstream from the 
PCB system. However, the maximum pocketing angle at impact location no. 7 exceeded the 
recommended value of 23 degrees, as shown in Table 17. Further, the maximum pocketing angle 
at impact location no. 8 was within 20% of 23 degrees.  
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Table 17. Pocketing Angle Results – Thrie Beam with Fully-Blocked Rail 
Impact 
Location 
Pocketing 
Angle 
Time 
(ms) 
Location 
1 2.9° 80 Centerline of Post No. 6 
2 11.0° 50 
2 ft – 7.1 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Blockout No. 4 
3 15.2° 70 
2 ft – 9.2 in. Upstream from 
Centerline of Blockout No. 2 
4 15.6° 70 
1 ft – 10.5 in. Upstream from 
Centerline of Blockout No. 3 
5 14.7° 70 
1 ft – 10.4 in. Upstream from 
Centerline of Blockout No. 4 
6 17.5° 60 
2 ft – 9.2 in. Upstream from 
Centerline of Blockout No. 5 
7 25.4° 120 
11.8 in. Upstream from 
Centerline of Blockout No. 5 
8 18.7° 190 
1 ft – 8.5 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 1 
9 15.9° 190 
2 ft – 7.1 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 2 
Recommended 
Limits 
23.0° N/A N/A 
*Yellow cells denote values within 20% of MASH or recommended limits 
*Red cells denote values that exceed MASH or recommended limits 
While the oversized blockouts engaged the PCBs earlier in the impact event than 
observed in the configurations with posts in front of PCBs, there was still a delay between 
vehicle impact with the thrie beam and the onset of PCB displacement. This delay resulted from 
the significant inertia that must be overcome prior to PCB displacement. As such, the vehicle 
greatly deformed the thrie beam upstream from the PCB system and led to high pocketing angles 
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prior to PCB displacement, as shown in Figure 62. It was determined that PCB displacement 
should be initiated even earlier in the impact event.  
 
Figure 62. Pocketing Angle for Impact Location No. 7 at 120 ms 
9.6 Discussion  
While the blocked connection allowed for earlier engagement of the PCB system, high 
pocketing angles continued to occur. It was determined that PCB displacement should occur 
even sooner in the impact event. Therefore, the next step involved the attachment of a cantilever 
beam to the front face of the most upstream PCB, which would allow the guardrail posts to rotate 
into the cantilever beam and initiate PCB displacement. 
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 THRIE BEAM WITH FULLY-BLOCKED RAIL AND CANTILEVER BEAM 10
10.1 Introduction 
Due to high pocketing angles found in the thrie beam-with-fully-blocked rail 
configuration, researchers decided that the PCB displacement needed to be initiated earlier in the 
impact event. Thus, a cantilever beam was installed on the front face of the most upstream PCB. 
This configuration used a transition to thrie beam with fully-blocked rail, similar to the previous 
configuration. The thrie beam-with-fully-blocked rail-and-cantilever beam configuration was 
impacted at the same nine impact locations as used for the previous configuration, as shown in 
Figure 63. 
 
 
 
Figure 63. Thrie Beam with Fully-Blocked Rail and Cantilever Beam – Impact Locations 
10.2 Model Modifications 
10.2.1 Cantilever Beam 
A 15-ft (4,572-mm) long cantilever beam was used to initiate displacement of the PCB 
system. This length was chosen to ensure that a post would be able to rotate into the cantilever 
beam regardless of PCB placement. For the 15-ft (4,572-mm) beam, a 6-ft (1,829 mm) segment 
was attached to the face of the PCB, 6 ft (1,829 mm) was a straight cantilever, and the last 3 ft 
(914 mm) was curved backward to prevent vehicle snag on the end. The cantilever beam was 6 
in. (152 mm) deep x 8 in. (203 mm) tall x ¼ in. (6 mm) thick and was installed 30 in. (762 mm) 
above the groundline, as shown in Figure 64. 
1 2 3 5 4 6 78 9 
Thrie Beam Transition W-Beam 
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Figure 64. Cantilever Beam Attached to PCB 
The cantilever beam was modeled using ASTM A36 steel. The cantilever beam was 
meshed to have similar mesh size as the PCB segments in order to allow for a good contact 
interface, as shown in Figure 65. The cantilever beam was rigidly attached to the face of the PCB 
segment. This simplified connection was chosen in the interest of time to allow for the 
simulation of the most design concepts. If the final design concept utilized a cantilever beam, a 
full moment analysis would be undertaken to design both the final cross-section size and a 
proper connection of the cantilever beam to the PCB.  
 
Figure 65. Cantilever Beam Mesh and Attachment  
30 in. 
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10.3 Vehicle Behavior 
None of the vehicle stability measures for the thrie beam-with-fully-blocked rail-and-
cantilever beam configuration exceeded the MASH limits, and no wheel snag was found on the 
PCBs for any of the nine impact locations, as shown in Table 18. While the vehicle was captured 
and redirected for all nine impact locations, the roll angle for impact location no. 3 was 65.3 
degrees and had not reached a maximum value prior to the conclusion of the simulation. 
Researchers believed that the vehicle would have likely rolled over. However, upon further 
inspection, the excessive roll motion was deemed unrealistic and was likely caused by the 
exaggerated stiffness of the vehicle’s rear suspension when the back end of the vehicle impacted 
the thrie beam. This finding revealed that the MASH limits would not likely be exceeded.  
Table 18. Vehicle Behavior Results – Thrie Beam with Fully-Blocked Rail and Cantilever Beam 
Impact 
Location 
Roll Pitch Yaw 
Wheel 
Snag on 
PCBs? 
1 31.6° 25.7°
1 
40.2° No 
2 26.9° 14.4° 45.8°
 
No 
3 65.3°
1 
29.8°
1 
62.2°
1 
No 
4 25.4°
 
15.7° 40.0° No 
5 22.3°
 
6.1° 33.1°
 
No 
6 9.0°
 
5.9°
 
35.2°
1 
No 
7 28.8° 10.3°
 
40.2°
 
No 
8 32.8° 12.9° 37.3°
1 
No 
9 49.0°
 
14.2° 38.4° No 
MASH 
Limits 
< 75° < 75° N/A N/A 
1
Maximum value was not reached prior to conclusion of simulation 
*Yellow cells denote values within 20% of MASH or recommended limits 
June 26, 2014  
MwRSF Report No. TRP-03-300-14 
 
115 
10.4 Occupant Risk 
The occupant risk values for the thrie beam-with-fully-blocked rail-and-cantilever beam 
configuration were relatively low for all nine impact locations, except for the longitudinal OIV at 
impact location no. 6, as shown in Table 19. 
Table 19. Occupant Risk Results – Thrie Beam with Fully-Blocked Rail and Cantilever Beam 
Impact 
Location 
OIV  
ft/s  
(m/s) 
ORA 
g's 
Longitudinal Lateral Longitudinal Lateral 
1 
-20.11 
(-6.13) 
-18.86 
(-5.75) 
-13.29 -14.14 
2 
-24.05 
(-7.33) 
-18.54 
(-5.65) 
-8.88 -10.73 
3 
-31.27 
(-9.53) 
-22.28 
(-6.79) 
-13.50 -8.82 
4 
-28.41 
(-8.66) 
-17.62 
(-5.37) 
-8.31 -7.93 
5 
-29.30 
(-8.93) 
-17.13 
(-5.22) 
-7.79 -5.07 
6 
-40.52 
(-12.35) 
-11.42 
(-3.48) 
-6.49 -9.14 
7 
-24.02 
(-7.32) 
-19.16 
(-5.84) 
-12.67 -5.43 
8 
-19.72 
(-6.01) 
-18.64 
(-5.68) 
-11.21 -8.06 
9 
-16.17 
(-4.93) 
-17.45 
(-5.32) 
-8.90 -9.76 
MASH 
Limits 
≤ 40  
(12.2) 
≤ 40 
(12.2) 
≤ 20.49 ≤ 20.49 
*Red cells denote values that exceed MASH or recommended limits 
The longitudinal OIV at impact location no. 6 was -40.52 ft/s (-12.35 m/s), which 
exceeded the maximum allowable limit of 40 ft/s (12.2 m/s) as outlined in MASH. The 
longitudinal OIV reached this elevated level as a result of vehicle snag on one of the oversized 
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blockouts, as shown in Figure 66. While these oversized blockouts eliminate the bowing of the 
rail, they also present an opportunity for vehicle snag. Wood blockouts in full-scale crash testing 
would likely fracture upon impact, but the blockouts in the LS-DYNA model have no failure 
criteria due to wood modeling limitations. Therefore, researchers determined that the vehicle 
snag on the blockout was not a physical phenomenon and likely would not occur in a full-scale 
crash testing program. 
 
Figure 66. Vehicle Snag on Blockout, Impact Location No. 6 at 90 ms 
10.5 Pocketing Angle 
The cantilever beam was implemented in order to initiate PCB displacement earlier in the 
impact event and reduce pocketing angles. The maximum pocketing angles, as found in Table 
20, do not exceed the recommended value of 23 degrees. However, impact location nos. 7 and 8 
yielded maximum pocketing angles within 20% of 23 degrees. As compared to the previous 
configuration without the cantilever beam, the pocketing angle for impact location no. 7 was 
reduced from 25.4 degrees to 20.5 degrees, which led researchers to determine that the 
installation of the cantilever beam helped reduce pocketing angles.  
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Table 20. Pocketing Angle Results – Thrie Beam with Fully-Blocked Rail and Cantilever Beam 
Impact 
Location 
Pocketing 
Angle 
Time 
(ms) 
Location 
1 2.9° 80 Centerline of Post No. 6 
2 10.9° 50 
2 ft – 7.1 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Blockout No. 4 
3 15.1° 70 
2 ft – 9.2 in. Upstream from 
Centerline of Blockout No. 2 
4 15.5° 70 
1 ft – 10.5 in. Upstream from 
Centerline of Blockout No. 3 
5 15.2° 70 
1 ft – 10.4 in. Upstream from 
Centerline of Blockout No. 4 
6 18.3° 60 
2 ft – 9.2 in. Upstream from the 
Centerline of Blockout No. 5 
7 20.5° 120 
2 ft – 7.1 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 1 
8 20.0° 130 
1 ft – 10.4 in. Upstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 1 
9 16.7° 200 
2 ft – 7.1 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 2 
Recommended 
Limits 
23.0° N/A N/A 
*Yellow cells denote values within 20% of MASH or recommended limits 
10.6 Discussion 
The cantilever beam was installed on the most upstream PCB with the intention of 
reducing maximum pocketing angles by initializing PCB displacement earlier in the impact 
event. The simulation results showed that the cantilever beam did reduce maximum pocketing 
angles. However, the maximum pocketing angles for impact location nos. 7 and 8 were still 
within 20% of the recommended value. Also, the longitudinal OIV for impact location no. 6 
exceeded the MASH limit. It was determined that this result was due to vehicle snag on one of 
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the oversized blockouts installed between the thrie beam and PCBs. This value was likely due to 
the lack of failure criteria for the blockouts in the model. These blockouts would likely fracture 
in full-scale crash testing, and the longitudinal OIV would likely be much lower. Based on the 
results of the thrie beam with fully-blocked rail and cantilever beam, this configuration likely 
demonstrated the highest probability of meeting the MASH testing criteria for any system 
investigated so far. However, pocketing was still the primary concern, and researchers continued 
to explore ways to reduce maximum pocketing angles. 
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 NESTED THRIE BEAM WITH FULLY-BLOCKED RAIL 11
11.1 Introduction 
Thus far, the use of thrie beam, removal of posts in front of PCB system, additional 
blockouts at each post location between the thrie beam and PCBs, and installation of a cantilever 
beam to the upstream end of the PCB system had each improved the performance of the 
transition when compared to the baseline system. However, maximum pocketing angles had 
remained a concern for every configuration so far. In order to further reduce pocketing concerns 
upstream from the end of the PCB system, the thrie beam was nested in front of the PCB system, 
as shown in Figure 67. The nested-thrie beam-with-fully-blocked rail configuration was 
impacted at the same nine impact locations as the three previous designs. 
 
 
 
Figure 67. Nested Thrie Beam with Fully-Blocked Rail – Impact Locations 
11.2 Model Modification 
11.2.1 Nested Thrie Beam 
The final three sections of thrie beam were nested. This change was incorporated by 
doubling the thickness of each section as well as the bolt hole areas from a single 12-gauge 
(2.66-mm) rail section to two nested 12-gauge (2.66-mm) rail sections. Researchers determined 
that stiffening the rail ahead of the PCB system would reduce the amount of vehicle deformation 
into the thrie beam system upstream from the PCB system, which would reduce the maximum 
rail pocketing angles.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 78 9 
Nested Thrie Beam Thrie Beam W-Beam Transition 
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11.3 Vehicle Behavior 
The simulation results for the nested-thrie beam-with-fully-blocked rail configuration 
indicated that the vehicle was captured and redirected for all nine impact locations. However, 
vehicle stability degraded with this modification, as shown in Table 21. The roll angle for impact 
location no. 2 was 96.9 degrees and had not reached a maximum value prior to conclusion of the 
simulation. Also, the roll angle for impact location no. 1 was within 20% of the MASH limit and 
had not reached a maximum value prior to conclusion of the simulation. Researchers felt the 
vehicle would have likely rolled over at both impact locations. However, upon further inspection, 
the excessive roll motion was deemed unrealistic and was likely caused by the exaggerated 
stiffness of the vehicle’s rear suspension when the back end of the vehicle impacted the nested 
thrie beam. The increased stiffness of the nested thrie beam further accentuated the response of 
the vehicle’s rear suspension, which caused even higher roll angles than were seen in previous 
designs. This finding led researchers to determine that the MASH limits would not likely be 
exceeded.  
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Table 21. Vehicle Behavior Results – Nested Thrie Beam with Fully-Blocked Rail 
Impact 
Location 
Roll Pitch Yaw 
Wheel 
Snag on 
PCBs? 
1 71.4°
1 
26.3°
1 
37.9° No 
2 96.9°
1 
27.3° 40.7°
 
No 
3 37.6°
 
10.1°
 
35.4°
 
No 
4 36.0°
 
7.4° 35.5° No 
5 31.0°
 
7.8° 35.6°
 
No 
6 33.4°
 
10.5°
 
38.1°
 
No 
7 32.3° 12.0°
 
43.5°
 
No 
8 41.1° 13.3° 39.8°
 
No 
9 42.3°
 
12.8° 37.6° No 
MASH 
Limits 
< 75° < 75° N/A N/A 
1
Maximum value was not reached prior to conclusion of simulation 
*Yellow cells denote values within 20% of MASH or recommended limits 
*Red cells denote values that exceed MASH or recommended limits 
11.4 Occupant Risk 
The occupant risk values for the nested-thrie beam-with-fully-blocked rail configuration 
did not exceed or come within 20% of the MASH limits for any of the nine impact locations, as 
shown in Table 22. These relatively low OIV and ORA values led researchers to believe that the 
nested thrie beam had improved the safety performance of the transition, and occupant risk 
values would likely meet the MASH TL-3 criteria.  
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Table 22. Occupant Risk Results – Nested Thrie Beam with Fully-Blocked Rail 
Impact 
Location 
OIV  
ft/s  
(m/s) 
ORA 
g's 
Longitudinal Lateral Longitudinal Lateral 
1 
-18.21 
(-5.55) 
-19.62 
(-5.98) 
-13.30 -13.03 
2 
-14.90 
(-4.54) 
-18.31 
(-5.58) 
-14.42 -6.69 
3 
-18.54 
(-5.65) 
-22.11 
(-6.74) 
-5.86 -9.66 
4 
-15.35 
(-4.68) 
-18.37 
(-5.60) 
-4.67 -7.02 
5 
-17.39 
(-5.30) 
-20.80 
(-6.34) 
-4.42 -5.95 
6 
-18.96 
(-5.78) 
-17.36 
(-5.29) 
-5.70 -8.41 
7 
-23.20 
(-7.07) 
-20.41 
(-6.22) 
-6.77 -7.13 
8 
-20.14 
(-6.14) 
-18.60 
(-5.67) 
-10.09 -10.19 
9 
-16.96 
(-5.17) 
-17.55 
(-5.35) 
-10.12 -8.88 
MASH 
Limits 
≤ 40  
(12.2) 
≤ 40 
(12.2) 
≤ 20.49 ≤ 20.49 
 
11.5 Pocketing Angle 
The nested thrie beam was installed to stiffen the rail in an attempt to reduce pocketing 
angles. The pocketing angles for all nine impact locations can be found in Table 23, and none of 
the maximum pocketing angles exceeded the recommended value of 23 degrees. The maximum 
pocketing angle at impact location no. 7 was 20.3 degrees, which is within 20% of 23 degrees. 
Compared to the thrie-beam-with-fully-blocked rail configuration, the maximum pocketing 
angles at every impact location were reduced; thus, the nested thrie beam was successful in 
reducing maximum pocketing angles. 
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Table 23. Pocketing Angle Results – Nested Thrie Beam with Fully-Blocked Rail 
Impact 
Location 
Pocketing 
Angle 
Time 
(ms) 
Location 
1 2.9° 70 Centerline of Post No. 6 
2 2.9° 100 Centerline of Post No. 6 
3 7.2° 300 
2 ft – 7.1 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Blockout No. 2 
4 10.1° 330 
2 ft – 7.1 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Blockout No. 2 
5 8.9° 350 
9.7 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Blockout No. 2 
6 11.9° 160 
9.7 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Blockout No. 4 
7 20.3° 120 
2 ft – 7.2 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 1 
8 16.3° 160 
9.7 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 1 
9 14.2° 120 
2 ft – 9.1 in. Upstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 2 
Acceptable 
Limits 
23.0° N/A N/A 
*Yellow cells denote values within 20% of MASH or recommended limits 
11.6 Discussion 
The nested-thrie beam-with-fully-blocked rail configuration reduced the maximum 
pocketing angles below those observed in previously simulated design concepts. While the 
occupant risk values remained well below the MASH limits, impact location nos. 1 and 2 yielded 
maximum roll angles that were either in excess of the MASH limits, or believed would likely 
have exceeded MASH limits. However, due to unrealistic rear suspension behavior that has 
plagued this vehicle model in the past, researchers felt that the actual angles would likely be 
much lower. These results led researchers to determine that this transition design had the highest 
possibility of successfully meeting the TL-3 MASH full-scale crash testing criteria. 
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 PCBs BEHIND NESTED THRIE BEAM 12
12.1 Introduction 
While there were several configurations for the Flared PCB–Modified G4(1S) design 
concept that had a chance of success, a second design concept was developed and simulated to 
determine its likelihood for success. The Parallel PCB–Modified G4(1S) design concept 
presented to the TAC members, as noted in Chapter 3, utilized modified G4(1S) guardrail 
attached to the F-shape PCB system with two PCB segments installed parallel to and behind the 
guardrail system. However, based on the simulation results from the Flared PCB–Modified 
G4(1S) design concept and subsequent configurations along with engineering judgment, several 
of the design modifications were implemented into the initial system. The modified G4(1S) 
guardrail exhibited a low propensity for vehicle capture due to its low top-rail height, thus a 
transition to thrie beam was installed. While the single thrie beam aided in the vehicle capture, it 
exhibited high pocketing angles upstream from the PCB system, and nested thrie beam was 
installed for the final five rail sections in the transition. Also, posts installed in front of PCBs 
tended to wedge against the PCBs, causing wheel snag and vehicle instabilities. Therefore, all of 
the posts in front of the PCBs were removed, and blockouts were installed at standard 6-ft 3-in. 
(1,905 mm) post spacings, as shown in Figure 68. Two PCB segments were installed parallel to 
and behind the nested thrie beam system before transitioning to the 15H:1V flared PCB system.  
 
 
 
Figure 68. PCBs Behind Nested Thrie Beam – Impact Locations 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Nested Thrie Beam Thrie Beam Transition W-Beam 
June 26, 2014  
MwRSF Report No. TRP-03-300-14 
 
125 
12.2 Vehicle Behavior 
The PCBs-behind-nested thrie beam configuration captured and redirected the vehicle 
with no wheel snag on the PCBs for all twelve impact locations, as shown in Table 24. However, 
the roll angle for impact location no. 11 exceeded the MASH limit and had not reached a 
maximum value prior to conclusion of the simulation. Also, the roll angle for impact location no. 
12 was within 20% of the MASH limit. Upon further inspection, the excessive roll motion was 
deemed unrealistic and was likely caused by the exaggerated stiffness of the vehicle’s rear 
suspension when the back end of the vehicle impacted the nested thrie beam. For this reason, 
researchers determined that the MASH limits would not likely be exceeded at these two impact 
locations, and the vehicle would likely have been safely redirected. 
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Table 24. Vehicle Behavior Results – PCBs Behind Nested Thrie Beam 
Impact 
Location 
Roll Pitch Yaw 
Wheel Snag 
on PCBs? 
1 58.7°
1 
27.3°
1 
42.5° No 
2 31.3°
 
18.2° 42.0°
 
No 
3 44.1°
 
9.5°
 
36.8°
 
No 
4 29.2°
 
9.2° 38.1° No 
5 35.1°
 
9.0° 35.8°
 
No 
6 20.3°
 
7.8°
 
35.5°
 
No 
7 28.5° 7.1°
 
35.0°
 
No 
8 24.6° 8.4° 34.4°
 
No 
9 33.1°
 
10.4° 35.7° No 
10 26.3° 7.4° 37.7° No 
11 83.3°
1 
19.2° 40.6° No 
12 68.5° 18.1° 40.1° No 
MASH 
Limits 
< 75° < 75° N/A N/A 
1
Maximum value was not reached prior to conclusion of simulation 
*Yellow cells denote values within 20% of MASH or recommended limits 
*Red cells denote values that exceed MASH or recommended limits 
12.3 Occupant Risk 
The occupant risk evaluation for the PCBs-behind-nested thrie beam configuration 
yielded results with two values within 20% of the MASH limits, as shown in Table 25. The 
maximum longitudinal ORA for impact location nos. 1 and 12 were 18.88 and -17.41 g’s, 
respectively. These high ORA values occurred as the vehicle became airborne upon redirection 
and impacted the ground. Researchers determined that a more stable vehicle capture and 
redirection was necessary to reduce the high longitudinal ORA values. 
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Table 25. Occupant Risk Results – PCBs Behind Nested Thrie Beam 
Impact 
Location 
OIV  
ft/s  
(m/s) 
ORA 
g's 
Longitudinal Lateral Longitudinal Lateral 
1 
-14.60 
(-4.45) 
-17.65 
(-5.38) 
18.88 -12.14 
2 
-17.29 
(-5.27) 
-21.92 
(-6.68) 
-11.85 -10.97 
3 
-15.81 
(-4.82) 
-19.23 
(-5.86) 
-4.17 -6.64 
4 
-16.96 
(-5.17) 
-20.31 
(-6.19) 
-5.28 -15.16 
5 
-18.80 
(-5.73) 
-18.31 
(-5.58) 
-7.89 -8.45 
6 
-17.75 
(-5.41) 
-20.37 
(-6.21) 
4.17 -10.19 
7 
-15.88 
(-4.84) 
-19.16 
(-5.84) 
-5.03 -5.96 
8 
-16.60 
(-5.06) 
-20.34 
(-6.20) 
-5.65 -5.24 
9 
-20.21 
(-6.16) 
-18.47 
(-5.63) 
-6.16 -8.82 
10 
-17.91 
(-5.46) 
-19.85 
(-6.05) 
-11.60 -8.95 
11 
-18.50 
(-5.64) 
-19.23 
(-5.86) 
16.35 -7.99 
12 
-18.60 
(-5.67) 
-17.88 
(-5.45) 
-17.41 -10.43 
MASH 
Limits 
≤ 40  
(12.2) 
≤ 40 
(12.2) 
≤ 20.49 ≤ 20.49 
*Yellow cells denote values within 20% of MASH or recommended limits 
12.4 Pocketing Angle 
One reason for installing two PCBs parallel to and behind the nested thrie beam was to 
engage PCBs early in the impact event using oversized blockouts, thus reducing pocketing 
angles. The pocketing angles for all twelve impact locations can be found in Table 26, and none 
of the maximum pocketing angles exceeded or came within 20% of the recommended value of 
23 degrees. This finding showed that nesting of thrie beam and PCB segments running parallel to 
and behind the guardrail had helped to reduce pocketing angles. 
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Table 26. Pocketing Angle Results – PCBs Behind Nested Thrie Beam 
Impact 
Location 
Pocketing 
Angle 
Time 
(ms) 
Location 
1 2.8° 110 Centerline of Post No. 5 
2 4.4° 140 
3 ft – 7.9 in. Upstream from 
Centerline of Blockout No. 1 
3 7.2° 140 
3 ft – 7.9 in. Upstream from 
Centerline of Blockout No. 1 
4 10.1° 290 
3 ft – 7.9 in. Upstream from 
Centerline of Blockout No. 1 
5 10.4° 400 
3 ft – 7.9 in. Upstream from 
Centerline of Blockout No. 1 
6 8.5° 480 
3 ft – 7.9 in. Upstream from 
Centerline of Blockout No. 1 
7 8.9° 320 
2 ft – 7 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Blockout No. 5 
8 8.0° 310 
2 ft – 9.2 in. Upstream from 
Centerline of Blockout No. 5 
9 12.1° 60 
2 ft – 7.1 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 1 
10 18.2° 110 
2 ft – 7.1 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 1 
11 15.3° 150 
9.7 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 1 
12 12.7° 160 
1 ft – 8.5 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 2 
Recommended 
Limits 
23.0° N/A N/A 
12.5 Discussion 
Upon full investigation of the simulation findings for the PCBs-behind-nested thrie beam 
configuration, impact location nos. 11 and 12 yielded maximum roll angles that were either in 
excess, or within 20% of, the MASH limits. However, due to unrealistic rear suspension 
behavior that has plagued this vehicle model in the past, those values would likely be much 
lower. At impact location nos. 1 and 12, the longitudinal ORAs were within 20% of the MASH 
limit due to the vehicle impacting the ground after becoming airborne. Based on these findings, 
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researchers had a high amount of confidence that the PCB-behind-guardrail-with-nested thrie 
beam configuration would successfully pass MASH criterion. Based on the results found for the 
cantilever beam configuration, researchers decided to install a cantilever beam and further 
investigate its safety performance. 
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 PCBs BEHIND NESTED THRIE BEAM WITH CANTILEVER BEAM 13
13.1 Introduction 
Due to the success observed with installing a cantilever beam in the thrie beam-with-
fully-blocked rail-and-cantilever beam configuration of the Flared PCB–Modified G4(1S) design 
concept, and the marginal results associated with the PCBs-behind-nested thrie beam 
configuration, the same cantilever beam was installed on the most upstream PCB to improve 
results. This system utilized a similar setup as used in the previous configuration with a transition 
from modified G4(1S) guardrail to thrie beam and nested thrie beam placed in front of the PCB 
system, as shown in Figure 69. The cantilever beam was again 15 ft (4,572 mm) long. This 
configuration was impacted at the same twelve impact locations. 
 
 
 
Figure 69. PCB Behind Guardrail with Nested Thrie and Cantilever Beam – Impact Locations 
13.2 Vehicle Behavior 
The PCBs-behind-nested thrie beam-with-cantilever beam configuration captured and 
redirected the vehicle with no wheel snag on the PCBs, as shown in Table 27. However, the roll 
angle for impact location no. 1 was 88.7 degrees and had not reached a maximum value prior to 
conclusion of the simulation. Also, the roll angle for impact location no. 12 was within 20% of 
the MASH limit. However, upon further inspection, the excessive roll motion was deemed 
unrealistic and was likely caused by the exaggerated stiffness of the vehicle’s rear suspension 
when the back end of the vehicle impacted the nested thrie beam. The results were very similar 
to those observed for the previous configuration, and both were believed capable of safely 
redirecting the vehicle for all impact locations.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
W-Beam Transition Thrie Beam Nested Thrie Beam 
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Table 27. Vehicle Behavior Results – PCBs Behind Nested Thrie Beam with Cantilever Beam  
Impact 
Location 
Roll Pitch Yaw 
Wheel 
Snag on 
PCBs? 
1 88.7°
1 
23.3°
1 
40.3° No 
2 39.4°
 
19.9° 37.6°
 
No 
3 44.3°
 
7.9°
 
33.6°
 
No 
4 25.3°
 
8.6° 34.4° No 
5 37.8°
 
7.5° 35.9°
 
No 
6 21.3°
 
7.9°
 
34.3°
 
No 
7 28.6° 10.7°
 
35.6°
 
No 
8 26.0° 8.1° 33.7°
 
No 
9 24.1°
 
9.4° 35.4° No 
10 48.1° 15.5° 38.5° No 
11 45.3°
 
11.3° 37.1° No 
12 61.8° 16.7° 41.1° No 
MASH 
Limits 
< 75° < 75° N/A N/A 
1
Maximum value was not reached prior to conclusion of simulation 
*Yellow cells denote values within 20% of MASH or recommended limits 
*Red cells denote values that exceed MASH or recommended limits 
13.3 Occupant Risk 
The occupant risk values for the PCBs-behind-nested thrie beam-with-cantilever beam 
configuration revealed two values within 20% of the MASH limits, as shown in Table 28. The 
maximum longitudinal ORA for impact location nos. 1 and 12 were -16.70 g’s and -16.92 g’s, 
respectively. These high ORA values occurred after the vehicle became airborne upon 
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redirection and impacted the ground. Researchers determined that a more stable vehicle capture 
and redirection was necessary to reduce these high ORA values. 
Table 28. Occupant Risk Results – PCBs Behind Nested Thrie Beam with Cantilever Beam 
Impact 
Location 
OIV  
ft/s  
(m/s) 
ORA 
g's 
Longitudinal Lateral Longitudinal Lateral 
1 
-14.80 
(-4.51) 
-17.33 
(-5.28) 
-13.09 -16.70 
2 
-18.90 
(-5.76) 
-23.13 
(-7.05) 
-12.88 -13.88 
3 
-17.65 
(-5.38) 
-20.37 
(-6.21) 
4.23 -6.33 
4 
-17.29 
(-5.27) 
-20.41 
(-6.22) 
-5.26 -12.56 
5 
-16.40 
(-5.00) 
-19.00 
(-5.79) 
-5.64 -6.77 
6 
-18.18 
(-5.54) 
-20.41 
(-6.22) 
-4.78 -7.08 
7 
-19.49 
(-5.94) 
-17.65 
(-5.38) 
-6.82 -8.12 
8 
-17.42 
(-5.31) 
-20.34 
(-6.20) 
-4.56 -5.54 
9 
-18.90 
(-5.76) 
-18.60 
(-5.67) 
-6.46 -6.76 
10 
-17.98 
(-5.48) 
-20.14 
(-6.14) 
-4.54 -6.55 
11 
-19.85 
(-6.05) 
-19.82 
(-6.04) 
-8.40 -6.73 
12 
-19.49 
(-5.94) 
-18.44 
(-5.62) 
-16.92 -10.57 
MASH 
Limits 
≤ 40  
(12.2) 
≤ 40 
(12.2) 
≤ 20.49 ≤ 20.49 
*Yellow cells denote values within 20% of MASH or recommended limits 
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13.4 Pocketing Angle 
The pocketing angles for all twelve impact locations can be found in Table 29, and none 
of the maximum pocketing angles exceeded or came within 20% of the recommended value of 
23 degrees. When compared to the results from the previous configuration without the cantilever 
beam, the maximum pocketing angles were not significantly different. Researchers believe that 
both configurations exhibited a high probability to redirect the vehicle with acceptable pocketing 
angles.  
Table 29. Pocketing Angle Results – PCBs Behind Nested Thrie Beam with Cantilever Beam 
Impact 
Location 
Pocketing 
Angle 
Time 
(ms) 
Location 
1 2.8° 100 Centerline of Post No. 5 
2 4.7° 150 
3 ft – 7.9 in. Upstream from 
Centerline of Blockout No. 1 
3 6.6° 290 
3 ft – 7.9 in. Upstream from 
Centerline of Blockout No. 1 
4 9.7° 280 
3 ft – 7.9 in. Upstream from 
Centerline of Blockout No. 1 
5 9.2° 360 
3 ft – 7.9 in. Upstream from 
Centerline of Blockout No. 1 
6 8.5° 320 
2 ft – 9.2 in. Upstream from 
Centerline of Blockout No. 3 
7 8.6° 340 
2 ft – 7 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Blockout No. 5 
8 7.7° 310 
2 ft – 9.2 in. Upstream from 
Centerline of Blockout No. 5 
9 8.2° 70 
2 ft – 7.1 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 1 
10 11.4° 110 
2 ft – 7.1 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 1 
11 18.3° 110 
2 ft – 7.2 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 2 
12 15.7° 160 
1 ft – 8.5 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 2 
Recommended 
Limits 
23.0° N/A N/A 
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13.5 Discussion 
Upon full investigation of the simulation findings for the PCBs-behind-nested thrie 
beam-with-cantilever beam configuration, impact location nos. 1 and 12 yielded maximum roll 
angles that were either in excess of or within 20% of the MASH limits. However, due to 
unrealistic rear suspension behavior that has plagued this vehicle model in the past, those values 
would likely be much lower. At impact location nos. 1 and 12, the longitudinal ORA were within 
20% of the MASH limit due to the vehicle impacting the ground after becoming airborne. The 
maximum pocketing angles for all twelve impact locations were very comparable to the results 
observed for the previous configuration. Thus, the installation of the cantilever beam did not 
significantly improve the results of the transition and was an unnecessary addition.  
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 SIMULATION RESULTS DISCUSSION 14
14.1 Introduction 
Following simulation of the Flared PCB–Modified G4(1S) design concept, the Parallel 
PCB–Modified G4(1S) design concept, and subsequent configurations, MwRSF researchers 
reviewed and ranked each configuration within each design concept based on metrics for vehicle 
behavior, occupant risk, and rail pocketing. These rankings were presented to and discussed with 
the TAC for future consideration.  
14.2 Flared PCB–Modified G4(1S) Design Concept 
The Flared PCB–Modified G4(1S) design concept utilized an attachment of the modified 
G4(1S) directly to the 15H:1V flared F-shape PCB system using a W-beam end-shoe connection. 
Researchers quickly realized that the modified G4(1S) system lacked the height and stiffness to 
safely capture and redirect the vehicle without rail pocketing concerns. Thus, a transition to thrie 
beam was included in the design, which yielded improved vehicle stability. However, posts had a 
tendency to wedge against the PCBs and caused elevated occupant risk values, and rail pocketing 
angles were also high. Posts were removed due to their tendency to wedge against PCBs. 
Blockouts were installed at a standard 6-ft 3-in. (1,905 mm) post spacing in the next 
configuration.  
The thrie beam-with-fully-blocked rail configuration yielded results with improved 
vehicle stability and occupant risk values but with high rail pocketing values. The pocketing 
behavior was caused by slow displacement of the PCBs at the beginning of the simulation. 
Therefore, the next configuration included a cantilever beam that was attached to the front face 
of the PCB system, which was intended to initiate PCB displacement when impacted by rotated 
posts within the thrie beam system. This configuration yielded similar vehicle stability and 
occupant risk values to the configuration without the cantilever beam, but the cantilever beam 
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helped to improve pocketing angles. However, there were still two impact locations that yielded 
marginal pocketing angles. Thus, researchers nested the thrie beam in front of the PCBs. The 
nesting of the rail was intended to stiffen the guardrail system ahead of the PCB system and 
lower the rail pocketing angles.  
The nested thrie beam-with-fully-blocked rail configuration yielded improved pocketing 
angles, and only one impact location had a pocketing angle of marginal concern. Based on these 
results, the Flared PCB–Modified G4(1S) configurations were ranked, as shown below: 
(1) Nested Thrie Beam with Fully-Blocked Rail, 
(2) Thrie Beam with Fully-Blocked Rail and Cantilever Beam, 
(3) Thrie Beam End-Shoe, 
(4) Thrie Beam with Fully-Blocked Rail, and 
(5) Modified G4(1S) End-Shoe. 
14.3 Parallel PCB–Modified G4(1S) Design Concept 
The Parallel PCB–Modified G4(1S) design concept involved the modified G4(1S) 
guardrail system attaching to the 15H:1V flared PCB system with two PCB segments placed 
parallel to and behind the modified G4(1S) system. The guardrail posts within the modified 
G4(1S) system remained in front of PCB segments placed parallel to and behind the guardrail 
and were intended to initiate PCB displacement after rotation. Based on findings obtained for the 
first design concept and using engineering judgment, modifications were implemented into the 
initial configuration. The rail height of the modified G4(1S) guardrail system proved incapable 
of vehicle capture and redirection, and it was transitioned to thrie beam. Also, the single thrie 
beam yielded high rail pocketing angles, so nested thrie beam was installed in front of the PCB 
system. Also, guardrail posts installed in front of the PCB system showed a tendency to wedge 
against PCBs and cause vehicle instabilities as well as elevated occupant risk values. Therefore, 
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all of the guardrail posts installed in front of PCBs were removed, and blockouts were installed 
behind the nested thrie beam at standard 6-ft 3-in. (1,905 mm) centers. The nested thrie beam-
with-fully-blocked rail configuration yielded two marginal longitudinal ORA values but with 
acceptable vehicle stability and rail pocketing angles. In an attempt to improve the simulation 
results, a cantilever beam was installed to the front face of the most upstream PCB. This 
configuration yielded similar results for the vehicle behavior, occupant risk, and rail pocketing. 
Thus, it was concluded that the cantilever beam did not significantly improve the transition 
system and should not be used. Therefore, the Parallel PCB–Modified G4(1S) configurations 
were ranked in this order: 
(1) PCBs Behind Nested Thrie Beam and 
(2) PCBs Behind Nested Thrie Beam with Cantilever Beam 
14.4 Transition Design Discussion 
These findings were presented to the TAC members. It was recommended that both the 
nested-thrie beam-with-fully-blocked rail configuration and the PCBs behind nested thrie beam 
configuration would have the highest likelihood of successfully meeting TL-3 of MASH. It was 
also noted that the thrie beam-with-fully-blocked rail and cantilever beam-and-thrie beam-end-
shoe connection configurations, along with the PCBs-behind-nested thrie beam-with-cantilever 
beam configuration also had a high likelihood of meeting TL-3 of MASH. The thrie beam-with-
fully-blocked rail configuration had a marginal likelihood of meeting TL-3 of MASH. Finally, 
the modified G4(1S) end-shoe configuration had a low likelihood of meeting TL-3 of MASH.  
Once the simulation results for the first two design concepts were presented to the TAC 
members with rankings and recommendations, a discussion about feasibility and complexity 
followed. Concerns were raised by the TAC members that the some of the configurations were 
overly complex and labor intensive. Therefore, the TAC members recommended that the 
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modified G4(1S) be replaced with MGS. It was predicted that the taller top mounting height of 
the MGS would aid in vehicle capture and redirection and not require a transition to thrie beam. 
Other TAC recommendations included the installation of blockouts to the back of the guardrail 
posts installed in front of the PCB system in order to engage the PCBs earlier in the impact event 
and initiate PCB displacement. Another TAC recommendation was to install a blockout from the 
back of the guardrail post to the front of the cantilever beam. Therefore, a simulation study was 
conducted on a transition system that included MGS instead of modified G4(1S) guardrail. 
14.5 Flared PCB–MGS Design Concept 
Based on the concern that was expressed about the complexity of installing thrie beam, 
nested rail, and a cantilever beam in the first two design concepts, researchers explored the 
option of using the 31-in. (787-mm) tall MGS. Researchers believed that an increased top-rail 
height would improve vehicle capture and redirection. Similar to the Flared PCB–Modified 
G4(1S) design concept, the MGS was attached to the 15H:1V flared F-shape PCB system using a 
W-beam end-shoe connection. The 15H:1V flared PCB system extended behind the guardrail 
system, as shown in Figure 70. The two posts that remained in front of the PCBs were intended 
to aid in PCB displacement. Upon impact, the posts were expected to rotate backward into the 
PCBs and initiate PCB displacement, which would reduce vehicle climb and instabilities. Based 
on the results, several modifications could be made to the transition system to improve its 
likelihood of success. These modifications included: blockouts installed from the back of 
guardrail posts to PCBs, installation of a cantilever beam on the front face of the most upstream 
PCB, blockouts installed from the back of guardrail posts to the cantilever beam, nesting of rail 
components, removal of posts in front of PCBs, and installation of blockouts between rail and 
PCBs. 
  
Ju
n
e 2
6
, 2
0
1
4
  
M
w
R
S
F
 R
ep
o
rt N
o
. T
R
P
-0
3
-3
0
0
-1
4
 
1
3
9
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
(1) Blockouts may be installed from back of guardrail posts to PCBs. 
(2) Cantilever beam may be installed on most upstream PCB. 
(3) Blockout may be installed from back of guardrail post to cantilever beam. 
(4) Nesting of rail components may be required. 
(5) May require blockouts between W-beam guardrail and PCBs where post removal was required. 
 
Figure 70. Flared PCB–Modified G4(1S) Design Concept 
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 MIDWEST GUARDRAIL SYSTEM (MGS) END-SHOE 15
15.1 Introduction 
A third design concept was pursued using the Midwest Guardrail System (MGS) in the 
place of the modified G4(1S) guardrail and thrie beam systems. The 31-in. (787-mm) high MGS 
with 12-in. (305-mm) deep blockouts was attached to the fourth F-shape PCB segment using the 
30-in. (762-mm) long, W-beam end-shoe connection. Two guardrail posts remained in front of 
the PCB system, and blockouts were installed on 6-ft 3-in. (1,905 mm) centers between the rail 
and PCBs where posts interfered with PCB placement and were removed. The layout of the 
MGS-end-shoe configuration and ten impact locations are shown in Figure 71. 
 
 
Figure 71. MGS End-Shoe – Impact Locations 
15.2 Vehicle Behavior 
The MGS-end-shoe configuration captured and redirected the vehicle for all ten impact 
locations, and none of the roll, pitch, or yaw angles exceeded or were within 20% of the MASH 
limits, as shown in Table 30. Wheel snag on the PCB was found at impact location nos. 8 and 9. 
While there is no criterion associated with wheel snag on the PCBs, it was monitored because 
prior testing had indicated that wheel snag can lead to vehicle instabilities and increased 
decelerations. In this configuration, wheel snag was minor and did not cause vehicle instability 
or excessive deceleration. Thus, the MGS-end-shoe configuration would likely meet the TL-3 
MASH criteria in terms of vehicle stability. 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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Table 30. Vehicle Behavior Results – MGS End-Shoe 
Impact 
Location 
Roll Pitch Yaw 
Wheel 
Snag on 
PCBs? 
1 49.9°
1 
40.6°
1 
40.7° No 
2 26.5°
 
14.0° 42.8°
1 
No 
3 7.7°
 
9.6°
 
46.9°
1 
No 
4 8.1°
 
8.8° 47.2°
1 
No 
5 6.0°
 
6.5° 29.1°
1 
No 
6 4.6°
 
8.2°
 
38.6°
1 
No 
7 6.2° 5.4°
 
41.8°
 
No 
8 9.9° 9.3° 42.7°
1 
Yes 
9 16.8°
 
10.8° 47.2° Yes 
10 12.0° 8.8° 43.5°
1 
No 
MASH 
Limits 
< 75° < 75° N/A N/A 
1
Maximum value was not reached prior to conclusion of simulation 
*Yellow cells denote values within 20% of MASH or recommended limits 
15.3 Occupant Risk 
The occupant risk evaluation for the MGS-end-shoe configuration yielded results with 
two values within 20% of the MASH limits, as shown in Table 31. The maximum OIVs for 
impact location nos. 3 and 5 were -32.55 ft/s (-9.92 m/s) and -35.66 ft/s (-10.87 m/s), 
respectively. Due to the higher rail height of the MGS, the bumper of the pickup truck protruded 
underneath the W-beam rail upon impact. As the vehicle deformed the MGS, the wheel engaged 
the F-shape PCB system. This contact led to vehicle climb up the PCB face, which caused the 
bumper to lift and twist the W-beam as well as allowed vehicle snag on the blockouts in front of 
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the PCBs, as shown in Figure 72. This twisting and lifting of the W-beam guardrail caused 
concern for rail rupture and system failure. This behavior was not seen in either the modified 
G4(1S) or thrie beam configurations, because neither allowed the vehicle’s bumper to protrude 
underneath the rail. 
Table 31. Occupant Risk Results – MGS End-Shoe  
Impact 
Location 
OIV  
ft/s  
(m/s) 
ORA 
g's 
Longitudinal Lateral Longitudinal Lateral 
1 
-19.23 
(-5.86) 
-19.00 
(-5.79) 
-12.18 -9.95 
2 
-27.26 
(-8.31) 
-20.01 
(-6.10) 
-5.74 -9.63 
3 
-32.55 
(-9.92) 
-16.86 
(-5.14) 
-10.94 -8.70 
4 
-30.15 
(-9.19) 
-18.37 
(-5.60) 
-8.59 -7.60 
5 
-35.66 
(-10.87) 
-17.16 
(-5.23) 
-10.35 -8.30 
6 
-27.43 
(-8.36) 
-16.47 
(-5.02) 
-15.32 -10.73 
7 
-22.87 
(-6.97) 
-17.65 
(-5.38) 
-9.75 -8.75 
8 
-20.96 
(-6.39) 
-19.88 
(-6.06) 
-15.36 -9.06 
9 
-15.42 
(-4.70) 
-16.83 
(-5.13) 
-11.57 -11.28 
10 
-15.29 
(-4.66) 
-16.80 
(-5.12) 
-9.27 -9.13 
MASH 
Limits 
≤ 40  
(12.2) 
≤ 40 
(12.2) 
≤ 20.49 ≤ 20.49 
*Yellow cells denote values within 20% of MASH or recommended limits 
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Figure 72. W-Beam Lifting and Twisting for Impact Location No. 5 at 140 ms 
15.4 Pocketing Angle 
The pocketing angles for all ten impact locations can be found in Table 32, and the 
maximum pocketing angles for all of the impact locations upstream of the PCB system either 
exceeded, or were within 20% of, the recommended value of 23 degrees. Upon impact, the 
guardrail posts began to rotate, and the two posts located in front of the PCBs rotated and 
contacted the PCBs. While this post rotation initiated PC displacement, it also severely slowed 
the post rotation, which caused high pocketing angles, as shown in Figure 73. 
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Table 32. Pocketing Angle Results – MGS End-Shoe 
Impact 
Location 
Pocketing 
Angle 
Time 
(ms) 
Location 
1 1.0° 60 Centerline of Post No. 1 
2 11.5° 60 
2 ft – 6.8 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Blockout No. 2 
3 14.6° 60 
2 ft – 10.0 in. Upstream from 
Centerline of Blockout No. 2 
4 15.2° 70 
2 ft – 9.5 in. Upstream from 
Centerline of Blockout No. 3 
5 16.8° 70 
3 ft – 6.0 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 1 
6 17.9° 120 
2 ft – 7.4 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 1 
7 21.3° 120 
2 ft – 6.8 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 2  
8 21.3° 130 
2 ft – 9.0 in. Upstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 2 
9 24.7° 200 
2 ft – 7.4 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 3 
10 19.9° 270 
2 ft – 7.4 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 3 
Recommended 
Limits 
23.0° N/A N/A 
*Yellow cells denote values within 20% of MASH or recommended limits 
*Red cells denote values that exceed MASH or recommended limits 
 
Figure 73. Pocketing Angle for Impact Location No. 9 at 200 ms 
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15.5 Discussion 
Upon full investigation of the simulation findings for the MGS-end-shoe configuration, it 
was determined that the taller MGS improved vehicle engagement and yielded much lower 
vehicle stability values than those observed for both the modified G4(1S) and thrie beam 
systems. However, at impact location nos. 3 and 5, the longitudinal OIVs were within 20% of the 
MASH limit, which was caused by vehicle snag on the blockouts and lifting and twisting of the 
W-beam. This lifting and twisting of the W-beam guardrail had potential to result in rail rupture. 
The four impact locations upstream from the PCB system yielded maximum pocketing angles 
either in excess, or within 20%, of the recommended value of 23 degrees. Based on these 
findings, it was determined that the MGS-end-shoe configuration had a marginal chance of 
success. There were pocketing and occupant risk concerns for this system, so researchers 
explored options to reduce both issues. 
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 MGS WITH BLOCKOUTS BEHIND POSTS 16
16.1 Introduction 
Inertial resistance of the PCB system and subsequent vehicle pocketing were the primary 
concerns for the MGS-end-shoe configuration. Blockouts were added to the back of two 
guardrail posts installed in front of the PCBs. By eliminating the gap between the guardrail posts 
and face of the PCBs, the PCBs were predicted to begin displacing earlier in the impact event. 
The layout for the MGS-with-blockouts-behind-posts configuration and ten impact locations are 
shown in Figure 74. 
 
 
Figure 74. MGS with Blockouts Behind Posts – Impact Locations 
16.2 Model Modifications 
16.2.1 Blockouts behind Posts 
One blockout was installed on the back of each of the two guardrail posts installed in 
front of the PCB system. The geometry of the blockouts required a 5.81-degree vertical taper, 
along with a 3.81-degree longitudinal cut similar to the blockouts shown in Figure 60. The two 
blockouts were 6 in. (152 mm) wide x 14¼ in. (362 mm) long and had depths of 13½ in. (343 
mm) and 8½ in. (216 mm), as shown in Figure 75. 
 
Figure 75. Blockouts Behind Posts Depths 
The blockouts were made of the same simplified wood material as used in the previous 
blockouts. Due to modeling limitations and complex fracture mechanics of wood, failure was not 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
13½ in. 8½ in. 
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defined for these blockouts. The blockouts were rigidly attached to the backside of the posts 
using spotwelds with no failure criteria. The blockouts were not attached to the PCBs as they 
were intended to initiate displacement but not provide continuity between the two systems.  
16.3 Vehicle Behavior 
The MGS-with-blockouts-behind-posts configuration captured and redirected the vehicle 
for all ten impact locations, and none of the roll, pitch, or yaw angles exceeded or were within 
20% of the MASH limits, as shown in  
Table 33. Wheel snag on the PCBs was found at impact location no. 8. The wheel snag 
was minor and did not cause vehicle instability or excessive deceleration. 
Table 33. Vehicle Behavior Results – MGS with Blockouts Behind Posts 
Impact 
Location 
Roll Pitch Yaw 
Wheel 
Snag on 
PCBs? 
1 37.3°
 
30.3°
1 
40.3° No 
2 19.2°
1 
13.4° 48.8°
1 
No 
3 7.1°
 
9.4°
 
46.4°
1 
No 
4 7.3°
 
9.6° 26.8°
 
No 
5 7.8°
 
7.7° 30.8°
1 
No 
6 7.7°
 
6.5°
 
34.8°
1 
No 
7 6.9° 12.2°
 
57.1°
1 
No 
8 7.7° 11.5° 46.2°
1 
Yes 
9 14.9°
 
7.8° 41.9°
1 
No 
10 13.0° 8.2° 45.2°
1 
No 
MASH 
Limits 
< 75° < 75° N/A N/A 
1
Maximum value was not reached prior to conclusion of simulation 
*Yellow cells denote values within 20% of MASH or recommended limits 
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16.4 Occupant Risk 
The occupant risk evaluation for the MGS-with-blockouts-behind-posts configuration 
yielded five values within 20% of the MASH limits, as shown in Table 34. The maximum 
longitudinal OIVs for impact location nos. 3, 4, and 5 were -32.05 ft/s (-9.77 m/s), -32.45 ft/s     
(-9.89 m/s), and -33.01 ft/s (-10.06 m/s) respectively. Also, the maximum ORAs for impact 
location nos. 7 and 8 were -17.21 g’s and -19.55 g’s, respectively. These elevated ORAs 
occurred after the vehicle’s bumper protruded underneath the W-beam with the wheel engaged 
with the PCBs and causing vehicle climb. The vehicle climb caused lifting and twisting of the 
rail as well as vehicle snag on the blockouts between the rail and the PCBs. This twisting and 
lifting of the W-beam guardrail also caused concern for rail rupture and system failure. 
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Table 34. Occupant Risk Results – MGS with Blockouts Behind Posts 
Impact 
Location 
OIV  
ft/s  
(m/s) 
ORA 
g's 
Longitudinal Lateral Longitudinal Lateral 
1 
-19.49 
(-5.94) 
-18.83 
(-5.74) 
12.79 -10.30 
2 
-27.99 
(-8.53) 
-20.57 
(-6.27) 
-8.28 -9.61 
3 
-32.05 
(-9.77) 
-17.65 
(-5.38) 
-9.63 -10.43 
4 
-32.45 
(-9.89) 
-16.99 
(-5.18) 
-10.03 -7.22 
5 
-33.01 
(-10.06) 
-17.62 
(-5.37) 
-11.08 5.84 
6 
-23.95 
(-7.30) 
-15.85 
(-4.83) 
-15.31 -7.22 
7 
-27.10 
(-8.26) 
-19.75 
(-6.02) 
-17.21 -8.13 
8 
-20.11 
(-6.13) 
-18.27 
(-5.57) 
-19.55 -9.48 
9 
-16.27 
(-4.96) 
-17.85 
(-5.44) 
-9.88 -7.40 
10 
-15.65 
(-4.77) 
-17.09 
(-5.21) 
-8.32 -8.40 
MASH 
Limits 
≤ 40  
(12.2) 
≤ 40 
(12.2) 
≤ 20.49 ≤ 20.49 
*Yellow cells denote values within 20% of MASH or recommended limits 
16.5 Pocketing Angle 
The pocketing angles for all ten impact locations can be found in Table 35, and the 
maximum pocketing angles for all of the impact locations upstream of the PCB system either 
exceeded, or were within 20% of, the recommended value of 23 degrees. The blockouts on the 
backside of the guardrail posts and placed in front of the PCBs were installed in order to initiate 
PCB displacement earlier in the impact event. However, these blockouts created a stiffened area, 
which actually increased the majority of the maximum pocketing angles. 
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Table 35. Pocketing Angle Results – MGS with Blockouts Behind Posts 
Impact 
Location 
Pocketing 
Angle 
Time 
(ms) 
Location 
1 1.0° 60 Centerline of Post No. 1 
2 11.6° 60 
2 ft – 6.8 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Blockout No. 2 
3 14.6° 60 
2 ft – 10.0 in. Upstream from 
the Centerline of Blockout No. 
2 
4 15.0° 70 
2 ft – 9.5 in. Upstream from 
Centerline of Blockout No. 3 
5 15.6° 60 
3 ft – 6.0 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 1 
6 16.2° 140 
2 ft – 7.4 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 1 
7 27.3° 120 
2 ft – 6.8 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 1 
8 26.2° 110 
2 ft – 7.4 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 3 
9 28.6° 190 
2 ft – 7.4 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 3 
10 19.6° 280 
2 ft – 7.4 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 3 
Recommended 
Limits 
23.0° N/A N/A 
*Yellow cells denote values within 20% of MASH or recommended limits 
*Red cells denote values that exceed MASH or recommended limits 
The maximum pocketing angle at impact location no. 9 was 28.6 degrees, which was well 
above the recommended value of 23 degrees. The maximum pocketing angles were increased 
with the blockout installation, since these posts must overcome both the post-soil forces and PCB 
inertia prior to the initiating PCB displacement. The delay in PCB displacement allowed the 
vehicle to greatly deform the MGS and pocket within the guardrail upstream from the PCB 
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system before the PCBs began to displace. The sequentials of impact location no. 9, as shown in 
Figure 76, indicate that the PCBs had not begun to displace at 100 ms after impact. By 200 ms, 
the vehicle was near the upstream end of the PCB system, and the maximum vehicle pocketing 
had occurred, while the PCBs had just begun displacing. 
16.6 Discussion 
Upon full investigation of the simulation findings for the MGS-with-blockouts-behind-
posts configuration, it was determined that blockout installation between the backside of 
guardrail posts and the PCBs increased occupant risk values as well as maximum pocketing 
angles. At impact location nos. 3, 4, and 5, the longitudinal OIVs were within 20% of the MASH 
limit. Also, at impact location nos. 7 and 8, the longitudinal ORAs were within 20% of the 
MASH limits. The four impact locations upstream from the PCB system yielded maximum 
pocketing angles either in excess, or within 20%, of the recommended value of 23 degrees. 
Based on these findings, it was determined that blockouts placed behind posts increased the 
likelihood of failure for the transition and thus were not recommended. Researchers continued to 
explore other options to initiate PCB displacement earlier in the impact event. 
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                             0 ms                                                                  500 ms 
 
                            100 ms                                                                600 ms 
 
                            200 ms                                                                700 ms 
 
                            300 ms                                                                800 ms 
 
                            400 ms                                                                  900 ms 
 
Figure 76. MGS with Blockouts Behind Posts Sequentials, Impact Location No. 9 
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 MGS WITH CANTILEVER BEAM 17
17.1 Introduction 
Previously, the installation of a cantilever beam on the upstream PCB had demonstrated 
some success in reducing pocketing concerns in the Flared PCB–Modified G4(1S) design 
concept. Thus, a cantilever beam was installed on the most upstream PCB to investigate if it 
improved the performance of the transition. This configuration utilized an MGS system with W-
beam end-shoe connected to the fourth PCB segment, two guardrail posts installed in front of the 
PCB system, blockouts installed at 6-ft 3-in. (1,905 mm) centers, and a cantilever beam attached 
to the most upstream PCB. The configuration, as shown in Figure 77, was impacted at the same 
ten impact locations as previously used. The cantilever beam conformed to the same 15-ft 
(4,572-mm) long section that was previously used.  
 
 
Figure 77. MGS with Cantilever Beam – Impact Locations 
17.2 Vehicle Behavior 
The MGS-with-cantilever beam configuration captured and redirected the vehicle for all 
ten impact locations, and none of the roll, pitch, or yaw angles exceeded, or were within 20% of, 
the MASH limits, as shown in Table 36. It was also found that there was no wheel snag on the 
upstream end of the PCB system. Therefore, researchers determined that the MGS-with-
cantilever beam configuration would likely meet the TL-3 MASH criteria for vehicle stability. 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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Table 36. Vehicle Behavior Results – MGS with Cantilever Beam 
Impact 
Location 
Roll Pitch Yaw 
Wheel 
Snag on 
PCBs? 
1 47.6°
 
43.1°
1 
40.8° No 
2 12.3°
 
11.4° 39.9°
 
No 
3 8.0°
 
10.0°
 
51.8°
1 
No 
4 10.7°
1 
10.2° 46.2°
1 
No 
5 6.7°
 
7.9° 31.0°
1 
No 
6 5.0°
1 
8.2°
 
38.6°
1 
No 
7 7.9° 9.6°
 
42.3°
 
No 
8 7.6° 9.1° 43.4°
1 
No 
9 9.4°
 
7.1° 47.3°
1 
No 
10 14.5° 8.7° 41.7°
1 
No 
MASH 
Limits 
< 75° < 75° N/A N/A 
1
Maximum value was not reached prior to conclusion of simulation 
17.3 Occupant Risk 
The simulation results for the MGS-with-cantilever beam configuration showed only one 
impact location with an occupant risk value within 20% of the MASH limits, as shown in Table 
37. The maximum longitudinal OIV for impact location no. 5 was -36.52 ft/s (-11.13 m/s). This 
elevated OIV occurred after the vehicle’s bumper protruded underneath the MGS and allowed 
the wheel to engage the PCBs, thus causing vehicle climb. The vehicle climb caused lifting and 
twisting of the rail as well as vehicle snag on the blockouts between the rail and PCBs. This 
twisting and lifting of the W-beam guardrail caused concern for rail rupture and system failure. 
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Table 37. Occupant Risk Results – MGS with Cantilever Beam 
Impact 
Location 
OIV  
ft/s  
(m/s) 
ORA 
g's 
Longitudinal Lateral Longitudinal Lateral 
1 
-19.39 
(-5.91) 
-18.96 
(-5.78) 
-9.92 -7.71 
2 
-27.76 
(-8.46) 
-20.28 
(-6.18) 
-7.10 -10.26 
3 
-27.66 
(-8.43) 
-16.50 
(-5.03) 
-12.84 -6.85 
4 
-30.25 
(-9.22) 
-17.19 
(-5.24) 
-6.87 -7.34 
5 
-36.52 
(-11.13) 
-17.13 
(-5.22) 
-13.75 -9.08 
6 
-27.46 
(-8.37) 
-16.21 
(-4.94) 
-12.94 -8.77 
7 
-31.30 
(-9.54) 
-14.44 
(-4.40) 
-16.30 -11.94 
8 
-19.68 
(-6.00) 
-18.24 
(-5.56) 
-13.88 -11.02 
9 
-21.33 
(-6.50) 
-18.08 
(-5.51) 
-12.17 -8.93 
10 
-15.03 
(-4.58) 
-16.86 
(-5.14) 
-12.62 -11.48 
MASH 
Limits 
≤ 40  
(12.2) 
≤ 40 
(12.2) 
≤ 20.49 ≤ 20.49 
*Yellow cells denote values within 20% of MASH or recommended limits 
17.4 Pocketing Angle 
The pocketing angles for all ten impact locations can be found in Table 38. The 
maximum pocketing angles for the impact locations upstream from the PCB system either 
exceeded or were within 20% of the recommended value. While these values are concerning, the 
collective results show that the cantilever beam helped to lower pocketing angles at almost every 
impact location over what was observed for the two previous MGS configurations.  
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Table 38. Pocketing Angle Results – MGS with Cantilever Beam 
Impact 
Location 
Pocketing 
Angle 
Time 
(ms) 
Location 
1 1.0° 120 Centerline of Post No. 1 
2 11.6° 60 
2 ft – 6.8 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Blockout No. 2 
3 14.6° 60 
2 ft – 10.0 in. Upstream from 
Centerline of Blockout No. 2 
4 15.1° 70 
2 ft – 9.5 in. Upstream from 
Centerline of Blockout No. 3 
5 16.8° 70 
3 ft – 6.0 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 1 
6 17.8° 120 
2 ft – 7.4 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 1 
7 19.0° 130 
2 ft – 6.8 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 2 
8 21.3° 220 
2 ft – 6.8 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 2 
9 20.8° 120 
2 ft – 6.8 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 4 
10 24.0° 190 
2 ft – 6.8 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 4 
Recommended 
Limits 
23.0° N/A N/A 
*Yellow cells denote values within 20% of MASH or recommended limits 
*Red cells denote values that exceed MASH or recommended limits 
17.5 Discussion 
Upon full investigation of the simulation findings for the MGS-with-cantilever beam 
configuration, the cantilever beam was found to reduce occupant risk values and pocketing 
angles. Only impact location no. 5 had a longitudinal OIV within 20% of the MASH limit. Also, 
the four impact locations upstream from the PCB system still yielded pocketing angles either in 
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excess, or within 20%, of the recommended value of 23 degrees. Based on these findings, the 
MGS-with-cantilever beam configuration had the highest propensity for successfully meeting 
TL-3 of MASH out of the MGS configurations thus far. However, other options were explored to 
initiate PCB displacement earlier in the impact event and reduce pocketing angles. 
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 MGS WITH BLOCKOUT TO CANTILEVER BEAM 18
18.1 Introduction 
The MGS-with-cantilever beam configuration showed that the installation of a cantilever 
beam aided in reducing pocketing angles. Thus, it was further explored with modifications. The 
greatest pocketing concerns occurred at impact locations upstream from the PCB system, which 
were related to delayed PCB displacement. A blockout was installed on the backside of the 
guardrail post located in front of the cantilever beam in order to engage it earlier in the impact 
event. The configuration layout, as shown in Figure 78, was impacted at the same ten impact 
locations as previously used. 
 
 
Figure 78. MGS with Blockout to Cantilever Beam – Impact Locations 
18.2 Model Modifications 
18.2.1 Blockout to Cantilever Beam 
One blockout was installed between the back of the guardrail post and the front of the 
cantilever beam, which was attached to the most upstream PCB. The geometry of the spacer 
blocks required a 5.81-degree vertical taper along with a 3.81-degree longitudinal cut similar to 
the blockouts shown in Figure 60. The blockout was 6 in. (152 mm) wide x 14¼ in. (362 mm) 
long and had a depth of 12½ in. (318 mm), as shown in Figure 79. 
 
Figure 79. Blockout to Cantilever Beam Depth 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
12½ in. 
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The blockout was made of the same simplified wood material as used for the previous 
blockouts. Due to modeling limitations and complex fracture mechanics of wood, failure was not 
defined for this blockout. The blockout was rigidly attached to the backside of the post using 
spotwelds without failure criteria. The blockout was not attached to the cantilever beam, as it 
was intended to initiate PCB displacement and not provide continuity between the two barrier 
systems.  
18.3 Vehicle Behavior 
The MGS-with-blockout-to-cantilever beam configuration captured and redirected the 
vehicle for all ten impact locations, and none of the roll, pitch, or yaw angles exceeded or were 
within 20% of the MASH limits, as shown in Table 39. No wheel snag was found on the 
upstream end of the PCB system. Therefore, the MGS-with-blockout-to-cantilever beam 
configuration would likely meet the TL-3 MASH criteria for vehicle stability. 
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Table 39. Vehicle Behavior Results – MGS with Blockout to Cantilever Beam 
Impact 
Location 
Roll Pitch Yaw 
Wheel 
Snag on 
PCBs? 
1 44.0°
 
40.7°
1 
40.4° No 
2 24.4°
 
14.6° 40.8°
1 
No 
3 9.0°
 
12.6°
1 
55.4°
1 
No 
4 6.9°
 
9.2° 33.1°
1 
No 
5 8.6°
 
9.8° 15.4°
 
No 
6 5.5°
 
9.2°
 
38.8°
1 
No 
7 9.1° 7.1°
 
40.6°
 
No 
8 12.8° 10.9° 42.8°
1 
No 
9 10.9°
 
7.4° 44.8°
1 
No 
10 13.3° 9.0° 41.9°
1 
No 
MASH 
Limits 
< 75° < 75° N/A N/A 
1
Maximum value was not reached prior to conclusion of simulation 
18.4 Occupant Risk 
The occupant risk results for the MGS-with-blockout-to-cantilever beam configuration 
yielded one value within 20% of the MASH limits, as shown in Table 40. The maximum 
longitudinal OIV for impact location no. 5 was -35.99 ft/s (-10.97 m/s). This elevated OIV 
occurred after the vehicle’s bumper protruded underneath the W-beam rail and allowed the 
wheel to engage the PCBs, thus causing vehicle climb. The vehicle climb caused lifting and 
twisting of the rail as well as vehicle snag on the blockouts between the rail and PCBs. This 
twisting and lifting of the W-beam guardrail caused concern for rail rupture and system failure. 
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Table 40. Occupant Risk Results – MGS with Blockout to Cantilever Beam 
Impact 
Location 
OIV  
ft/s  
(m/s) 
ORA 
g's 
Longitudinal Lateral Longitudinal Lateral 
1 
-19.23 
(-5.86) 
-18.83 
(-5.74) 
-11.75 -9.10 
2 
-27.36 
(-8.34) 
-20.11 
(-6.13) 
9.67 -9.55 
3 
-29.92 
(-9.12) 
-16.44 
(-5.01) 
-10.82 -6.80 
4 
-29.99 
(-9.14) 
-17.85 
(-5.44) 
-8.70 -7.97 
5 
-35.99 
(-10.97) 
-17.03 
(-5.19) 
-9.41 -5.50 
6 
-27.69 
(-8.44) 
-15.72 
(-4.79) 
-11.30 -10.45 
7 
-20.47 
(-6.24) 
-17.95 
(-5.47) 
-10.65 -7.01 
8 
-22.08 
(-6.73) 
-17.13 
(-5.22) 
-15.86 -11.40 
9 
-18.27 
(-5.57) 
-17.49 
(-5.33) 
-10.86 -7.69 
10 
-15.68 
(-4.78) 
-17.45 
(-5.32) 
-10.26 -8.59 
MASH 
Limits 
≤ 40  
(12.2) 
≤ 40 
(12.2) 
≤ 20.49 ≤ 20.49 
*Yellow cells denote values within 20% of MASH or recommended limits 
18.5 Pocketing Angle 
The pocketing angles for all ten impact locations can be found in Table 41, and the 
pocketing angles for all of the impact locations upstream from the PCB system either exceeded, 
or were within 20% of, the recommended value of 23 degrees. For the most part, the blockout 
installation between the back of the guardrail post and the front of the cantilever beam caused the 
pocketing angles to increase instead of decrease.  
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Table 41. Pocketing Angle Results – MGS with Blockout to Cantilever Beam 
Impact 
Location 
Pocketing 
Angle 
Time 
(ms) 
Location 
1 1.0° 160 Centerline of Post No. 1 
2 11.5° 60 
2 ft – 6.8 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Blockout No. 2 
3 14.6° 60 
2 ft – 10.0 in. Upstream from 
Centerline of Blockout No. 2 
4 15.2° 70 
2 ft – 9.5 in. Upstream from 
Centerline of Blockout No. 3 
5 16.8° 70 
3 ft – 6.0 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 1 
6 18.1° 130 
2 ft – 7.4 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 1 
7 20.8° 120 
2 ft – 6.8 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 2 
8 20.6° 200 
2 ft – 6.8 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 2 
9 24.4° 110 
2 ft – 6.8 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 4 
10 26.0° 190 
2 ft – 6.8 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 4 
Recommended 
Limits 
23.0° N/A N/A 
*Yellow cells denote values within 20% of MASH or recommended limits 
*Red cells denote values that exceed MASH or recommended limits 
The maximum pocketing angle at impact location no. 9 was 26.0 degrees which is well 
above the recommended value of 23 degrees. Similar to the MGS-with-blockouts-behind-posts 
transition system, and as found in Chapter 16, the maximum pocketing angles increased because 
the blockout installation stiffened the system, since the post must overcome both the post-soil 
forces and PCB inertia prior to deflection. When the vehicle impacted upstream from the 
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blockout that was attached to the cantilever beam, the rotation of the guardrail post was slowed 
or resisted. The sequentials for impact location no. 10, as shown in Figure 80, indicate that the 
PCBs had not begun to displace at 100 ms after impact. By 200 ms, the vehicle was just 
upstream from the cantilever beam, PCBs had just begun to displace, and the maximum 
pocketing angle of 26.0 degrees had occurred. 
18.6 Discussion 
Upon full investigation of the simulation findings for the MGS-with-blockout-to-
cantilever beam configuration, the addition of the blockout had a negative effect on performance 
even though the cantilever beam helped reduce occupant risk values and pocketing angles. Three 
of the four impact locations upstream from the PCB system yielded higher pocketing angles than 
observed with the cantilever beam alone. Based on these findings, the blockout installation 
between the back of a guardrail post and the front of the cantilever beam was not recommended 
for further testing and evaluation. Therefore, other options were explored to initiate PCB 
displacement earlier in the impact event and reduce pocketing angles. 
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                             0 ms                                                                  500 ms 
 
                            100 ms                                                                600 ms 
 
                            200 ms                                                                700 ms 
 
                            300 ms                                                                800 ms 
 
                            400 ms                                                                  900 ms 
 
Figure 80. MGS with Blockout to Cantilever Beam Sequentials, Impact Location No. 10 
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 NESTED MGS 19
19.1 Introduction 
While the installation of a cantilever beam on the most upstream PCB was successful in 
reducing pocketing angles, some pocketing angles still exceeded, or within 20% of, the 
recommended value of 23 degrees for impact locations upstream from the PCB system. 
Therefore, nested MGS was considered in front of the PCB system in order to further stiffen the 
guardrail ahead of the PCBs and help reduce rail pocketing. The nested MGS layout and ten 
impact locations are shown in Figure 81. 
 
 
 
Figure 81. Nested MGS – Impact Locations 
19.2 Vehicle Behavior 
The nested-MGS configuration captured and redirected the vehicle for all ten impact 
locations, and none of the roll, pitch, or yaw angles exceeded or were within 20% of the MASH 
limits, as shown in Table 42. No wheel snag on the PCBs was found. Therefore, the nested MGS 
configuration would likely meet the TL-3 MASH criteria for vehicle stability. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Nested MGS MGS 
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Table 42. Vehicle Behavior Results – Nested MGS 
Impact 
Location 
Roll Pitch Yaw 
Wheel 
Snag on 
PCBs? 
1 42.7°
 
26.0°
 
42.4° No 
2 25.3°
 
13.9° 35.9°
1 
No 
3 42.8°
 
14.7°
 
38.5°
 
No 
4 26.1°
 
9.7° 40.9°
 
No 
5 5.2°
 
6.2° 36.4°
1 
No 
6 14.7°
 
7.8°
 
35.6°
1 
No 
7 17.8° 5.8°
 
37.2°
1 
No 
8 25.3° 8.2° 40.0°
1 
No 
9 28.7°
 
12.3° 43.0°
 
No 
10 25.0° 9.1°
1 
41.0°
 
No 
MASH 
Limits 
< 75° < 75° N/A N/A 
1
Maximum value was not reached prior to conclusion of simulation 
19.3 Occupant Risk 
The occupant risk results for the nested-MGS configuration did not yield values 
exceeding, or within 20% of, the MASH limits, as shown in Table 43. No vehicle snag on 
oversized blockouts, or lifting and twisting of W-beam was observed in the nested-MGS 
configuration. The increased stiffness of the nested MGS did not allow the vehicle’s bumper to 
deform as far into the guardrail system, which reduced vehicle climb on the PCBs. Thus, the 
nested-MGS configuration would likely meet the TL-3 MASH criteria for occupant risk.  
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Table 43. Occupant Risk Results – Nested MGS 
Impact 
Location 
OIV  
ft/s  
(m/s) 
ORA 
g's 
Longitudinal Lateral Longitudinal Lateral 
1 
-16.47 
(-5.02) 
-20.11 
(-6.13) 
-15.20 -15.86 
2 
-21.26 
(-6.48) 
-21.33 
(-6.50) 
-6.65 -9.73 
3 
-18.54 
(-5.65) 
-20.77 
(-6.33) 
-8.25 -5.85 
4 
-22.54 
(-6.87) 
-20.90 
(-6.37) 
-6.69 -5.12 
5 
-23.52 
(-7.17) 
-19.75 
(-6.02) 
8.57 -7.52 
6 
-19.49 
(-5.94) 
-21.33 
(-6.50) 
-10.73 -8.22 
7 
-16.63 
(-5.07) 
-18.96 
(-5.78) 
-7.90 -11.48 
8 
-16.63 
(-5.07) 
-18.80 
(-5.73) 
-7.08 -10.49 
9 
-18.90 
(-5.76) 
-16.54 
(-5.04) 
-10.49 -12.08 
10 
-16.34 
(-4.98) 
-16.90 
(-5.15) 
-9.20 -9.72 
MASH 
Limits 
≤ 40  
(12.2) 
≤ 40 
(12.2) 
≤ 20.49 ≤ 20.49 
19.4 Pocketing Angle 
The pocketing angles for all ten impact locations can be found in Table 44, and none of 
the pocketing angles for the impact locations upstream from the PCB system exceeded, or were 
within 20% of, the recommended value of 23 degrees. This finding was a major improvement 
over any other MGS configuration, since it was the first system that yielded pocketing angles 
significantly below the recommended value of 23 degrees. Thus, the nesting of the MGS in front 
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of the PCB system had significantly improved pocketing angles. As a result, full-scale crash 
testing of this configuration should reveal a reduced potential for vehicle pocketing and 
excessive rail loads. 
Table 44. Pocketing Angle Results – Nested MGS 
Impact 
Location 
Pocketing 
Angle 
Time 
(ms) 
Location 
1 1.5° 80 
1 ft – 8.8 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 1 
2 7.0° 70 
2 ft – 6.8 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Blockout No. 2 
3 7.7° 150 
2 ft – 6.8 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Blockout No. 2 
4 10.6° 330 
2 ft – 6.8 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Blockout No. 2 
5 12.7° 60 
3 ft – 6.0 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 1 
6 14.5° 120 
2 ft – 7.4 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 1 
7 13.3° 120 
2 ft – 9.5 in. Upstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 1 
8 15.1° 120 
2 ft – 9.0 in. Upstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 2 
9 18.1° 190 
2 ft – 7.4 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 3 
10 13.2° 170 
1 ft – 8.1 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 4 
Recommended 
Limits 
23.0° N/A N/A 
19.5 Discussion 
Upon full investigation of the simulation findings, the nested MGS significantly 
improved the performance of the transition system. No vehicle stability, occupant risk, or 
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pocketing angles exceeded, or were within 20% of, the MASH limits or recommended values. 
These findings demonstrated that the nested-MGS configuration had a high likelihood to meet 
the MASH TL-3 full-scale crash test criteria. 
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 MGS WITH FULLY-BLOCKED RAIL 20
20.1 Introduction 
In the interest of providing the safest transition design, several variations of the MGS and 
PCB configurations were explored. Some of the early MGS configurations revealed wheel snag 
on the upstream end of the PCB and decreased post rotation due to contact with the face of the 
PCBs, thus slowing initiation of PCB displacement. Since some success was observed in post 
removal in front of the PCBs and blockout installation between the thrie beam and PCBs of 
previous configurations, these modifications were implemented with the MGS. The posts in front 
of the PCBs were removed, blockouts were installed in their place, and the MGS configuration 
was impacted at the same ten impact locations, as shown in Figure 82. 
 
 
Figure 82. MGS with Fully-Blocked Rail – Impact Locations 
20.2 Model Modifications 
20.2.1 Post Removal and Blocked Connection 
Upon removal of two posts in front of the PCB, there were six locations where blockout 
implementation was necessary between the rail and PCBs. Due to the 15H:1V flare of the PCB 
system and the sloped face of the F-shape PCBs, the geometry of the blockouts required a 5.81-
degree vertical taper along with a 3.81-degree longitudinal cut, as shown in Figure 60.  In order 
to create the six blockouts for this configuration, one blockout was generated and meshed. Then, 
it was scaled to fit each of the other five locations, as shown in Figure 83. The corresponding 
blockout depths are also shown in Table 45. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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Figure 83. MGS with Fully-Blocked Rail Blockout Setup 
Table 45. MGS with Fully-Blocked Rail Blockout Depths 
Blockout No. Depth, in. (mm) 
1 6⅜ (162) 
2 11 (279) 
3 16⅛ (410) 
4 21⅜ (543)  
5 26¼ (667) 
6 31¼ (794) 
The blockouts were modeled using the same simplified wood material as used for the 
other blockouts. Due to the complicated fracture mechanics of wood, a reliable material 
formulation has yet to be developed that can accurately model wood fracture. Therefore, the 
blockouts had no failure criteria. Along with blockouts, guardrail bolts were installed and scaled 
to fit each new blockout location. The blockout bolts were modeled to connect directly to the 
face of the PCB segments. If these oversized blockouts are used in the final design, additional 
research must be conducted to determine the final configuration for the guardrail bolt-to-PCB 
attachment prior to full-scale crash testing.  
20.3 Vehicle Behavior 
The MGS-with-fully-blocked rail configuration captured and redirected the vehicle for all 
ten impact locations, and none of the roll, pitch, or yaw angles exceeded, or were within 20% of, 
the MASH limits, as shown in Table 46. No wheel snag on the PCBs was found. Therefore, the 
MGS-with-fully-blocked rail configuration would likely meet the TL-3 MASH criteria for 
vehicle stability. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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Table 46. Vehicle Behavior Results – MGS with Fully-Blocked Rail 
Impact 
Location 
Roll Pitch Yaw 
Wheel 
Snag on 
PCBs? 
1 50.4°
 
42.4°
1 
41.0° No 
2 28.6°
1 
13.0° 41.6°
1 
No 
3 30.6°
1 
15.8°
1 
66.0°
1 
No 
4 8.5°
 
9.9° 36.4°
1 
No 
5 9.1°
 
6.7° 39.0°
 
No 
6 13.4°
 
4.9°
 
39.7°
1 
No 
7 11.4° 6.3°
 
32.7°
1 
No 
8 11.2° 4.2° 33.4°
1 
No 
9 7.0°
 
5.0° 40.7°
 
No 
10 11.3° 8.3°
 
42.6°
1 
No 
MASH 
Limits 
< 75° < 75° N/A N/A 
1
Maximum value was not reached prior to conclusion of simulation 
20.4 Occupant Risk 
The occupant risk evaluation for the MGS-with-fully-blocked rail configuration yielded 
one value within 20% of the MASH limits, as shown in Table 47. The maximum longitudinal 
OIV for impact location no. 7 was -37.37 ft/s (-11.39 m/s). This elevated OIV occurred after the 
vehicle’s bumper protruded underneath the MGS and allowed the wheel to engage the PCBs, 
thus resulting in vehicle climb. The vehicle climb caused lifting and twisting of the rail, as well 
as vehicle snag on the blockouts between the rail and PCBs. This twisting and lifting of the MGS 
caused concern for rail rupture and system failure. 
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Table 47. Occupant Risk Results – MGS with Fully-Blocked Rail 
Impact 
Location 
OIV  
ft/s  
(m/s) 
ORA 
g's 
Longitudinal Lateral Longitudinal Lateral 
1 
-19.09 
(-5.82) 
-18.80 
(-5.73) 
-11.56 -6.98 
2 
-27.46 
(-8.37) 
-19.65 
(-5.99) 
9.50 -9.71 
3 
-25.52 
(-7.78) 
-16.86 
(-5.14) 
-9.82 -7.93 
4 
-30.05 
(-9.16) 
-16.83 
(-5.13) 
-11.96 -6.60 
5 
-29.72 
(-9.06) 
-18.21 
(-5.55) 
-10.20 -7.77 
6 
-28.94 
(-8.82) 
-17.32 
(-5.28) 
-13.27 -5.27 
7 
-37.37 
(-11.39) 
-10.33 
(-3.15) 
-13.35 -6.71 
8 
-22.38 
(-6.82) 
-18.93 
(-5.77) 
-14.24 -6.00 
9 
-16.27 
(-4.96) 
-17.91 
(-5.46) 
-10.41 -7.66 
10 
-15.12 
(-4.61) 
-16.96 
(-5.17) 
-8.21 -9.24 
MASH 
Limits 
≤ 40  
(12.2) 
≤ 40 
(12.2) 
≤ 20.49 ≤ 20.49 
*Yellow cells denote values within 20% of MASH or recommended limits 
20.5 Pocketing Angle 
The pocketing angles for all ten impact locations can be found in Table 48, and pocketing 
angles for all of the impact locations upstream from the PCB system either exceeded, or were 
within 20% of, the recommended value of 23 degrees. The removal of two posts in front of the 
PCB system and installation of a blocked connection caused pocketing angles to increase over 
those observed for several of the configurations with two posts in front of the PCBs. This finding 
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demonstrated that installation of a fully-blocked connection was not successful in reducing 
pocketing angles. 
Table 48. Pocketing Angle Results – MGS with Fully-Blocked Rail 
Impact 
Location 
Pocketing 
Angle 
Time 
(ms) 
Location 
1 1.2° 100 
2 ft – 7.4 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 3 
2 11.6° 60 
2 ft – 6.8 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Blockout No. 2 
3 14.9° 70 
2 ft – 10.0 in. Upstream from 
Centerline of Blockout No. 2 
4 15.4° 70 
2 ft – 9.5 in. Upstream from 
Centerline of Blockout No. 3 
5 15.4° 60 
3 ft – 6.0 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 1 
6 15.0° 70 
2 ft – 9.5 in. Upstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 1 
7 18.4° 60 
2 ft – 9.0 in. Upstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 2 
8 28.7° 120 
2 ft – 7.4 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 3 
9 28.0° 190 
2 ft – 7.4 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 3 
10 18.6° 200 
2 ft – 9.5 in. Upstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 1 
Recommended 
Limits 
23.0° N/A N/A 
*Yellow cells denote values within 20% of MASH or recommended limits 
*Red cells denote values that exceed MASH or recommended limits 
20.6 Discussion 
Upon full investigation of the simulation findings for the MGS-with-fully-blocked rail 
configuration, removal of two posts in front of PCBs and installation of a fully-blocked 
connection did not increase the potential for the configuration to meet TL-3 of MASH. The 
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longitudinal OIV for impact location no. 7 was within 20% of the MASH limits. Also, pocketing 
angles for all four impact locations upstream from the PCB system either exceeded, or were 
within 20% of, the recommended value of 23 degrees. Therefore, other options were explored to 
create a safe transition design. 
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 MGS WITH FULLY-BLOCKED RAIL AND CANTILEVER BEAM 21
21.1 Introduction 
Since the replacement of two posts with blockouts in front of the PCB system did not 
reduce pocketing angles or improve the transition, a cantilever beam was installed to the most 
upstream PCB. The MGS-with-fully-blocked rail-and-cantilever beam configuration was 
simulated at the same ten impact locations, as shown in Figure 84. The cantilever beam was 15 ft 
(4,572 mm) long and the same as used in the previous configurations. 
 
 
Figure 84. MGS Fully-Blocked Rail and Cantilever Beam – Impact Locations 
21.2 Vehicle Behavior 
The MGS-with-fully-blocked rail-and-cantilever beam configuration captured and 
redirected the vehicle for all ten impact locations. However, the roll angle for impact location no. 
1 was within 20% of the MASH limit, and it had not reached a maximum value prior to the 
conclusion of the simulation, as shown in Table 49. Upon further inspection, the excessive roll 
motion was deemed unrealistic and likely caused by the exaggerated stiffness of the vehicle’s 
rear suspension when the back end of the vehicle impacted the W-beam. This finding led to the 
conclusion that the MASH limits would not likely be exceeded, and this configuration would 
likely meet the TL-3 MASH vehicle stability criteria for all impact locations.  
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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Table 49. Vehicle Behavior Results – MGS with Fully-Blocked Rail and Cantilever Beam 
Impact 
Location 
Roll Pitch Yaw 
Wheel 
Snag on 
PCBs? 
1 61.3°
1 
47.4°
1 
40.7° No 
2 20.3°
 
14.3° 40.4°
 
No 
3 7.6°
 
9.9°
 
49.2°
1 
No 
4 7.0°
 
8.3° 36.7°
1 
No 
5 6.9°
 
6.4° 40.7°
 
No 
6 9.4°
 
4.9°
 
35.5°
 
No 
7 4.5° 5.9°
 
17.3°
1 
No 
8 5.9° 4.7° 35.0°
 
No 
9 6.2°
 
3.5° 39.6°
1 
No 
10 13.6° 8.1°
 
39.6°
 
No 
MASH 
Limits 
< 75° < 75° N/A N/A 
1
Maximum value was not reached prior to conclusion of simulation 
*Yellow cells denote values within 20% of MASH or recommended limits 
21.3 Occupant Risk 
The occupant risk results for the MGS-with-fully-blocked rail-and-cantilever beam 
configuration yielded one value within 20% of the MASH limits, as shown in Table 50. The 
maximum longitudinal OIV for impact location no. 7 was -37.57 ft/s (-11.45 m/s). This elevated 
OIV occurred after the vehicle’s bumper protruded underneath MGS and allowed the wheel to 
engage the PCBs, thus resulting in vehicle climb. The vehicle climb caused lifting and twisting 
of the MGS as well as vehicle snag on the blockouts between the rail and PCBs. This twisting 
and lifting of the MGS caused concern for rail rupture and system failure.  
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Table 50. Occupant Risk Results – MGS with Fully-Blocked Rail and Cantilever Beam 
Impact 
Location 
OIV  
ft/s  
(m/s) 
ORA 
g's 
Longitudinal Lateral Longitudinal Lateral 
1 
-19.23 
(-5.86) 
-18.80 
(-5.73) 
13.14 10.30 
2 
-27.20 
(-8.29) 
-19.82 
(-6.04) 
7.39 -9.93 
3 
-29.82 
(-9.09) 
-16.93 
(-5.16) 
11.61 -6.46 
4 
-29.79 
(-9.08) 
-16.96 
(-5.17) 
-11.02 -6.84 
5 
-29.00 
(-8.84) 
-17.62 
(-5.37) 
-8.91 -8.43 
6 
-31.10 
(-9.48) 
-16.60 
(-5.06) 
-15.21 -5.19 
7 
-37.57 
(-11.45) 
-13.19 
(-4.02) 
-10.68 -7.69 
8 
-22.97 
(-7.00) 
-19.52 
(-5.95) 
-11.00 -5.95 
9 
-21.26 
(-6.48) 
-17.72 
(-5.40) 
-12.45 -8.96 
10 
-15.09 
(-4.60) 
-17.16 
(-5.23) 
-8.98 -9.04 
MASH 
Limits 
≤ 40  
(12.2) 
≤ 40 
(12.2) 
≤ 20.49 ≤ 20.49 
*Yellow cells denote values within 20% of MASH or recommended limits 
21.4 Pocketing Angle 
The pocketing angles for all ten impact locations can be found in Table 51. While the 
majority of the pocketing angles decreased with the use of the cantilever beam, the pocketing 
angles for all of the impact locations upstream from the PCB system either exceeded, or were 
within 20% of, the recommended value of 23 degrees. 
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Table 51. Pocketing Angle Results – MGS with Fully-Blocked Rail and Cantilever Beam 
Impact 
Location 
Pocketing 
Angle 
Time 
(ms) 
Location 
1 1.3° 100 
2 ft – 7.4 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 3 
2 11.6° 60 
2 ft – 6.8 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Blockout No. 2 
3 14.8° 70 
2 ft – 10.0 in. Upstream from 
Centerline of Blockout No. 2 
4 15.4° 70 
2 ft – 9.5 in. Upstream from 
Centerline of Blockout No. 3 
5 15.3° 60 
3 ft – 6.0 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 1 
6 14.6° 60 
2 ft – 9.5 in. Upstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 1 
7 18.5° 60 
2 ft – 9.0 in. Upstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 2 
8 22.8° 120 
2 ft – 7.4 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 3 
9 23.2° 200 
2 ft – 7.4 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 3 
10 22.8° 190 
2 ft – 6.8 in. Downstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 4 
Recommended 
Limits 
23.0° N/A N/A 
*Yellow cells denote values within 20% of MASH or recommended limits 
*Red cells denote values that exceed MASH or recommended limits 
21.5 Discussion 
Upon full investigation of the simulation findings for the MGS-with-fully-blocked rail-
and-cantilever beam configuration, the installation of the cantilever beam successfully reduced 
pocketing angles. The longitudinal OIV for impact location no. 7 was within 20% of the MASH 
limits, a somewhat minor concern. Based on these findings, the MGS-with-fully-blocked rail-
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and-cantilever beam configuration had the second highest probability of successfully meeting the 
TL-3 criteria outlined in MASH, just behind the nested-MGS configuration. 
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 FLARED PCB–MGS DESIGN CONCEPT SUMMARY 22
22.1 Introduction 
Upon completion of the simulation study for the Flared PCB–MGS design concept, the 
results were reviewed and compared, as was previously completed for the Flared PCB–Modified 
G4(1S) and the Parallel PCB–Modified G4(1S) design concepts in Chapter 14.  
22.2 Flared PCB–MGS Design Concept 
The Flared PCB–MGS design concept was similar to the Flared PCB–Modified G4(1S) 
design concept, except MGS was connected to the 15H:1V flared PCB system in lieu of 
modified G4(1S). The MGS was connected to the upstream end of the fourth PCB segment with 
three PCBs extending behind the rail. Although simulation results for the modified G4(1S) 
indicated that posts in front of PCBs would deform and wedge against the face of PCBs, the 
higher MGS was believed capable to capture and redirect the 2270P vehicle with reduced 
instabilities. Thus, two posts remained in front of the PCB system. Posts were removed when 
they interfered with placement of the PCB system, but blockouts were installed in their place.  
Simulation results for the MGS-end-shoe configuration yielded high occupant risk values 
due to vehicle snag, and pocketing angles were a concern for impacts upstream from the PCB 
system. To initiate PCB displacement earlier in the event, blockouts were installed from the back 
of the posts to the face of the PCBs. Simulation results for the MGS-with-blockouts-behind-posts 
configuration indicated that the additional blockouts stiffened the barrier system, as the posts had 
to overcome post-soil resistance, PCB inertial resistance, and barrier friction. This increased 
resistance resulted in high pocketing angles upstream from the PCB system and elevated 
occupant risk values, which led to the conclusion that blockouts from posts to PCBs should not 
be used.  
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The next configuration utilized a cantilever beam on the upstream PCB to allow specific 
posts to rotate into and contact the cantilever beam in order to initiate PCB displacement. The 
simulation results for the MGS-with-cantilever beam configuration indicated that pocketing 
angles were reduced for impacts upstream from the PCB system, but they were still too high.  
For the next configuration, a blockout was installed between a post and the cantilever 
beam, which could initiate PCB displacement earlier in the event. However, simulation results 
for the MGS-with-blockout-to-cantilever beam configuration indicated that the blockout to the 
cantilever beam stiffened the barrier system, as the post had to overcome post-soil resistance, 
PCB inertial resistance, and barrier friction. As such, a blockout between the cantilever beam 
should not be used.  
In the next configuration, the MGS was nested upstream and in front of the PCB system, 
which would stiffen the barrier system and lower pocketing angles. The simulation results for the 
nested-MGS configuration showed that occupant risk values and pocketing angles were reduced 
to acceptable levels for all impact locations. Some of the early configurations indicated that 
vehicle snag occurred on PCBs, and the next configuration attempted to alleviate snag by 
removal of posts in front of PCBs but with blockouts installed in their place.  
The simulation results for the MGS-with-fully-blocked rail configuration indicated that 
vehicle snag on PCBs was eliminated, but pocketing angles were significantly higher for impacts 
upstream from the PCB system. Therefore, a final configuration utilized a cantilever beam on the 
most upstream PCB. The simulation results for the MGS-with-fully-blocked rail-and-cantilever 
beam configuration indicated that vehicle snag on PCBs did not occur. Although pocketing 
angles decreased, they were still marginal. Based on these results, the Flared PCB–MGS 
configurations were ranked, as shown below: 
(1) Nested MGS, 
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(2) MGS with Fully-Blocked Rail and Cantilever Beam, 
(3) MGS with Cantilever Beam, 
(4) MGS with Blockout to Cantilever Beam, 
(5) MGS End-Shoe, 
(6) MGS with Fully-Blocked Rail, and 
(7) MGS with Blockouts Behind Posts. 
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 SELECTION OF PREFERRED DESIGN ALTERNATIVES 23
23.1 Introduction 
Previously, the Flared PCB–Modified G4(1S), Parallel PCB–Modified G4(1S), and 
Flared PCB–MGS design concepts were simulated with several configurations. These 
configurations were summarized within their respective design concept. Now, all three design 
concepts with their respective configurations will be summarized and ranked together in order to 
select preferred design alternatives. 
23.2 Design Summary and Selection 
In order to select preferred design alternatives, a summary of results for all three design 
concepts with subsequent configurations was prepared, as shown in Tables 52 and 53. The 
maximum value for each evaluation metric was tabulated at each configuration. The minimum 
value for each metric was then highlighted within each design concept in order to better 
understand which configurations represented the safest transition design. Several metrics were 
also noted, including number of impact locations with values exceeding the MASH or 
recommended limit, number of impact locations with values within 20 percent of the MASH or 
recommended limit, and number of values that were deemed realistic or likely representative of a 
physical phenomenon. As previously explained, several high roll angles and occupant risk values 
were attributed to an overly stiff rear suspension in the Chevrolet Silverado pickup truck model. 
They were not deemed accurate and thus should not be heavily considered when selecting 
preferred design alternatives. 
As each design concept was discussed, the configurations were weighed by the number of 
highlighted cells that each possessed, the number of values that exceeded or were within 20% of 
MASH or recommend limits, amount of vehicle snag, practicality, and ease of installation. 
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Table 52. Summary of Design Concepts and Configurations 
Design 
Concepts 
Configurations  
[No. of Impact 
Locations] 
Roll 
[X,Y,Z] 
Pitch 
[X,Y,Z] 
Yaw 
OIV 
ft/s 
(m/s) 
[X,Y,Z] 
ORA 
g's 
[X,Y,Z] 
Wheel 
Snag 
on 
PCBs? 
[X] 
Max. 
Pocketing 
Angle 
[X,Y,Z] 
Longitudinal Lateral Longitudinal Lateral 
Flared 
PCB-
Modified 
G4(1S) 
Baseline [6] 
106.4°
1 
[3,0,3] 
42.7°
1 
[0,0,0] 
90.1°
1
 
-38.68 
(-11.79) 
[0,1,1] 
-19.49 
(-5.94) 
[0,0,0] 
-81.87 
[3,0,3] 
17.27 
[0,1,1] 
Yes  
[3] 
N/A 
Modified G4(1S) 
End-Shoe [6] 
133.6°
1 
[3,0,3] 
32.6°
 
[0,0,0] 
44.2° 
-28.02 
(-8.54) 
[0,0,0] 
-20.44 
(-6.23) 
[0,0,0] 
-23.62 
[1,0,1] 
-11.42 
[0,0,0] 
Yes  
[1] 
23.1° 
[1,2,3] 
Thrie Beam End-
Shoe [9] 
56.5°
1 
[0,0,0] 
24.6°
1 
[0,0,0] 
41.4°
1
 
-24.02 
(-7.32) 
[0,0,0] 
-20.47 
(-6.24) 
[0,0,0] 
-15.20 
[0,0,0] 
-15.57 
[0,0,0] 
No 
21.5° 
[0,2,2] 
Thrie Beam with 
Fully-Blocked Rail 
[9] 
67.4°
1 
[0,1,0] 
26.0°
1 
[0,0,0,] 
66.8° 
-31.20 
(-9.51) 
[0,0,0] 
-22.34 
(-6.81) 
[0,0,0] 
-16.85 
[0,1,1] 
-11.75 
[0,0,0] 
No 
25.4° 
[1,1,2] 
Thrie Beam with 
Fully-Blocked Rail 
and Cantilever Beam 
[9] 
65.3°
1 
[0,1,0] 
29.8°
1 
[0,0,0,] 
62.2°
1
 
-40.52 
(-12.35) 
[1,0,0] 
-22.28 
(-6.79) 
[0,0,0] 
-13.50 
[0,0,0] 
-14.14 
[0,0,0] 
No 
20.5° 
[0,2,2] 
Nested Thrie Beam 
with  
Fully-Blocked Rail 
[9] 
96.9°
1 
[1,1,0] 
27.3°
 
[0,0,0,] 
43.5° 
-23.20 
(-7.07) 
[0,0,0] 
-22.11 
(-6.74) 
[0,0,0] 
-14.42 
[0,0,0] 
-13.03 
[0,0,0] 
No 
20.3° 
[0,1,1] 
Parallel 
PCB-
Modified 
G4(1S) 
PCBs Behind Nested 
Thrie Beam [12] 
83.3°
1 
[1,1,0] 
27.3°
1 
[0,0,0] 
42.5°
1
 
-20.21 
(-6.16) 
[0,0,0] 
-21.92 
(-6.68) 
[0,0,0] 
18.88 
[0,2,2] 
-12.14 
[0,0,0] 
No 
18.2° 
[0,0,0] 
PCBs Behind Nested 
Thrie Beam with 
Cantilever Beam [12] 
88.7°
1 
[1,1,0] 
23.3°
1 
[0,0,0] 
41.1° 
-18.90 
(-5.76) 
[0,0,0] 
-23.13 
(-7.05) 
[0,0,0] 
-16.92 
[0,1,1] 
-16.70 
[0,1,1] 
No 
18.3° 
[0,0,0] 
MASH or Recommended Limit < 75° < 75° N/A 
≤ 40  
(12.2) 
≤ 40 
(12.2) 
≤ 20.49 ≤ 20.49 N/A < 23° 
1
Maximum value was not reached prior to conclusion of simulation 
X – Number of values that exceeded MASH or recommended limit 
Y – Number of values within 20% of MASH or recommended limit 
Z – Sum of X and Y values that were deemed physical (real) phenomenon and not modeling limitations 
 Maximum metric value for Flared PCB–Modified G4(1S) Design Concept 
 Maximum metric value for Parallel PCB–Modified G4(1S) Design Concept 
 Maximum metric value for Flared PCB–MGS Design Concept 
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Table 53. Summary of Design Concepts and Configurations (cont.) 
Design 
Concepts 
Configurations  
[No. of Impact 
Locations] 
Roll 
[X,Y,Z] 
Pitch 
[X,Y,Z] 
Yaw  
[X,Y,Z] 
OIV 
ft/s 
(m/s) 
[X,Y,Z] 
ORA 
g's 
[X,Y,Z] 
Wheel 
Snag 
on 
PCBs? 
[X] 
Max. 
Pocketing 
Angle 
[X,Y,Z] 
Longitudinal Lateral Longitudinal Lateral 
Flared 
PCB-
MGS 
MGS End-Shoe [10] 
49.9°
1 
[0,0,0] 
40.6°
1 
[0,0,0] 
47.2° 
-35.66 
(-10.87) 
[0,2,2] 
-20.01 
(-6.10) 
[0,0,0] 
-15.36 
[0,0,0] 
-11.28 
[0,0,0] 
Yes  
[2] 
24.7° 
[1,3,4] 
MGS with Blockouts 
Behind Posts [10] 
37.3°
 
[0,0,0] 
30.3°
1 
[0,0,0] 
57.1°
1
 
-33.01 
(-10.06) 
[0,3,3] 
-20.57 
(-6.27) 
[0,0,0] 
-19.55 
[0,2,2] 
-10.43 
[0,0,0] 
Yes  
[1] 
28.6° 
[3,1,4] 
MGS with 
Cantilever Beam 
[10] 
47.6°
 
[0,0,0] 
43.1°
1 
[0,0,0] 
51.8°
1
 
-36.52 
(-11.13) 
[0,1,1] 
-20.28 
(-6.18) 
[0,0,0] 
-16.30 
[0,0,0] 
-11.94 
[0,0,0] 
No 
24.0° 
[1,3,4] 
MGS with Blockout 
to Cantilever Beam 
[10] 
44.0°
 
[0,0,0] 
40.7°
1 
[0,0,0] 
55.4°
1
 
-35.99 
(-10.97) 
[0,1,1] 
-20.11 
(-6.13) 
[0,0,0] 
-11.75 
[0,0,0] 
-11.40 
[0,0,0] 
No 
26.0° 
[2,2,4] 
Nested MGS [10] 
42.8°
 
[0,0,0] 
26.0°
 
[0,0,0] 
43.0° 
-23.52 
(-7.17) 
[0,0,0] 
-21.33 
(-6.50) 
[0,0,0] 
-15.20 
[0,0,0] 
-15.86 
[0,0,0] 
No 
18.1° 
[0,0,0] 
MGS with Fully-
Blocked Rail [10] 
50.4°
 
[0,0,0] 
42.4°
1 
[0,0,0] 
66.0°
1
 
-37.37 
(-11.39) 
[0,1,1] 
-19.65 
(-5.99) 
[0,0,0] 
-14.24 
[0,0,0] 
-9.71 
[0,0,0] 
No 
28.7° 
[2,2,4] 
MGS with Fully-
Blocked Rail and 
Cantilever Beam 
[10] 
61.3°
1 
[0,1,0] 
47.4°
1 
[0,0,0] 
49.2°
1
 
-37.57 
(-11.45) 
[0,1,1] 
-19.82 
(-6.04) 
[0,0,0] 
-15.21 
[0,0,0] 
10.30 
[0,0,0] 
No 
23.2° 
[1,3,4] 
MASH or Recommended Limit < 75° < 75° N/A 
≤ 40  
(12.2) 
≤ 40 
(12.2) 
≤ 20.49 ≤ 20.49 N/A < 23° 
1
Maximum value was not reached prior to conclusion of simulation 
X – Number of values that exceeded MASH or recommended limit 
Y – Number of values within 20% of MASH or recommended limit 
Z – Sum of X and Y values that were deemed physical (real) phenomenon and not modeling limitations 
 Maximum metric value for Flared PCB–Modified G4(1S) Design Concept 
 Maximum metric value for Parallel PCB–Modified G4(1S) Design Concept 
 Maximum metric value for Flared PCB–MGS Design Concept 
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The tabulated results were used to rank the configurations within each design concept, as 
well as to establish whether each configuration had a high, moderate, or low likelihood of 
success, as shown in Table 54.  
Table 54. Ranking of Design Configurations 
Rank 
Flared PCB– 
Modified G4(1S) 
Parallel PCB–Modified 
G4(1S) 
Flared PCB–MGS 
1 
Nested Thrie Beam with 
Fully-Blocked Rail 
PCBs Behind Nested 
Thrie Beam 
Nested MGS 
2 
Thrie Beam with Fully-
Blocked Rail and 
Cantilever Beam 
PCBs Behind Nested 
Thrie Beam with 
Cantilever Beam 
MGS with Fully-Blocked 
Rail and Cantilever Beam 
3 Thrie Beam End-Shoe   MGS with Cantilever Beam 
4 
Thrie Beam with Fully-
Blocked Rail 
  
MGS with Blockout to 
Cantilever Beam 
5 
Modified G4(1S) End-
Shoe 
  MGS End-Shoe 
6 Baseline   
MGS with Fully-Blocked 
Rail  
7     
MGS with Blockouts 
Behind Posts 
    
  
High Likelihood of 
Success 
  
  
Moderate Likelihood of 
Success 
    Low Likelihood of Success 
  
Based on the rankings, it was determined that nested MGS stood above other 
configurations. It was the only configuration within all three design concepts that did not display 
concerns for vehicle behavior and occupant risk, or pocketing angle that exceeding or coming 
within 20% of the MASH or recommended values. Also, nesting of MGS would significantly 
increase the ease of installation as compared to several other promising configurations, which 
may include a W-beam guardrail transition to thrie beam, or fabrication and installation of a 
special cantilever beam. Thus, nested MGS was selected as the preferred alternative and 
recommended for full-scale crash testing and evaluation.  
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 CRITICAL IMPACT POINT (CIP) STUDY 24
24.1 Impacts Near End-Shoe Attachment 
Once a preferred design alternative was chosen for full-scale crash testing and evaluation, 
further computer simulation was conducted in order to determine a Critical Impact Point (CIP). 
The first portion of the CIP study was to determine the behavior of the transition system when 
impacted near the location of the end-shoe attachment. Therefore, the nested MGS was simulated 
for impacts at the end-shoe and at four 6-ft 3-in. (1905 mm) spacings farther downstream, as 
shown in Figure 85.  
 
Figure 85. Impact Locations Near End-Shoe Attachment  
Since the nested MGS was not impacted, pocketing angles were not calculated or 
considered for the CIP investigation near the end-shoe. Therefore, only vehicle behavior and 
occupant risk values were evaluated, as shown in Table 55. The simulation results showed that 
the vehicle would remain upright throughout and following the impact event, with very little 
instability for all five impact locations. However, three of the five impact locations displayed 
lateral ORAs within 20% of the MASH limit. Upon further investigation, these high ORAs 
occurred late in the impact event after the back end of the vehicle had impacted the PCB system. 
As noted previously, these high ORAs were likely due to an overly stiff rear suspension of the 
vehicle model and not representative of a physical phenomenon. Therefore, researchers had high 
confidence that impacts near the end-shoe would allow the nested MGS to safely capture and 
redirect the vehicle with vehicle stability and occupant risk values within the MASH TL-3 limits. 
1 2 3 4 5 
  
Ju
n
e 2
6
, 2
0
1
4
  
M
w
R
S
F
 R
ep
o
rt N
o
. T
R
P
-0
3
-3
0
0
-1
4
 
1
8
9
 
Table 55. Results for Impacts Near the End-Shoe Attachment 
Impact 
Location 
Roll Pitch Yaw 
OIV 
ft/s 
(m/s) 
ORA 
g's 
Longitudinal Lateral Longitudinal Lateral 
1 34.4° 28.1°
1
 39.9° 
-16.21 
(-4.94) 
-23.06 
(-7.03) 
-12.34 -20.25 
2 39.9° 26.0°
1
 40.6° 
-13.58 
(-4.14) 
-17.78 
(-5.42) 
-14.63 -16.45 
3 36.7° 26.7°
1
 41.4° 
-16.44 
(-5.01) 
-23.13 
(-7.05) 
12.04 -14.39 
4 14.1° 18.5° 44.1° 
-15.22 
(-4.64) 
-17.49 
(-5.33) 
-11.22 -8.94 
5 35.6° 27.2°
1
 42.2° 
-16.40 
(-5.00) 
-23.00 
(-7.01) 
-11.78 -17.72 
       1
Maximum value was not reached prior to conclusion of simulation 
    *Yellow cells denote values within 20% of MASH or recommended limits 
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24.2 Critical Attachment Location 
The second portion of the CIP study was to determine the critical attachment location of 
the MGS-to-PCB system. The primary concern associated with different attachment locations 
was the number of posts in front of PCBs that could cause vehicle snag, vehicle instabilities, or 
elevated pocketing angles. Since it was determined that the MGS must attach to the fourth PCB 
segment, three attachment locations were considered for the critical attachment location study, as 
shown in Figure 86: 
Case 1 – MGS attached to upstream end of fourth PCB segment, 
Case 2 – MGS attached to fourth PCB segment to allow most upstream PCB segment to 
just miss being contacted by post rotation in front of it, and 
Case 3 – MGS attached to fourth PCB segment to allow most upstream PCB segment to 
be engaged by post rotation in front of it. 
Case 1 was chosen as guardrail attachment to the upstream end of the fourth PCB would 
provide for the least amount of PCB length extending behind the rail and the greatest opportunity 
for vehicle snag on the upstream end of the PCB system. Case 2 was chosen because extending 
PCB segments behind the rail without allowing another guardrail post to engage the PCB 
segment could increase vehicle pocketing upstream from the PCB system. Case 3 was chosen to 
evaluate whether extending PCB segments behind the rail and allowing another post to engage 
the PCB segment could cause vehicle snag on the post as well as vehicle instabilities. 
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Case 1 
 
Case 2 
 
Case 3 
Figure 86. Critical Attachment Cases and Impact Locations 
Each case was simulated at four locations near the upstream end of the PCB system, and 
vehicle behavior values, occupant risk values, and pocketing angles were compiled and 
compared against each other. Both vehicle stability results and occupant risk values were found 
to be well below the MASH limits for all three cases. Thus, these criteria were not used in the 
determination of the critical attachment location. Therefore, maximum pocketing angles were 
used to determine the critical attachment location. For this investigation, it was concluded that 
Case 1 yielded the highest pocketing angles as well as longitudinal OIV and longitudinal ORA, 
and should be used as the critical attachment location for the CIP study. 
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Table 56. Simulation Results – Critical Attachment Location  
1
Maximum value was not reached prior to conclusion of simulation 
 Maximum metric value for Case 1 
 Maximum metric value for Case 2 
 Maximum metric value for Case 3 
 
Impact 
Location 
Roll Pitch Yaw 
OIV 
ft/s 
(m/s) 
ORA 
g's 
Wheel 
Snag 
on 
PCBs? 
Pocketing 
Longitudinal Lateral Longitudinal Lateral 
Max. 
Angle 
Time Location 
Case 1 
7 17.8° 5.8° 37.2°1 
-16.63 
(-5.07) 
-18.96 
(-5.78) 
-7.90 -11.48 No 13.3° 120 
2 ft 9.5 in. Upstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 1  
8 25.3° 8.2° 40.0°1 
-16.63 
(-5.07) 
-18.80 
(-5.73) 
-7.08 -10.49 No 15.1° 120 
2 ft 9.0 in. Upstream  from 
Centerline of Post No. 2 
9 28.7° 12.3° 43.0° 
-18.90 
(-5.76) 
-16.54 
(-5.04) 
-10.49 -12.08 No 18.1° 190 
2 ft 7.4 in. Downstream  from 
Centerline of Post No. 3  
10 25.0° 9.1°1 41.0° 
-16.34 
(-4.98) 
-16.90 
(-5.15) 
-9.20 -9.72 No 13.2° 170 
1 ft 8.1 in. Downstream  from 
Centerline of Post No. 4 
Case 2 
7 16.9° 5.6° 37.7°1 
-16.83 
(-5.13) 
-19.29 
(-5.88) 
-8.09 -9.98 No 12.7° 110 
2 ft - 6.8 in. Downstream  
from Centerline of Post No. 2 
8 33.6° 9.5° 38.2°1 
-16.31 
(-4.97) 
-19.32 
(-5.89) 
10.14 -12.19 No 15.4° 120 
2 ft - 9.0 in. Upstream  from 
Centerline of Post No. 2 
9 23.9° 8.3° 39.8°1 
-13.06 
(-3.98) 
-17.59 
(-5.36) 
-8.98 -8.10 No 14.5° 180 
2 ft - 7.4 in. Downstream  
from Centerline of Post No. 3 
10 25.6° 7.5° 37.4°1 
-12.93 
(-3.94) 
-17.32 
(-5.28) 
-6.17 -8.69 No 12.0° 180 
2 ft - 6.8 in. Downstream  
from Centerline of Post No. 4  
Case 3 
7 16.3° 6.5° 37.6°1 
-16.90 
(-5.15) 
-19.49 
(-5.94) 
-6.42 -8.85 No 12.8° 130 
2 ft - 9.5 in. Upstream  from 
Centerline of Post No. 1  
8 15.6° 6.3° 40.9°1 
-14.96 
(-4.56) 
-18.67 
(-5.69) 
-9.15 -9.31 No 13.7° 130 
1 ft - 10.5 in. Upstream  from 
Centerline of Post No. 2 
9 25.6° 7.1° 39.0°1 
-13.58 
(-4.14) 
-18.37 
(-5.60) 
-7.45 -9.79 No 12.4° 120 
2 ft - 10.5 in. Upstream  from 
Centerline of Post No. 3 
10 25.8° 8.3° 38.8° 
-13.16 
(-4.01) 
-17.55 
(-5.35) 
-7.33 -9.39 No 11.9° 180 
2 ft - 6.8 in. Downstream  
from Centerline of Post No. 4  
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24.3 Critical Impact Location 
Once a critical attachment location was determined, the final portion of the CIP study 
was to find the worst-case impact location for use in a full-scale crash testing and evaluation 
program. Case 1 was chosen as the worst-case attachment location and was actually used in 
simulating the ten impacts for the nested-MGS configuration in Chapter 19. Therefore, the 
simulation results from the original ten impact locations were reviewed again to determine the 
CIP. Due to the vehicle behavior and occupant risk values being well below the MASH limits, 
maximum pocketing angles were primarily evaluated for the nested-MGS configuration. Impact 
location no. 9 had the highest pocketing angle of 18.1 degrees. Therefore, the general CIP region 
was selected near impact location no. 9, and further simulations were conducted at 18¾-in. (476 
mm) intervals (i.e., quarter-post spacings) between impact location nos. 8 and 10. The vehicle 
stability, occupant risk, and pocketing angle results for these additional impact locations are 
shown in Table 57. 
It was found that impact location no. 9 had the highest roll, pitch, yaw, longitudinal OIV, 
lateral ORA, and pocketing angle. Therefore, future full-scale crash testing of the nested-MGS 
configuration should utilize impact location no. 9 as the CIP. 
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Table 57. Simulation Results – Additional Critical Impact Point Investigation 
Impact 
Location 
Roll Pitch Yaw 
OIV 
ft/s 
(m/s) 
ORA 
g's 
Wheel 
Snag 
on 
PCBs? 
Pocketing 
Longitudinal Lateral Longitudinal Lateral 
Max. 
Angle 
Time Location 
8 25.3° 8.2° 40.0°
1
 
-16.63 
(-5.07) 
-18.80 
(-5.73) 
-7.08 -10.49 No 15.1° 120 
2 ft 9.0 in. Upstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 2 
8¼  22.2° 7.9° 40.6°
1
 
-15.55 
(-4.74) 
-18.57 
(-5.66) 
-11.62 -9.09 No 16.7° 140 
2 ft 9.0 in. Upstream from 
Centerline of Post No. 2 
8½  21.2° 8.0° 40.3°
1
 
-14.07 
(-4.29) 
-18.83 
(-5.74) 
-9.78 -9.47 No 16.7° 150 
2 ft 7.4 in. Downstream 
from Centerline of Post No. 
3 
8¾  18.7° 8.9° 42.1° 
-15.19 
(-4.63) 
-18.67 
(-5.69) 
-9.87 -8.84 No 17.6° 170 
2 ft 7.4 in. Downstream 
from Centerline of Post No. 
3 
9 28.7° 12.3° 43.0° 
-18.90 
(-5.76) 
-16.54 
(-5.04) 
-10.49 -12.08 No 18.1° 190 
2 ft 7.4 in. Downstream 
from Centerline of Post No. 
3 
9¼  22.3° 9.2° 41.3° 
-15.06 
(-4.59) 
-17.49 
(-5.33) 
-9.60 -8.97 No 15.1° 200 
1 ft 8.8 in. Downstream 
from Centerline of Post No. 
3 
9½  22.8° 8.0° 40.3° 
-15.22 
(-4.64) 
-19.26 
(-5.87) 
-6.82 -8.54 No 13.1° 210 
1 ft 8.8 in. Downstream 
from Centerline of Post No. 
3 
9¾  23.4° 8.1° 39.6°
1
 
-16.08 
(-4.90) 
-19.16 
(-5.84) 
-7.58 -9.36 No 12.7° 150 
1 ft 8.1 in. Downstream 
from Centerline of Post No. 
4 
10 25.0° 9.1°
1
 41.0° 
-16.34 
(-4.98) 
-16.90 
(-5.15) 
-9.20 -9.72 No 13.2° 170 
1 ft 8.1 in. Downstream 
from Centerline of Post No. 
4 
MASH 
Limits 
< 75° < 75° N/A 
≤ 40  
(12.2) 
≤ 40 
(12.2) 
≤ 20.49 ≤ 20.49 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1
Maximum value was not reached prior to conclusion of simulation 
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24.4 Minimum Length for PCB Installation 
For the prior LS-DYNA analyses, simulations were conducted using a PCB system 
configured with sixteen segments. Historically, F-shape PCB barrier systems have been 
simulated, tested, and evaluated using sixteen segments and with impact near the center of the 
system. Further, MwRSF researchers have previously recommended that eight barrier segments 
be installed upstream and downstream from this impact location, and thus it has become an 
unofficial length-of-need. Therefore, and for this study, a simulation was performed at the CIP 
(i.e. impact location no. 9) using eight PCB segments instead of thirteen downstream from the 
end-shoe attachment. For now, eight PCB segments would be the minimum downstream length-
of-need until further analysis or testing is conducted to demonstrate otherwise. The end-shoe was 
attached to the upstream end of the fourth PCB segment with three PCB segments extending 
upstream and behind the MGS. When considering eight PCBs installed downstream, a total of 
eleven PCB segments were used to configure the modified PCB installation. The simulation 
results, as shown in Table 58, yielded values that were very similar to the CIP investigation, 
which used sixteen PCB segments. The barrier system captured and redirected the 2270P pickup 
truck without vehicle snag on the PCB system. The vehicle stability indicators, occupant risk 
values, or pocketing angles did not exceed or come within 20% of the MASH or recommended 
limits.  
Table 58. Simulation Results – CIP Investigation with 11 PCBs – Impact Location No. 9 
Roll Pitch Yaw 
OIV 
ft/s 
(m/s) 
ORA 
g's 
Pocketing 
Longitudinal Lateral Longitudinal Lateral 
Max. 
Angle 
Time 
(ms) 
Location 
29.7° 8.7° 40.5° 
-15.26 
(-4.65) 
-18.21 
(-5.55) 
-7.33 -8.91 17.9° 190 
2 ft 7.4 in. Downstream 
from Centerline of Post 
No. 3 
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For the study, the longitudinal displacement of the eleventh and last (i.e. downstream) 
PCB segment in the eleven- and sixteen-PCB systems were recorded. The eleventh PCB segment 
displaced 1.7 in. (43 mm) longitudinally, while the sixteenth PCB segment displaced 2.7 in. (69 
mm) longitudinally in the sixteen PCB system. The eleventh PCB segment displaced 4.3 in. (109 
mm) longitudinally, in the eleven PCB system. This increased longitudinal displacement was not 
believed to adversely affect the performance of the nested-MGS transition system. Thus, an 
eleven PCB system was deemed suitable for future full-scale crash testing. 
Also considered for this study were the maximum rail forces at several locations 
throughout the length of the MGS. The locations and corresponding maximum rail forces are 
shown in Figure 87 and Table 59, respectively. The maximum rail force throughout the system 
was 60.9 kips (270.9 kN), which occurred just downstream of the impact location. The maximum 
rail force near the end-shoe attachment location was 51.2 kips (227.9 kN). These rail forces were 
tracked in order to aid in future connection design for blockouts to PCBs and for W-beam end-
shoes to PCBs.  
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Figure 87. Maximum Rail Force Locations 
Table 59. Maximum Rail Forces for CIP with 11 PCB Segments 
 
Location No. 
Maximum Rail 
Force  
kips (kN) 
1 (Through Anchor Cable) 26.9 (119.7) 
2 5.5 (24.5) 
3 27.5 (122.4) 
4 34.7 (154.4) 
5 55.2 (245.5) 
6 59.6 (265.2) 
7 60.9 (270.9) 
8 52.0 (231.1) 
9 50.9 (226.2) 
10 51.2 (227.9) 
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24.5 Reverse-Direction Impact Scenarios 
Previously, it was discussed that the primary transition consisted of guardrail extending 
up to PCBs, but that reverse-direction impacts should be considered within the scope of the 
project. When a preferred design alternative was selected, it was also deemed necessary to 
perform a simulation study on reverse-direction, TL-3 impacts with a 2270P vehicle into the 
transition system. Therefore, the nested MGS was subjected to reverse-direction impacts at seven 
locations, as shown in Figure 88. One impact scenario occurred at the end-shoe attachment, three 
locations occurred at 6-ft 3-in. (1,905 mm) centers upstream from the end-shoe attachment on the 
PCB system, and three locations occurred at 6-ft 3-in. (1,905 mm) centers downstream from the 
end-shoe attachment on the nested MGS. These seven impact locations were chosen in an 
attempt to encompass all portions of the system. 
 
Figure 88. Reverse-Direction Impact Scenarios 
24.5.1 Simulation Results 
The system captured and redirected the vehicle for all seven impact locations, and none 
of the vehicle stability values exceeded or were within 20% of, the MASH limits, as shown in 
Table 60. However, the lateral ORA for impact location no. 2 was 16.49 g’s, which was within 
20% of the MASH limit of 20.49 g’s. Upon further inspection, the lateral ORA was deemed 
unrealistic, likely due to the exaggerated stiffness of the vehicle’s rear suspension after the back 
end of the vehicle impacted the W-beam. This finding led to the determination that the MASH 
limits would not likely be exceeded.   
One concern with the reverse-direction impact scenario was that the vehicle could impact 
the PCB system and climb the face of the PCBs, thus increasing the propensity for the vehicle to 
4 3 2 1 
5 6 7 
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override the MGS or become unstable and roll over. While the vehicle did not override the MGS 
in any of the seven simulated impact locations, the time sequentials for impact location no. 2, as 
shown in Figure 89, depicted that this concern was not unfounded. At 100 ms, the vehicle had 
impacted the transition system and begun to climb the face of the PCB. By 200 ms, the vehicle 
had begun to interact with the MGS, and the bottom of the wheel was approximately at the 
height of the bottom of the nested MGS. However, by 300 ms, the vehicle had redirected, and 
MGS override was no longer a concern. These findings led to the determination that the nested-
MGS configuration would likely contain and redirect the test vehicle and meet TL-3 of MASH. 
Full-scale crash testing should be conducted in the reverse direction at impact location no. 2 due 
to the concern for system override. 
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Table 60. Simulation Results – Reverse-Direction Impact Scenarios 
Impact 
Location 
Roll Pitch Yaw 
OIV 
ft/s 
(m/s) 
ORA 
g's 
Longitudinal Lateral Longitudinal Lateral 
1 27.2° 25.8°
1
 33.9° 
-7.51 
(-2.29) 
14.67 
(4.47) 
-10.36 15.04 
2 34.3° 18.1° 32.2° 
-8.96 
(-2.73) 
17.78 
(5.42) 
-10.89 16.49 
3 25.7° 11.9° 36.7° 
-12.04 
(-3.67) 
15.87 
(4.84) 
11.63 11.95 
4 15.2° 12.9° 38.6° 
-17.29 
(-5.27) 
19.23 
(5.86) 
-10.68 5.87 
5 22.0° 10.1° 36.9° 
-17.55 
(-5.35) 
19.85 
(6.05) 
9.62 6.39 
6 29.4° 8.5° 36.8° 
-18.21 
(-5.55) 
-18.04 
(-5.50) 
-5.90 7.33 
7 16.9° 6.7° 37.3° 
-19.75 
(-6.02) 
17.75 
(5.41) 
-7.50 -7.20 
1
Maximum value was not reached prior to conclusion of simulation 
*Yellow cells denote values within 20% of MASH or recommended limits 
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                             0 ms                                                                  500 ms 
 
                            100 ms                                                                600 ms 
 
                            200 ms                                                                700 ms 
 
                            300 ms                                                                800 ms 
 
                            400 ms                                                                  900 ms 
 
Figure 89. Reverse-Direction Impact Sequentials, Impact Location No. 2 
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 SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 25
25.1 Summary and Conclusions 
The research objectives were to determine performance and design constraints and to 
develop a stiffness transition between PCBs and W-beam guardrail that will significantly 
improve safety for the motoring public and workers within construction zones. The stiffness 
transition was designed and simulated according to the AASHTO MASH Test Level 3 impact 
safety standards. Design concepts were developed and refined through the use of LS-DYNA 
computer simulation.  
Prior to conducting the simulation effort, TAC members provided several design 
constraints for which the transition should be configured. The modified G4(1S) guardrail was 
preferred for use, since it represented the current guardrail standard in Nebraska, which would 
allow for a simpler retrofit to PCBs. In order to limit damage to the roadway surface and reduce 
installation time, it was preferred that the PCBs remain free-standing and not be anchored or 
pinned to the roadway surface. Since PCB placement may occur on compacted, crushed 
limestone, concrete, or asphalt, all three base conditions deserve to be considered for the design 
concepts and subjected to a full-scale crash testing program. Soil grading and terrain were also 
considered. If PCBs were to be placed on native soil, a minimum lateral width of 4 ft (1,219 mm) 
of compacted, crushed limestone should be used, or similar, behind the PCB installation due to 
concerns of PCBs settling or gouging into soft or saturated, native soil.  
25.1.1 Design Concept Development 
Within these constraints, design concepts were developed and presented to the TAC 
members. Ease of installation and simplicity were high on the list of priorities. Thus, all of the 
design concepts were presented in their simplest form, although several potential configurations 
were presented and may be required in order to improve system performance. The potential 
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configurations included: a transition to thrie beam, removal of posts in front of PCBs, a blocked 
connection between rail and PCBs, a cantilever beam attached to the most upstream PCB, 
nesting of rail, blockouts from the back of posts to the PCBs, and blockouts from the back of 
posts to a cantilever beam. Five design concepts were originally presented to the TAC members 
for consideration, as denoted in Chapter 3. The pros and cons for each concept were weighed, 
and design concepts were ranked based on feasibility, ease of installation, and likelihood of 
success, as denoted below: 
(1) Flared PCB–Modified G4(1S), 
(2) Parallel PCB–Modified G4(1S), 
(3) Beam Attachment Between PCB and Modified G4(1S), 
(4) PCB Offset from Modified G4(1S), and 
(5) Stiffened PCB and Modified G4(1S). 
These rankings served as a guide for making system decisions during the simulation 
process. Due to project constraints and sponsor priorities, only the first two design concepts and 
subsequent configurations for each were simulated in the initial study. The results are discussed 
below. 
25.1.2 Flared PCB–Modified G4(1S) 
The Flared PCB–Modified G4(1S) design concept used a W-beam end-shoe to attach the 
modified G4(1S) directly to the 15H:1V flared F-shape PCB system. Simulation results quickly 
showed that the rail height of the modified G4(1S) was inadequate to safely capture and redirect 
the vehicle. Thus, a transition to thrie beam was utilized in all of the following configurations, 
which showed a higher propensity for vehicle capture and redirection. Other configurations were 
considered to alleviate post wedging against PCBs, slow initiation of PCB displacement, and 
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high pocketing angles. Five configurations were simulated for the Flared PCB–Modified G4(1S) 
design concept, and the results were analyzed, compared, and ranked, as shown below: 
(1) Nested Thrie Beam with Fully-Blocked Rail, 
(2) Thrie Beam with Fully-Blocked Rail and Cantilever Beam, 
(3) Thrie Beam End-Shoe, 
(4) Thrie Beam with Fully-Blocked Rail, and 
(5) W-Beam End-Shoe. 
25.1.3 Parallel PCB–Modified G4(1S) 
When the Parallel PCB–Modified G4(1S) design concept was presented to the TAC 
members, it depicted the modified G4(1S) guardrail attached to the 15H:1V flared PCB system, 
with two PCB segments placed parallel to and behind the modified G4(1S). The posts of the 
modified G4(1S) remained in front of the PCBs. These posts were intended to initiate PCB 
displacement through rotation. Based on the results from the Flared PCB–Modified G4(1S) 
design concept, and using engineering judgment, modifications were made to this design. The 
rail height of the modified G4(1S) proved incapable of vehicle capture and redirection, and it 
was transitioned to thrie beam. Also, the single thrie beam yielded high pocketing angles, and 
nested thrie beam was installed ahead of the PCB system. Also, posts in front of the PCBs 
showed a tendency to wedge against the PCBs and cause vehicle instabilities and elevated 
occupant risk values. Thus, all of the posts in front of the PCBs were removed, and blockouts 
were installed in their place. The PCBs-behind-nested thrie beam configuration yielded two 
longitudinal ORAs that were marginal but with acceptable vehicle stability and pocketing angles. 
A cantilever beam was installed on the most upstream PCB to investigate if it would improve 
safety performance. The PCBs-behind-nested thrie beam-with-cantilever beam configuration 
yielded values similar to the previous configuration in vehicle behavior, occupant risk, and 
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pocketing angles. Based on these results, the Parallel PCB–Modified G4(1S) configurations were 
analyzed and ranked, as shown below: 
(1) PCBs Behind Nested Thrie Beam and 
(2) PCBs Behind Nested Thrie Beam with Cantilever Beam 
25.1.4 Design Concept Summary 
The results from the Flared PCB–Modified G4(1S) and the Parallel PCB–Modified 
G4(1S) design concepts and subsequent configurations were presented to the TAC members for 
consideration. The pros and cons for each configuration were considered, and TAC members 
determined that several of the configurations were too complex with a transition to thrie beam, 
installation and fabrication of a cantilever beam, and/or nesting of the rail.  Based on the 
simulation finding that the rail height of the modified G4(1S) was inadequate to capture the 
vehicle, TAC members advised the use of the Midwest Guardrail System (MGS) in lieu of the 
modified G4(1S). It was predicted that the taller MGS would improve vehicle capture and 
redirection without the need to transition from W-beam to thrie beam. 
25.1.5 Flared PCB–MGS  
The Flared PCB–MGS design concept was similar to the Flared PCB–Modified G4(1S) 
design concept, except that a taller MGS system was now attached to the 15H:1V flared PCB 
system. Although the modified G4(1S) had indicated that posts in front of PCBs would lead to 
wedging of posts against PCBs, the taller rail height of the MGS was believed capable of 
capturing the vehicle and reduce vehicle instabilities, so two posts remained in front of the PCBs. 
Posts were removed when they interfered with placement of PCBs, and blockouts were installed 
in their place. Simulation results for the MGS-end-shoe configuration indicated that occupant 
risk values were high due to vehicle snag, and pocketing angles were high for impact locations 
upstream from the PCB system. Several configurations were considered to alleviate high 
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occupant risk values, pocketing angles, and slow initiation of PCB displacement. Seven 
configurations were simulated for the Flared PCB–MGS design concept, and the results were 
analyzed, compared, and ranked, as shown below: 
(1) MGS with Nested W-Beam, 
(2) MGS with Fully-Blocked Rail and Cantilever Beam, 
(3) MGS with Cantilever Beam, 
(4) MGS End-Shoe Connection, 
(5) MGS with Blockout to Cantilever Beam, 
(6) MGS with Fully-Blocked Rail, and 
(7) MGS with Blockouts Behind Posts. 
25.1.6 Design Selection 
After simulation of the three design concepts, the results were compared against each 
other, and the configurations were ranked within each design concept. These rankings were 
presented to the TAC members for consideration, and a unanimous decision was reached to 
move forward with the nested-MGS configuration. This decision was made based on the 
simulation results, which indicated that all of the vehicle behavior values, occupant risk values, 
and pocketing angles were well below the MASH or recommended limits for all impact 
locations. No other configuration yielded similar results, which provided confidence that the 
nested MGS would meet the MASH TL-3 impact safety standards. Also, the TAC members were 
pleased with the ease of installation as it would not require any new components other than a few 
brackets for supporting or attaching blockouts to the face of the PCBs. 
25.1.7 CIP Study 
The final portion of this study was to conduct a simulation effort to find the CIP for the 
selected design alternative for later use in the full-scale crash testing program. This process was 
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completed through a number of steps. First, the nested MGS was subjected to impacts near the 
end-shoe connection to ensure that the vehicle would be safely captured and redirected for 
impacts on the 15H:1V flared PCB system alone. The results indicated that the vehicle was 
safely captured and redirected for all five impact locations near the end-shoe.  
The next portion of the CIP study was to determine the critical attachment location 
between the nested MGS and the PCB system. It was determined that a minimum of three PCB 
segments should be installed behind and upstream from the nested MGS that is attached to the 
PCB system in order to provide adequate longitudinal barrier tension to capture and redirect the 
vehicle, as well as to prevent vehicle snag on the upstream end of the PCB system. Thus, the 
critical attachment location should occur on the fourth PCB segment. Three attachment locations 
were simulated for investigating the critical attachment location. These locations included: (1) 
the end-shoe attached to the upstream end of the fourth PCB to allow for the minimum PCB 
length behind the MGS; (2) the end-shoe attached toward the center of the fourth PCB segment, 
such that one more post upstream of the PCB system would just miss the most upstream PCB 
segment upon rotation; and (3) the end-shoe attached toward the center of the fourth PCB 
segment, but such that the one more post upstream of the PCB system would impact the most 
upstream PCB upon rotation. Each attachment location was simulated at four impact locations 
near the upstream end of the PCB system. The results indicated that the first attachment location, 
corresponding to a minimum PCB length behind the MGS, provided the most critical attachment 
location. 
The next part of the CIP study was to find the critical impact location. The simulation 
results presented in Chapter 19 indicated that impact location no. 9 yielded some of the higher 
occupant risk values and the highest pocketing angle. Thus, it was determined that the CIP would 
be near impact location no. 9, and the nested-MGS configuration was subjected to impacts at 
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18¾-in. (476 mm) centers between impact location nos. 8 and 10. Based on the simulation 
results, impact location no. 9 still yielded the highest pocketing angle and several of the occupant 
risk values. Therefore, the CIP was determined to occur at impact location no. 9. 
Researchers wanted to refine the system even further to recommend the shortest design. 
Therefore, a simulation effort was conducted to investigate a reduced-length PCB installation. 
The original configuration for testing and evaluation of the F-shape PCB system used a sixteen-
PCB system with impacts near the center of the installation. In order to investigate a reduced 
length, three PCBs were upstream and eight PCBs were installed downstream from the end-shoe 
attachment to the PCB system, thus resulting in a total of eleven PCBs. This nested-MGS-with-
reduced-length PCB installation was impacted at the CIP location. Results indicated that the 
nested-MGS configuration was not adversely affected with the minimum PCB installation.  
The final portion of the CIP study was to investigate reverse-direction impacts into the 
nested-MGS transition system. The nested MGS was subjected to reverse-direction impacts at 
seven locations spaced on 6-ft 3-in. (1,905 mm) centers upstream from the end-shoe attachment 
through 6-ft 3-in. (1,905 mm) centers downstream from the end-shoe attachment, including one 
impact at the end-shoe attachment. The simulation results indicated that the vehicle was safely 
captured and redirected for all seven impact locations. However, the reverse-direction 
simulations indicated that a future full-scale crash testing program should include an evaluation 
at impact location no. 2. First, it showed the most vehicle climb on the PCB system. Second, a 
vehicle wheel was near the top of the MGS and could lead to MGS override. 
25.2 Recommendations 
A second phase of the research project will focus on the final design, fabrication, and 
full-scale crash testing of the TL-3 transition between MGS guardrail and F-shaped PCBs. It is 
anticipated that three full-scale crash tests would be required to fully evaluate the transition 
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system. These crash tests would include MASH test designation nos. 3-20 and 3-21, which are 
used to evaluate the barrier transition with a 1100C small car and a 2270P pickup truck, 
respectively. In addition, it is anticipated that a reverse-direction impact according to test 
designation no. 3-21 would be used with the 2270P test vehicle to evaluate the transition when 
installed in two-way traffic applications.  
Based on this research, the nested-MGS configuration was recommended for evaluation 
using a full-scale crash testing program. In addition, the nested MGS should use an attachment 
location configured per Case 1, which represented the minimum PCB length behind the MGS. 
Also, the W-beam end-shoe should be attached to the upstream end of the fourth PCB segment 
with three PCB segments extending behind the nested MGS. A minimum of five 12-ft 6-in. 
(3,810 mm) long, W-beam sections should be nested upstream from the end-shoe. For testing 
purposes, the transition should consist of at least a twenty-five post MGS system and an eleven 
segment PCB system at a 15H:1V flare. The critical impact point should occur at impact location 
no. 9 (i.e., the centerline of the fifth guardrail post upstream from the end-shoe attachment) for 
test designation no. 3-21. The reverse-direction test scenario should use impact location no. 2 
(i.e., 12 ft – 6 in. (3,810 mm) longitudinally upstream from the end-shoe attachment) for test 
designation no. 3-21.  
A simulation effort involving impacts with the 1100C small car was not conducted. As 
noted in Chapter 5, the 2270P test vehicle was deemed more critical than the 1100C small car for 
the concept development phase, due to the likelihood of increased barrier deflections, rail and 
anchor loads, rail pocketing, and wheel snag. Therefore, test designation no. 3-20 for the full-
scale crash testing program should use MASH procedures for determining a critical impact point. 
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25.2.1 Future Research 
The current nested-MGS model utilized simplified connections between the blockouts 
and PCBs. The blockout bolts were attached directly to the face of the PCB segments, which 
would not be possible in the actual configuration. Thus, design of the actual connection must be 
completed in order to properly attach the blockouts to the PCBs. Also, an attachment wedge was 
used to rigidly attach the W-beam end-shoe to the face of the PCB, which may be challenging in 
the actual configuration. Thus, a connection must be designed between the W-beam end-shoe 
and the PCB. 
Upon completion of a full-scale vehicle crash testing program, further validation and 
refinement of the nested-MGS model is recommended. While this overall transition 
configuration utilized two different systems that had been separately validated using results from 
full-scale crash testing, their dynamic impact behaviors when connected to one another have not 
been validated. When this physical test data becomes available, an opportunity will exist to 
improve the accuracy of the FEA barrier model. 
Throughout the simulation process, a number of modeling difficulties were encountered. 
These difficulties, along with remedies, were documented and compiled. Examples and a further 
explanation may be found in Appendix C. 
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Appendix A. PCB Evaluation Results 
The results from NCAC’s computer simulation study that were used to evaluate the 
performance of PCB systems are found in this appendix. The results include ride-down 
acceleration, ride-down velocity, barrier rotation angle, and barrier displacement. The results are 
compiled by barrier type: F-shape, New Jersey safety-shape, single slope, vertical shape, and 
inverted shape. 
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Figure A-1. F-Shape PCB Evaluation [7] 
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Figure A-2. New Jersey Shape PCB Evaluation [7] 
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Figure A-3. Single Slope PCB Evaluation [7]
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Figure A-4. Vertical Shape PCB Evaluation [7]  
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Figure A-5. Inverted Shape PCB Evaluation [7] 
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Appendix B. W-Beam Guardrail Deflections 
The results from TTI’s guardrail deflection study are found in this appendix. The results 
include testing agency, system description, maximum permanent and dynamic deflections, and 
working width. 
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Table B-1. W-Beam Guardrail Deflections [18] 
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Table B-2. W-Beam Guardrail Deflections, Cont. [18] 
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Table B-3. W-Beam Guardrail Deflections, Cont. [18] 
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Table B-4. W-Beam Guardrail Deflections, Cont. [18] 
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Table B-5. W-Beam Guardrail Deflections, Cont. [18] 
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Table B-6. W-Beam Guardrail Deflections, Cont. [18] 
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Appendix C. Modeling Difficulties 
Fender Penetration 
On several occasions, the left-front fender of the Chevrolet Silverado pickup model 
penetrated the rail section upon impact, as shown in Figure C-1. This penetration caused the fender 
to become snagged behind the rail section, which caused a spike in the total energy of the system, as 
shown in Figure C-2. 
 
 
Figure C-1. Fender Penetration 
 
Figure C-2. Global Energy Plot 
Fender Penetration 
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In order to alleviate the fender penetration issues, the DT2MS in the 
*CONTROL_TIMESTEP card was reduced from -1.112e-03 to -0.800e-03 for each occurrence. 
Reducing this time step eliminated the spike in total energy, and there were no longer any fender 
penetration concerns. 
Blockout Modeling 
The blockouts that were used in transition modeling were comprised of solid elements with 
a material definition of *MAT_ELASTIC. As previously noted, due to complex fracture mechanics 
of wood material, an LS-DYNA model that accurately reflects the fracture of wood has not been 
developed. This lack of failure caused deformations of the rail that likely would not occur in actual 
testing, as shown in Figure C-3. This unrealistic behavior was noted for affected simulations. 
 
Figure C-3.  Localized Kinking Between Oversize Blockouts 
Blockout Connection to PCBs 
A simplified connection of blockouts to PCBs was modeled using a discrete element 
connection similar to other bolted connections in the MGS model. The discrete elements were 
modeled to connect directly to the face of the PCB segment, as shown in Figure C-4. This 
simplified connection would not be possible in actual testing, so further research is necessary to 
develop a connection or bracket between blockouts and PCBs prior to full-scale crash testing. 
 
Figure C-4.  Blockout Connection to PCBs 
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W-Beam End-Shoe Attachment to PCBs 
Similarly, the W-beam end-shoe attachment was modeled as a simplified connection. An 
actual W-beam end-shoe could likely be bolted directly to the face of the F-shape PCB segment. 
However, due to the sloped face of the F-shape PCB in combination with limitations in modeling 
capabilities, a small attachment wedge was required, as shown in Figure C-5. The attachment wedge 
was constrained to the PCB segment using *CONSTRAINED_RIGID_BODIES due to the rigid 
material formulation of both the PCB segment and the attachment wedge. Since the W-beam end-
shoe was a deformable material, it was constrained to the attachment wedge using 
*CONSTRAINED_EXTRA_NODE_SET. A failure criterion was not defined for either of these 
constraint definitions. The attachment wedge and constraints would not be necessary in actual 
testing, so further research is necessary to develop a connection between the W-beam end-shoe and 
PCB prior to full-scale crash testing. 
 
Figure C-5. W-Beam End-Shoe Attachment 
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